Some significant conroversies and conflicts did arise. Perhaps especially important in that regard was the official invitation issued by N.A.T.O. on July 8, 1997, to Poland, the Czech Republic (Slovakia had Seceded from Czechoslovakia), and Hungary to join the alliance by 1999. (The three countries became members of N.A.T.O. on March 19, 1999). Judged, with some reason - especially with a view to a still further future expansion of N.A.T.O. - to be anti-Russian as well as unnecessary by the Russians, this move produced a strong negative reaction in Russia, mitigated to some extent by certain "special arrangements" instituted between the Russian Federation and N.A.T.O. Russia disagreed with the United States and other Western countries on many issues. This, however, no longer represented the dreaded confrontation of the communist and the free worlds. Indeed, in numerous matters, whether related to Bosnia or to Iraq, France, for example, often stood closer to Russia than to the United States.
The Kosovo tragedy, however, and in particular the aerial assault on Yugoslavia, beginning on the twenty-fourth of March, by the United States and other members of N.A.T.O., came as a tremendous shock to the Russians who were outraged by that unexpected attack on a sovereign, Orthodox and Slavic state. The liberals, who had put their trust in the West, were probably even more upset than the nationalists, the conservatives and the communists. A notable exception were the people of Islamic background inhabiting the Russian federation, such as the Tartars, who came out strongly in support of the victimized Moslem Albanians of Kosovo. In line with the popular outcry, the Russian government denounced the N.A.T.O. aggression and highlighted its opposition by such gestures as Primakov's turning back in the air on the way to a conference in Washington, once N.A.T.O. bombs began to fall, and a refusal of Russia to attend as a guest the celebration by N.A.T.O. of its fiftieth anniversary. Still, Yeltsin and his government maintained essential ties with the West, and indeed tried to borrow as much more money as they could from the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, continuous aerial bombardment as well as quite possibly Russian efforts at negotiation made Milosevic finally give in to N.A.T.O., and peace was established in Kosovo in the second half of June. Russia went on to participate - not without new tensions - in the occupation and the restoration of the devastated area. On the whole its international position improved because of its role in the Kosovo tragedy, with, in particular, promises of more Western financial help. And it had a new government, headed by another veteran of the establishment, Sergei Stepashin. Many observers believed that Yeltsin dismissed Primakov because he found the prime minister too popular and too independent.
Society, Religion, Culture
The years of Yeltsin's presidential rule, so obviously transitional in economics and politics, were no less fluid and even chaotic in social terms. Some of the
major changes that then occurred are probably irreversible. Thus, in direct contrast to the former command economy, some 80 per cent of industry and business became privatized. Privatization, aptly stigmatized by the Russians as prikhvatization (privatizatsiia-prikhvatizattsiia the latter word meaning snatching, or grabbing), together with certain other developments mentioned above, led to a sudden appearance of an extremely rich upper layer of Russian society. And, although such "oligarchs" as Berezovsky or Gusinsky were few, they constituted the uppermost level of the newly thriving class of bankers, speculators, and businessmen, with their attendant staffs and followers. It has been estimated that as much as one-third of the inhabitants of Moscow had already switched to the new capitalist key. Elsewhere in Russia this advance of capitalism was in general much slower, but it could be at least detected, and to it, presumably, belonged the future. The new entrepreneurs proceeded to discover rich opportunities and to prosper, even when the bulk of the population suffered. Yet the financial collapse in August 1998 put them too and their prospects in question.
Below them everything went almost unremittingly badly. As already emphasized, the government failed to pay its employees in offices, schools, hospitals, and even in the army and in the prison system, as well as the pensioneers, with the arrears mounting. People survived by moonlighting, frequently holding several jobs at the same time, cultivating garden plots for food, selling what little they had at markets and street corners, and obtaining when possible help from relatives. Industrial workers and miners could not collect their pay and were further threatened by the obsolescence and likely closure or at least revamping and streamlining of their factories and mines. In contrast, for example, to communist China, and plagued by the weakness of the related infrastructure and communication networks, an individualistic peasantry failed to develop. Crime, alcoholism, and illnesses took their toll. In fact, corruption and mafia-style crime have been highlighted by many observers as main obstacles to a successful economic and social evolution of Russia. And throughout the Yeltsin years the country was losing its citizens, often the ablest ones, whether mathematicians or ice hockey players, to a massive migration abroad.
One institution that profited enormously from the fall of communism and has continued to grow and prosper has been the patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church. Of course, all religions and all denominations had reason to celebrate the end of communism, which intended to exterminate them. Whereas only Albania and the Campuchea of the Khmer Rouges declared that program accomplished, other communist states, the Soviet Union very much included, could not be faulted for not trying. Recently available sources underline Lenin's personal hatred for and desire to destroy Orthodox priests and other proponents of the Church, quite in accord with the official ideology and attitude to be continued by his successors. Religion as such was the main enemy, and it is impossible to decide whether the massacre of the Russian priests or of the Buddhist lamas in Outer Mongolia, formally not even part of the Soviet Union, was more horrible.
But because of its importance, size, and geographic extent, Russian Orthodoxy was the greatest sufferer, with uncounted martyrs. It survived, as outlined in preceding chapters, because of the unexpectedly strong support of the faithful, because when total destruction failed, the government instituted a certain compromise accepted by the patriarchal Church, because of the national rally during the Second World War, and other special circumstances. With the fall of communism the Church suddenly emerged from what has been described as the greatest religious persecution in human history to a central and privileged position. At present the Church is favored by Yeltsin and by almost all political parties and groupings, with even Zyuganov and his communists proclaiming that they no longer opposed religion. Its expanding membership includes perhaps one-third of the Russian people, although many of them do not regularly attend services. What is more, repeated polls indicate that the population has a higher regard for and more confidence in the Church than in anything else in the country, be it the government, the armed forces, or the political parties. The Russian Orthodox Church has a fine position and excellent prospects, but it also has many problems.