In the glory days of the Soviet Union, the KGB dispatched professionals and undercover ‘illegals’ to carry out extra-judicial murders – known in the spy trade as ‘wet jobs’. Lugovoi and Kovtun’s mission to London was supposed to be exactly such an operation: ruthless, clinical, undetectable – an iron fist concealed in a velvet glove. It was to be done in the best traditions of the Cheka, the counter-revolutionary police force founded by Felix Dzerzhinsky, Lenin’s friend. Dzerzhinsky’s statuette with its cold, pinched features sat in Putin’s office.
But, despite a resurgence under Putin, Russia’s spy agencies had suffered the same degradation that had blighted all Russian institutions – the presidency, Russia’s parliament or Duma, medicine, science and technology. Critics said the country, despite its great power pretensions, was slowly dying. Its modern assassins were a shambolic lot.
The idea was that nobody would notice the visiting Russians. Once they had poisoned their victim they would escape back to Moscow, leaving few ripples on the busy surface of London life. Their target, of course, would die horribly. But the Kremlin’s hand would be hidden. The British would mark his death down as a baffling case of gastro-enteritis and those who carried out the murder would return to a life of shadowy anonymity. And, one imagines, reward. The payment for murder, Kovtun hinted, was a Moscow flat.
It didn’t quite work out like that. Russia’s poisoning project, when finally accomplished, would prompt a British public inquiry costing millions of pounds. One that examined the masses of evidence collected by the Metropolitan Police, from hotels, restaurants, car seats – even from a bronze phallus at a nightclub visited by the assassins in Soho. Scotland Yard was able to reconstruct minute by minute the events leading up to the murder. Its investigation – made public more than eight years later – was one of the most extensive in criminal history.
Yet despite this exposure there were soon to be other victims – opponents felled in murky circumstances abroad or, like the opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, killed outside the very gates of the Kremlin. Moscow would send tanks across borders, start a war in Europe, and annex a large chunk of neighbouring territory. Its proxies – or possibly Russian servicemen – would blow a civilian plane out of the sky.
The common theme here was contempt: a poisonous disregard for human life. For Vladimir Putin’s critics have an uncanny habit of turning up dead.
1
Mafia State
Russia, 1988–1999
‘You realise, of course, that you can be poisoned here and we cannot really help you?’
In September 2006, in London, the exiled Litvinenko put the finishing touches to a secret report. It was explosive stuff. The subject was Viktor Ivanov, one of Vladimir Putin’s closest friends and top advisers. Ivanov was a career KGB officer, the head of Russia’s powerful federal anti-narcotics agency, and one of very few people who had ‘direct access’ to the ear of the president.
Ivanov – so the report alleged – was also a vindictive, sociopathic ‘monster’, with long-standing links to the St Petersburg mafia. This mafia in turn did business with Colombian drug-smugglers. Putin, so the report said, had connections with the same mafia gang in what was Russia’s most criminalised city. He even advised the board of one of the mafia’s front companies.
The report included colourful details about Ivanov’s biography. According to Litvinenko, he’d been a mediocre spy. While his colleagues were sent on important overseas missions, Ivanov had been shuffled into the human resources department of Leningrad’s KGB office – ‘a sort of dump place’, as the report put it, and ‘the dead and gloomy end of a professional career’. It continued: ‘Other KGB men treated human resources people with contempt.’
In human resources, however, Ivanov made useful discoveries. He found himself well placed to collect compromising information on his KGB comrades. He could use this kompromat to destroy other people’s careers. Ivanov also developed a set of personal operational rules that would allow him to thrive in the KGB. And to overleap his more able but less crafty co-workers. His two years serving in Afghanistan – invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979 – confirmed to Ivanov the efficacy of these insights.
Rule one: it was important never to come up with an initiative in the KGB. If you did you’d be asked to implement it and then punished for not doing it successfully. According to the report, Ivanov was silent in meetings. He transformed himself into ‘a sort of professional Mr Nobody’. Rule two: he realised it was necessary to suck up to anybody more senior in the KGB’s hierarchy – to recognise who had ‘more rights in a bureaucratic sense’. The boss was always right.
Ivanov’s rise coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and followed a late-1980s order from the KGB’s top brass to go into business. At the time, the only people who understood the free market were criminals. Ivanov established relations with the Tambovskaya crime gang and its leader Viktor Kumarin, a villain with a mop of dark hair and a neat moustache. Kumarin was then embroiled in a major turf war with his rival Alexander Malyshev, and Malyshev’s gangster army.
The prize was control of St Petersburg’s seaport. The port was a major trans-shipment facility for Colombian drugs, which arrived here before continuing their lucrative journey to Western Europe. According to Litvinenko, Ivanov helped Kumarin wipe out the competition. In return, he got a share of the seaport’s business. The Tambovskaya group structured its criminal activities via a series of subsidiaries and daughter companies; Ivanov set up firms of his own, ‘Block’ and ‘Basis’.
It was the early 1990s. Another KGB spy helped Ivanov. This was Vladimir Putin. Officially, he was no longer with the kontora – as the KGB styled itself. Instead, he was working for St Petersburg’s new mayor, Anatoly Sobchak. As every recruit knew, though, hardly anybody ever quite leaves the KGB. The two spies, Ivanov and Putin, had something else in common: the KGB had marked them down as second-raters, mediocrities unfit for high office, something they must have resented.
Litvinenko’s report said: ‘Ironically, while Ivanov was cooperating with the gangsters, he was promoted to the operational department of [the] fight against smuggling and became its boss. His former subordinates described him as a monster boss – rude, authoritative and stubborn. It was a time when the line between the law enforcement officers and professional criminals was often very thin.’
The next paragraph reads: ‘While Ivanov was cooperating with gangsters, he was protected by Vladimir Putin, who was responsible for foreign economic relations at the office of St Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak.’ It adds: ‘Putin was himself not Mr Clean at that time.’
This was something of an understatement. Links between Putin and the criminal underworld turned up in all sorts of places. The report quoted leaked tape-recordings made in 2000 of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s then-president, who said his own spy agency had got hold of documents concerning a German company named SPAG that was a front for criminal activities. Its main job was ‘laundering [the] money of a Colombian drug cartel by buying out real estate in St Petersburg’. Kumarin, the gangster, sat on the board of a SPAG daughter company. Putin, in the mayor’s office, was SPAG’s adviser.