The rise of Moscow was a fundamental development in Russian history. The ultimate success of the northeastern principality meant the end of the appanage period and the establishment of a centralized state, and the particular character of Muscovite government and society affected the evolution of Russia for centuries to come. Yet, while the role of Moscow proved to be in the end overwhelming, its ability to attain this role long remained subject to doubt and thus its success needs a thorough explanation. Moscow, after all, began with very little and for a long time could not be compared to such flourishing principalities as Novgorod or Galicia. Even in its own area, the northeast, it started as a junior not only to old centers like Rostov and Suzdal but also to Vladimir, and it defeated Tver in a long struggle which it appeared several times to have lost. Written sources, on their part, indicate the surprise of contemporaries at the unexpected emergence of Moscow. In explaining the rise of Moscow, historians have emphasized several factors, or rather groups of factors, many of which have already become apparent in our brief narrative.
First, attention may be given to the doctrine of geographical causation which represents both one of the basic and one of the earliest explanations offered, having already been fully developed by S. Soloviev. It stresses the decisive importance of the location of Moscow for the later expansion of the Muscovite state and includes several lines of argument. Moscow lay at the crossing of three roads. The most important was the way from Kiev and the entire declining south to the growing northeast. In fact, Moscow has been described as the first stopping and settling point in the northeast. But it also profited from movements in other directions, including the reverse. Thus, it seems, immigrants came to Moscow after the Mongol devastation of the lands further to the northeast. Moscow is also situated on a bend of the Moscow river, which flows from the northwest to the southeast into the Oka, the largest western tributary of the Volga. To speak more broadly of water communications which span and unite European Russia, Moscow had the rare fortune of being located near the headwaters of four major rivers: the Oka, the Volga, the Don, and the Dnieper. This offered marvelous opportunities for expansion across the flowing plain, especially as there were no mountains or other natural obstacles to hem in the young principality.
In another sense too Moscow benefited from a central position. It stood in the midst of lands inhabited by the Russian, and especially the Great Russian, people, which, so the argument runs, provided a proper setting for a natural growth in all directions. In fact, some specialists have tried
to estimate precisely how close to the geographic center of the Russian people Moscow was situated, noting also such circumstances as its proximity to the line dividing the two main dialects of the Great Russian language. Central location within Russia, to make an additional point, cushioned Moscow from outside invaders. Thus, for example, it was Novgorod, not Moscow, that continuously had to meet enemies from the northwest, while in the southeast Riazan absorbed the first blows, a most helpful situation in the case of Tamerlane's invasion and on some other occasions. All in all, the considerable significance of the location of Moscow for the expansion of the Muscovite state cannot be denied, although this geographic factor certainly is not the only one and indeed has generally been assigned less relative weight by recent scholars.
The economic argument is linked in part to the geographic. The Moscow river served as an important trade artery, and as the Muscovite principality expanded along its waterways it profited by and in turn helped to promote increasing economic intercourse. Soviet historians in particular treated the expansion of Moscow largely in terms of the growth of a common market. Another economic approach emphasizes the success of the Muscovite princes in developing agriculture in their domains and supporting colonization. These princes, it is asserted, clearly outdistanced their rivals in obtaining peasants to settle on their lands, their energetic activities ranging from various inducements to free farmers to the purchase of prisoners from the Mongols. As a further advantage, they managed to maintain in their realm a relative peace and security highly beneficial to economic life.
The last view introduces another key factor in the problem of the Muscovite rise: the role of the rulers of Moscow. Moscow has generally been considered fortunate in its princes, and in a number of ways. Sheer luck constituted a part of the picture. For several generations the princes of Moscow, like the Capetian kings who united France, had the advantage of continuous male succession without interruption or conflict. In particular, for a long time the sons of the princes of Moscow were lucky not to have uncles competing for the Muscovite seat. When the classic struggle between "the uncles" and "the nephews" finally erupted in the reign of Basil II, direct succession from father to son possessed sufficient standing and support in the principality of Moscow to overcome the challenge. The princedom has also been considered fortunate because its early rulers, descending from the youngest son of Alexander Nevskii and thus representing a junior princely branch, found it expedient to devote themselves to their small appanage instead of neglecting it for more ambitious undertakings elsewhere.
It is generally believed that the policies of the Muscovite princes made a major and massive contribution to the rise of Moscow. From Ivan Kalita to Ivan III and Basil III these rulers stood out as "the gatherers of the
Russian land," as skillful landlords, managers, and businessmen, as well as warriors and diplomats. They all acted effectively even though, for a long time, on a petty scale. Kliuchevsky distinguishes five main Muscovite methods of obtaining territory: purchase, armed seizure, diplomatic seizure with the aid of the Golden Horde, service agreements with appanage princes, and the settlement by Muscovite population of the lands beyond the Volga. The relative prosperity, good government, peace, and order prevalent in the Muscovite principality attracted increasingly not only peasants but also, a fact of great importance, boyars, as well as members of other classes, to the growing grand princedom.
To be sure, not every policy of the Muscovite rulers contributed to the rise of Moscow. For example, they followed the practice of the appanage period in dividing their principality among their sons. Yet in this respect too they gained by comparison with other princedoms. In the Muscovite practice the eldest son of a grand prince received a comparatively larger share of the inheritance, and his share grew relatively, as well as absolutely, with time. Thus, Dmitrii Donskoi left his eldest son one-third of his total possessions, Basil II left his eldest one-half, and Ivan III left his eldest three-fourths. Furthermore, the eldest son became, of course, grand prince and thus had a stronger position in relation to his brothers than was the case with other appanage rulers. Gradually the right to coin money and to negotiate with foreign powers came to be restricted to the grand prince.
The development of the Muscovite state followed the pattern mentioned earlier in our general discussion of the northeast: in a relatively primitive society and a generally fluid and shifting situation, the prince became increasingly important as organizer and owner as well as ruler - with little distinction among his various capacities - while other elements of the Kievan political system declined and even atrophied. We know, for instance, that Basil Veliaminov, the last Muscovite tysiatskii, died in 1374 and that thenceforth that office was abolished. The Muscovite "gathering of Russia," while it was certainly a remarkable achievement, also reflected the trend of the time. The very extent of the division of Russia in the appanage period paved the way for the reverse process, because most principalities proved to be too small and weak to offer effective resistance to a centralizing force. After Moscow triumphed in the northeast, in the old principality of Vladimir-Suzdal, it had to deal with only two other major Russian lands, those of Novgorod and of Riazan, the rest having already been absorbed by the expanding Lithuanian-Russian state.