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Closely connected to the region’s hydrocarbon industry has been the channelling of surplus oil and gas revenues into long-term overseas investments by many Gulf monarchies. Conceived as a means of cushioning their domestic economies should the international oil industry falter, most of these sovereign wealth investments have been made through a handful of government owned authorities or companies. Today, their combined assets are thought to be in excess of $1.7 trillion,[181] and were generating some 10 per cent in interest per year prior to the 2008 credit crunch.[182] Although their operations remain fairly secretive, it is thought that they have historically favoured index-linked blue chip investments in the developed world along with mature western real estate.[183] Following the Dubai Ports crisis of 2006, when a government-owned Dubai company that had already purchased Britain’s Peninsula and Orient Steam Navigation Company unsuccessfully attempted to take over operations in several P&O managed ports in the US, most of the Gulf monarchies’ sovereign wealth funds have been careful to keep their stakes in western companies and multinationals relatively small in order to assuage fears that their investments are being used to gain political influence, and to avoid future xenophobic backlashes. As discussed later in this book, it appears that the funds have now branched out significantly into emerging markets and Pacific Asia, with Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian funds in particular having poured billions of dollars into China. Soon it is likely that the value of these Pacific Asian investments will exceed those in Western Europe and North America.[184]

By far the largest of the funds is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA). Founded in 1976, it had accumulated $100 billion in overseas assets by the mid-1990s[185] and about $360 billion by 2005.[186] Now symbolically housed in the tallest building in Abu Dhabi, it was estimated that ADIA controlled nearly $900 billion in assets in early 2008[187] and now it probably has about $600 billion following some losses, especially in the US.[188] The second largest and the eldest of the region’s funds is Saudi Arabia’s SAMA Foreign Holdings. Founded in 1960, it now holds over $400 billion in assets. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), founded in 1963, was for many years the largest of the funds, but after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent costly rebuilding programme a number of its assets were sold. Nevertheless it still stands at over $200 billion, making it the region’s third largest fund.

The other Gulf monarchies have more modest funds, reflecting their smaller hydrocarbon surpluses. The Investment Corporation of Dubai for example, may have about $20 billion in assets,[189] but this is unclear given some of the below-mentioned controversies regarding the Dubai government’s ability to make debt repayments. Bahrain’s Mumtalakat Holding Company and Oman’s State General Reserve Fund are even smaller, perhaps less than $12 billion[190]—and with depleting oil reserves they are unlikely to grow much further. Instead, the fastest growing funds are likely to be the more recently established Qatar Investment Authority — founded in 2006 and now controlling about $60 billion in assets given its access to substantial gas export revenues — and the numerous other sovereign wealth funds in Abu Dhabi that seem to operate in parallel to ADIA. Notable among these are the Mubadala Development Company, which was founded in 2002 under the umbrella of the emirate’s crown prince and which now controls about $15 billion in assets, and the much older International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), which has recently been rejuvenated under the stewardship of one of the crown prince’s brothers[191] and now controls about $14 billion in assets.[192]

Nonetheless, despite these substantial overseas investments, there has been a keen awareness in the Gulf monarchies of the need to diversify their economic bases, not only in an effort to reduce their vulnerability to the vagaries of the international oil markets, but also to generate employment opportunities for their fast-growing indigenous populations and to cope with some of the other mounting pressures discussed below. Initially most of the diversification efforts were concentrated on building up heavy, energy-reliant export-oriented industries, all of which relied on the competitive advantage of having cheap abundant energy supplied by the state. Unsurprisingly, it has been the resource-rich states, notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi that have led the way, often by developing petrochemicals, metals, fertilisers and plastics industries. In Saudi Arabia’s case the biggest player has been the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), which was established in 1976 to produce polymers and chemicals. Today it is one of the world’s largest exporters of such products, and is also the region’s largest producer of steel.[193] Established in 1997, Saudi Arabia’s Maaden was originally focused on developing the country’s gold mines, but has since diversified into the manufacture and exporting of aluminium and phosphate.[194] Six new ‘economic cities’ have been inaugurated too, the largest being the King Abdullah Economic City on the Red Sea coast. Containing both a seaport and industrial zone, it is intended to become an attractive, integrated hub for foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia’s manufacturing sector.[195]

