Читать онлайн "After the Sheikhs : The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies" - Davidson Christopher Michael - RuLit

Overall, the new British-influenced political and economic structures that emerged kept most of the region’s monarchies in power well into the twentieth century. It is no coincidence, perhaps, that every sheikhdom involved in the British protection treaties was by the 1950s also in receipt of at least one form of British rent payment. Indeed, in much the same way as Britain’s earlier political support for breakaway sheikhdoms such as Dubai and Qatar, its intervention on behalf of a favoured member of Oman’s ruling family in the 1870s, and its military assistance for Kuwait in the 1920s, the new rents also became an important part of the survival and in some cases creation of Gulf monarchies. In the case of Ajman, for example, the lack of air landing rights or oil concession payments became such a source of concern that the sheikhdom was purposely selected to host a British military base — an agreement which netted Ajman’s ruler an annual rent of 10,000 rupees and allowed him to reduce taxation in his sheikhdom.[96] Similarly profiting from British rents was the Sharqiyin tribe of Fujairah — a semi-autonomous Indian Ocean coastline territory nominally controlled by Sharjah. In 1951, concerned that the Sharqiyin were being courted by the American-Saudi oil giant, Aramco, Britain moved to lock the area into another IPC concession. In 1952 the Shariqin’s chief[97] was duly upgraded to the status of the other Trucial States’ rulers: this allowed the IPC to begin payments, and Fujairah was declared to be independent of Sharjah.[98]

Conversely, when sheikhdoms were deemed to be no longer of strategic interest to Britain, or their ruling families were proving problematic, Britain moved to cut payments and in extreme cases facilitated the collapse of dynasties. Hamriyyah and Dibba, for example, were quietly reabsorbed by Sharjah, as without rent payments their respective rulers were in no position to maintain sufficient loyalty from resident tribes. Similarly, the Indian Ocean coastline town of Kalba, which in 1936 had been recognised by Britain as a sheikhdom with its ruling family receiving rent for air landing rights, was reabsorbed by Sharjah in 1951. Britain had already ceased payments after failing to build an airbase and had chosen not to intervene following a series of fratricidal killings within its fragmented ruling family.[99] Other examples included the Al-Kaabi family of Mahadha, close to Oman. Despite repeatedly presenting his case to Britain in the late 1950s for both recognition and the need for rent payments in return for providing soldiers to help guard oil exploration parties, he was refused and Britain allowed Mahadha to fall under the control of Muscat’s Al-Said.[100]

Independence and state formation

By the time of Abdul-Aziz bin Saud’s death in 1953, Saudi Arabia had already become an internationally recognised state[101] with rulership having been handed on to his eldest sons, albeit with some turbulence. The first to take over was Saud bin Abdul-Aziz, who then abdicated in 1964 in favour of his more reform-focused younger brother, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz. Following Faisal’s 1975 assassination at the hands of a younger relative,[102] he was succeeded by Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz, who was then succeeded in 1982 by Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. Since Fahd’s death in 2005 another of Abdul-Aziz’s sons, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, has been king, having already effectively ruled Saudi Arabia as Fahd’s crown prince and regent since 1996.[103] In parallel to the now very elderly Abdullah, and underscoring the ongoing centrality of the original Saudi-Wahhabi pact to the Saudi state, the religious community continues to be led by the Al-Sheikh family — the direct descendants of Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab.[104] Presently led by the one-eyed Abdul-Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the Al-Sheikh remain in control of key positions in government, especially in justice and education, and maintain close family ties to the Al-Saud through intermarriage.[105] Together with other relatives and allies they also continue to dominate a number of state-backed bodies such as the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, thus forming the official religious establishment in Saudi Arabia.

Since Saud’s accession, Saudi Arabia’s government has been run by a Council of Ministers. Established by charter, it has served as both the executive and the legislative body of the Saudi state, with all of its members being appointed by royal decree.[106] In 1992, after a number of demands and petitions made to the ruling family by both liberal and conservative opponents in the wake of the Kuwait crisis[107] and the return of western troops (including female soldiers) to the region, Fahd instigated a number of reforms aimed at appeasing the religious community while also providing the state with a greater veneer of accountability.[108] Collectively, the new ‘Basic System of Governance’ or ‘Basic Law’ re-confirmed Islamic Sharia law as the basis for all legislation in the state, while also establishing new regulatory bodies to monitor government performance and separate the judiciary from other parts of the government — albeit with judges still being appointed by the king. To provide a greater degree of stability for the ruling family and to guard against internecine disputes or coups d’état, the 1992 reforms also clarified that succession would be limited to male descendants of Abdul-Aziz.[109] In this way, Fahd sought to enshrine in law some of the stabilisation mechanisms later observed by Michael Herb in his aforementioned work on dynastic monarchies.[110] In 1993, in a further effort to promote accountability, Fahd established a new Consultative Council or majlis al-shura. Although, as with the Saudi judges, all involved were appointed by the king.[111]

Under Abdullah, little has changed. The Consultative Council now stands at 150 members, but each is still appointed, sitting for four-year terms. Its powers remain weak, with its ability to call ministers to question or launch investigations into governmental affairs being very limited, despite supposedly being allowed to propose legislation.[112] The only significant development in recent years was an election in 2005 for municipal councils. But this too was severely restricted, with only half of the seats being elected, with only male candidates and voters being permitted, and with councillors enjoying little power as central ministries continued to dictate regional and municipal policies.[113] Fresh elections should have been staged in 2009, but these were cancelled on the grounds that the government needed time to study how best to ‘expand the electorate and the possibility of allowing women to vote’. Although elections were eventually staged in late 2011, seemingly as a concession to the Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the region, the same restrictions remained in place with no women being involved and with only half of the seats being elected.[114]