The ruling families of the smaller former Trucial States have, like Qatar, been a little more prone to internecine disputes and ‘palace coups’. In Sharjah’s case, only a year after independence its ruler Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi was assassinated by an exiled former ruler, Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi. Turning to Khalid’s most educated younger brother, the ruling family appointed Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi as ruler. In 1987 Sultan’s passed-over elder brother, Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, briefly seized power before Sultan was able to reassert control.[130] Similarly, in Ra’s al-Khaimah the succession process has been bumpy, although the ruling Al-Qasimi family’s authority has never been directly contested. As discussed later in this book, the emirate’s long-serving ruler, Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, had appointed his eldest son, Khalid bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, as crown prince in 1961. But in 2003 the aging Saqr had switched crown princes, choosing one of his younger sons, Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi.[131] Although Khalid was forced into exile, his return to Ra’s al-Khaimah following Saqr’s death in 2010 prompted a brief crisis before Saud was eventually confirmed as the new ruler.
The period immediately before and after the Trucial States’ independence from Britain in 1971 deserves special attention, as it has had important ramifications for these monarchies’ subsequent state formation process. In 1968 the British government announced that within just three years it would dismantle all of its bases and treaties ‘east of Aden’, in an effort to cut imperial expenditure and focus more resources on Britain’s struggling domestic welfare system. The ruling families of the Trucial States were so alarmed by the prospect of their protector’s departure that they even offered to subsidise the deployment of British troops in the region after independence was granted.[132] Britain’s solution, however, was to encourage the various rulers to form a cohesive federation that would provide their sheikhdoms with at least some degree of collective security.
Various meetings and negotiations took place, but it quickly became apparent that Bahrain and Qatar were unwilling to form a state with their less developed neighbours,[133] with both declaring themselves independent emirates in summer 1971. To make matters worse, Ra’s al-Khaimah was also baulking at joining the federation, as it too held ambitions to become an independent state. Moreover, on 1 December 1971—the day before Britain’s official withdrawal — Iran had seized three contested islands belonging to Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, thus further alarming the remaining Trucial States rulers. Nonetheless, the following day a six member federation of United Arab Emirates was inaugurated,[134] and the next month Ra’s al-Khaimah reluctantly agreed to join. Given that Abu Dhabi commanded the bulk of the UAE’s oil reserves it became the federal capital and its ruler, Zayed, was installed as the UAE’s first president with Dubai’s ruler, Rashid, as vice president.[135]
Much like Kuwait, Bahrain began its period of independence with an attempt at building a parliament as the ruling family sought to involve the influential merchant community. A constitution was drawn up detailing a fully elected body with an all-male electorate, and the first ballots were cast in 1973. Political parties were forbidden and the unelected prime minister — Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa — was a member of the ruling family. Nonetheless some political blocs did form, and a brief period of vibrant debate ensued. But within just two years the emir moved to dissolve the parliament. Members had begun to dispute the Al-Khalifa family’s enthusiasm for an American military presence in Bahrain and were frustrated over the lack of land reform, with the Al-Khalifa continuing to own most of the island’s territory. Moreover, parliament had crossed another red line by calling for a more transparent state budget as oil revenues boomed.[136] Thus, for most of the 1980s the only spaces for political discussion in Bahrain were in more traditional settings, in particular the majalis for Sunni citizens, and the ‘mourning houses,’ or mataams for Shia citizens.[137] By the early 1990s, with deepening security ties between the Al-Khalifa and the US, and with rising unemployment and falling incomes, hundreds of Bahrainis petitioned the emir for a reinstatement of the 1973 parliament, but only an appointed advisory council was established. Further opposition and fresh demands in the 1990s — detailed later in this book — were similarly unsuccessful, with the emir refusing to re-open parliament.
By 2001, however, the ruling family chose to return to earlier neo-patriarchal strategies by holding a referendum on a ‘National Action Charter’ that would supposedly transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy. In 2002 a new constitution was duly implemented on the basis of the charter which promised the creation of a bicameral, halfelected parliament, the abolishing of much maligned ‘security courts’, and a new requirement that half of all judges were to be elected. In 2006 ‘political societies’ were even approved,[138] bringing Bahrain the closest of all Gulf monarchies to accepting political parties. However, the charter also re-designated the emir as ‘king’ with Bahrain becoming a kingdom rather than an emirate, and the king remained in control of all key appointments, including the prime minister and all of the cabinet ministers. Crucially, he also retained the power of approving or rejecting all proposed legislation.[139] But interestingly, in parallel to the Khalifa bin Salman-controlled government, the king also set up a new Economic Development Board (EDB), which was gradually assigned more and more control over Bahrain’s economy. Given that the EDB is chaired by the king’s eldest son and crown prince, Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and given that — until recently at least — Khalifa bin Salman’s ministers had to answer to the EDB,[140] Bahrain provides a good example of how state formation in the Gulf monarchies has often been manipulated in order to manage ruling family divisions. Broadly speaking, the Al-Khalifa dynasty has become factionalised into conservatives led by the prime minister and a number of key members of the royal court, and reformists, led by the crown prince. The king, rather precariously, has had to sit somewhere in the middle.
Although having shared a similar imperial history to Bahrain, Qatar’s post-independence state formation process has been quite different and much more autocratic, mostly due to its smaller population and — as discussed in the following chapter — the ruling family’s greater ability to distribute wealth and resources. A ‘Basic Law of Qatar’ had already been drafted in 1970, a year before Britain’s departure, and this went on to become a provisional constitution in 1972. Although designed to be as flexible as possible, so as to reflect the transitional nature of the Qatari state,[141] it nonetheless provided the basis for setting up an appointed Council of Ministers and a twenty-member Advisory Council or Majlis Al-Shura. Although the latter was also appointed, some concessions were made to electoral politics, with Qatar being divided into ten tribal districts, the leaders of which could each nominate four members, two of whom would then be selected by the emir.[142] In 1975 the Advisory Council was expanded to thirty-five members, but it remained under the full control of the Al-Thani family, with the emir able to re-appoint its members indefinitely and to block or ratify all proposed legislation.[143]
132
76. Davidson (2005), chapter 1. The offer was rejected by the British government on the grounds that British armed forces could never be deployed as a mercenary force.
133
77. For a full discussion see Davidson (2009), chapter 3. Qatar also seemed to have hoped that the capital of the federation would be Doha. See Fromherz, Allen J.,
136
80. Kinninmont, Jane. ‘Bahrain’ in Davidson, Christopher M. (ed.),
137
81. Ibid., p. 46. The
141
85. Wright, Steven, ‘Qatar’ in Davidson, Christopher M. (ed.),