Since the founding of the Shuaiba Industrial Zone in 1962, Kuwait’s heavy industries have followed a similar pattern of development.[196] Most have concentrated on the exporting of petrochemicals, with others focusing on the production of ammonia, fertilisers, and cement.[197] Some of these industrial projects have either stalled or collapsed, often as a result of the aforementioned vibrancy of debate within Kuwait’s parliament. Most notably, in 2008 a multibillion dollar joint venture between Kuwait’s Petrochemical Industries and the American Dow Chemicals — expected to position Kuwait as the world’s greatest producer of polyethylene — was cancelled.[198] Qatar’s heavy industries have likewise concentrated on petrochemicals, fertilisers, and steel, with most activity taking place close to the main gas-exporting centres of Ras Laffan and Mesaieed. Most production is in the hands of Qatar Steel, the Qatar Primary Material Company, and Industries Qatar — which are second in the region only to SABIC. Abu Dhabi’s most prominent downstream industrial companies are Fertil (established in 1980 and co-owned by ADNOC and Total),[199] the Abu Dhabi Polymers Company (established in 1998),[200] and Emirates Aluminium (EMAL). The latter now operates the world’s largest aluminium processing facility on Abu Dhabi’s manmade Taweelah island.[201] Over the next few years the sector is set to expand further, with both Mubadala and the Abu Dhabi Basic Industries Corporation (ADBIC) planning to build massive new aluminium plants.[202] And by 2013 Abu Dhabi’s IPIC will have built a new Chemicals Industrial City: capable of producing 7 million tonnes per year of aromatics and ammonia derivatives, it will be the world’s largest such complex.[203] The government has put its full weight behind these developments, having increased spending on industrial infrastructure by over 400 per cent over the past decade. By the end of 2012 it promises the completion of the $7 billion Khalifa Port and Industrial Zone on Taweelah[204] and has committed a further $8 billion for other sector-specific infrastructure projects. A new unit — ZonesCorp[205]—has been set up to administer these new districts, provide organisational support, and build residential camps for labourers.[206] Combined, it is expected that the new projects will account for 15 per cent of Abu Dhabi’s GDP by 2030.[207]

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125. Kuwait News Agency, 15 January 2012. Combined assets are expected to reach $1.9 trillion in 2012.

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182

126. Euromoney, 1 April 2006.

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183

127. Davidson (2009), chapter 4.

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128. Davidson, Christopher M. The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to Interdependence (London: Hurst, 2011), chapter 5.

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129. Van der Meulen, Hendrik, ‘The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates’ (PhD thesis. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1997), p. 93.

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130. Davidson (2009), chapter 4.

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131. The Economist, 17 January 2008; Seznec, Jean-François. ‘The Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: Myths and Reality’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, pp. 97, 101. ADIA was believed to have had $875 billion in assets according to Deutsche Bank. However, Seznec believes the figure to be much lower. But he may have placed insufficient weight on ADIA’s history of investments in emerging markets.

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132. CIA World Factbook. People and economics overviews of Japan, China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. Statistics from 2007–2008, with 2009 population estimates. Supplementary data from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and OECD country overviews, 2009.

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133. Officially the Investment Corporation of Dubai holds $19.6 billion in assets. 2012 figures.

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134. According to Mumtalakat Holdings’ official financial report for December 2011 its total holdings were just over $11 billion. Oman’s State General Reserve Fund is thought to have just over $8 billion in assets.

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135. Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan.

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136. Quoting official figures for total holdings supplied in 2011 by the Qatar Investment Authority, the Mubadala Development Company, and the International Petroleum Investment Company.

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137. Arab News, 5 October 2009.

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138. Khaleej Times, 20 December 2009.

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139. Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Saudi Arabia’ in Davidson (2011), p. 78.

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140. Roberts (2011). p. 102.

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141. US Department of State. ‘Background Note: Kuwait’ 2011.

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142. New York Times, 28 December 2008.

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143. Oxford Business Group, ‘Abu Dhabi: The Report 2007’. p. 202.

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144. Also known as Borouge. Oxford Business Group, ‘United Arab Emirates: The Report 2000’. pp. 94–95.

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145. Oxford Business Group, ‘Abu Dhabi: The Report 2007’. p. 212.

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146. The latter being built at Ruwais in co-operation with Rio Tinto. The National, 24 July 2008; Seznec (2008), p. 101.

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147. Borealis press release, 19 March 2008.

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148. Gulf News, 1 March 2012.

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149. Also known as the Higher Corporation for Economic Zones.

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150. Davidson (2009), chapter 4.

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151. Gulf News, 1 March 2012.