Much like the Kuwaiti constitution and the second Bahraini constitution, Qatar’s provisional constitution also sought to combine patriarchal authority with legal-rational authority by slipping in a clause aimed at establishing the permanency of the ruling family. This required all Qatari citizens to ‘…pledge their loyalty and absolute obedience to the Ruler in the fear of God’. Moreover, in another attempt to strengthen the dynasty and prevent unwanted succession disputes the constitution described the need for consensus between ruling family members, although without outlining procedures or specifics.[144]
Upon his succession in 1995, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani made a number of promises to reform Qatar’s political institutions and several decrees were duly signed. Three years later the first elections were held for Qatar’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and in 1999 the first elections were held for Qatar’s twenty-nine member Municipal Council, with over 22,000 men and women voting. In 2007 a second round of elections were held, with about 50 per cent of the electorate voting.[145] Much like the Saudi elections though, these were only for an institution with very limited powers, and no influence on Qatar’s central government. In 2003 a referendum had already taken place on the subject of a new, permanent constitution to replace the original 1972 provisional constitution. Significantly the new constitution — approved by 97 per cent of Qataris — committed the state to becoming ‘democratic’ and called for a new, elected Advisory Council as opposed to the original appointed body. The council was to be expanded to forty-five members, thirty of whom would be elected; it would sit for four year terms and its recommendations would still require the emir’s approval.[146] Elections were promised for 2005 but never materialised, as was also the case in 2010. The council thus continues to be fully appointed and is increasingly criticised for its ineffective role and limited scope. Indeed, it only meets for eight months a year, and only sits for two hours a week.[147] Nevertheless in late 2011 another announcement was made that the promised reforms would still take place, with elections due to be held in 2013 for thirty of the forty-five positions.[148]
The UAE’s state formation has been more complicated, not least due to the existence of a federal government that came into being following independence in 1971, and the continuing existence of various emirate-level governments answering to their respective ruling families. Originally envisaged as a loose confederation, with only limited powers being transferred to federal ministries, a provisional constitution was signed by the six founding rulers in late 1971, and then by the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah in early 1972. Given that Abu Dhabi, as discussed, was in control of most of the UAE’s oil reserves and had become the UAE’s capital, most of the new ministries were located there. But neither defence nor oil policies were transferred to the federal government, as it was felt that too rapid centralisation of such key matters would harm the status and prestige of the poorer emirates’ governments, thus risking friction and instability. Indeed, when Abu Dhabi attempted to unify the different emirate-level armed forces in the late 1970s both Dubai and Ra’s al-Khaimah threatened their withdrawal from the union, prompting a constitutional crisis. Only in 1996 was the constitution made permanent with a unified UAE Armed Forces being established under Abu Dhabi’s umbrella. By this stage Dubai and most of the other emirates were pressing ahead with costly infrastructure projects in efforts to build up more diverse economic bases, and preferred to transfer as many costly services as possible to Abu Dhabi and the federal government.[149]
Overseeing the federal government since 1971 has been the Supreme Council of Rulers, which is made up of the seven hereditary rulers of each emirate and, on occasion, their respective crown princes. While the constitution allows for an SCR presidential election to take place every five years,[150] in practice the rulership of Abu Dhabi remains synonymous with the presidency of the UAE, not least because of Abu Dhabi’s single-handed financing of most federal development projects. The SCR also reflects Dubai’s elevated status in the UAE by awarding only the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai veto power in its meetings — as per an article of the constitution,[151]—and by always appointing the ruler of Dubai as the UAE’s vice president. In support of the SCR, or more specifically the president, there exists a presidential office and a presidential court with its own staff. However, given the ruler of Abu Dhabi’s similar emirate-level institutions it is unclear if the two function independently.
Responsible for most of the federal government’s decision-making is the Council of Ministers. Since its establishment in 1972 its composition has always reflected the relative power and influence of the member emirates. Although originally made up of eleven ministers in addition to a prime minister, the COM soon expanded to nineteen positions as the other emirates began to supply their contingents of appointees.[152] The premiership was transferred to the crown prince of Dubai, before the above-mentioned constitutional crisis persuaded the ruler of Dubai to become prime minister as well as vice president. Abu Dhabi has always held the lion’s share of COM positions including the deputy premiership and ministerial posts for the interior, higher education, and public works. Today, the COM’s membership has increased to twenty ministers and four ministers of state, including four women. But it remains equally in favour of Abu Dhabi, with members of its ruling family now also controlling the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Presidential Affairs among other portfolios. In total, there are now five members of the Al-Nahyan family serving as ministers while other Abu Dhabi nationals serve as the ministers for justice,[153] the economy,[154] and energy.[155] Moreover, at least two further ministers are de facto members of the Abu Dhabi contingent given their close ties to the emirate.
Operating beneath the COM, the Federal National Council is a consultative body made up of contingents from each emirate. Comprising forty members, including an internally elected speaker and two deputies, this chamber sits for sessions of two years at a time, and has several subcommittees. Much like the COM, the more powerful emirates dominate,[156] with Abu Dhabi and Dubai each supplying eight members, while Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah supply six, and the other three emirates supply just four.[157] These contingents, which were originally all appointed, were often made up of senior representatives of non-ruling tribes or sections, and they now include women. As with the Qatari Advisory Council, in recent years there has been mounting criticism of the FNC, with many of its members and other citizens claiming it is largely ineffective. While it has been successful in petitioning ministers on rather banal subjects,[158] it has been incapable of making more substantive interventions,[159] and has often failed to elicit responses from ministers.[160] In 2006 elections were held for half of the FNC positions, but these were widely ridiculed as only a few thousand UAE nationals were eligible to vote. A second round of elections should have taken place in late 2010 but were delayed until late 2011. As with Saudi Arabia’s 2011 Municipal Council elections, the latest FNC elections seem to have been used as a concession to the Arab Spring, as the size of the electorate was expanded to 80,000. Yet this still represented only a small proportion of UAE nationals — about 12 per cent[161]—and the FNC’s powers have remained very limited.[162] Embarrassingly for the UAE’s president — who had publicly called for a high voter turnout — fewer than 30 per cent of eligible voters actually participated.[163]
145
89. Kamrava, Mehran, ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’,
150
94. See Al-Nabeh, Najat Abdullah, ‘United Arab Emirates: Regional and Global Dimensions’ (PhD thesis. Claremont Graduate School, 1984).
151
95. Article 49. See Al-Gurg, Easa Saleh,
157
101. Rizvi, S., ‘From Tents to High Rise: Economic Development of the United Arab Emirates’,
158
102. These have normally been over concerns that were already shared by the Council of Ministers, such as the need for tightening anti-drug legislation and the need for further modifying the UAE’s property laws. Al-Nahyan, Shamma bint Muhammad,
159
103. Especially in cases where the FNC’s views were likely to diverge from the relevant minister’s outlook, such as over the price of petrol or the cultural content of terrestrial television. Ibid., p. 121.
160
104. There have been examples of the FNC’s letters to ministers having remained unanswered for several months, and occasions when the FNC has been unable to persuade ministers to attend their sessions and answer basic questions on their policies. Ibid., pp. 178–179,188.