F1
Formula One
FIFA
Fédération International de Football Association
FNC
Federal National Council (of the UAE)
FTA
free trade agreement
GCC
Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
GDP
gross domestic product
HH
his highness
HIV
human immunodeficiency virus
HRH
his royal highness
ICBC
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICD
Investment Corporation of Dubai
IDEX
International Defence Exhibition (of Abu Dhabi)
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IPIC
International Petroleum Investment Company (of Abu Dhabi)
IPC
Iraqi Petroleum Company
IRENA
International Renewable Energy Agency
ISP
internet service provider
JAFZ
Jebel Ali Free Zone (of Dubai)
JETRO
Japan External Trade Organisation
JODCO
Japan Oil Development Company
KAUST
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
KCIC
Kuwait-China Investment Company
KFAS
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences
KFAED
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
KIA
Kuwait Investment Authority
KIPCO
Kuwait Projects Company
LSE
London School of Economics and Political Science
NYU
New York University
ODA
official development assistance
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
P&O
Peninsula and Orient Steam Navigation Company
PDRY
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
PFLOAP
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf
PRC
People’s Republic of China
PGA
Professional Golfers Association
PIN
personal identification number
QIA
Qatar Investment Authority
QPC
Qatar Petroleum Company
QSI
Qatar Sports Investments
QE2
Queen Elizabeth 2 cruise liner
RAND
Research and Development Corporation
SABIC
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation
SCR
Supreme Council of Rulers (of the UAE)
Sinopec
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
SMS
short message service
SPC
Supreme Petroleum Council (of the UAE)
TDIC
Tourism and Development Investment Company (of Abu Dhabi)
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UCL
University College London
UK
United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO
United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRWA
United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSC
UN Security Council
US
United States (of America)
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT
value added tax
WTO
World Trade Organisation
ZCCF
Zayed Centre for Coordination and Follow-Up
INTRODUCTION
Central to the stability of the world’s oil and gas industries and home to the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia and its five smaller neighbours — the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain — have long fascinated scholars, diplomats, and journalists. In recent years international interest in the ‘Gulf monarchies’ of the Arabian Peninsula has soared. Not only have they played a key role in the War on Terror — on both sides of the conflict — but they also now account for the lion’s share of the Arab World’s gross domestic product[1] founded on ever-rising trade flows, financial zones, tourism, and even real estate sectors.
Since their formation and in some cases independence in the mid-twentieth century, the Gulf monarchies have remained governed by highly autocratic and — as many have argued — seemingly anachronistic regimes. Nevertheless, their rulers have demonstrated remarkable resilience despite having bloody conflicts on their doorsteps, fast-growing populations, and powerful modernising and globalising forces impacting on largely conservative societies. Obituaries for these traditional polities have frequently been penned — in some cases by leading commentators — but even now, well into the twenty-first century, these absolutist, almost medieval entities still appear to defy their critics. If anything, with the 2011and 2012 ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions that have been sweeping aside the region’s republics and accelerating the fall of other incumbent presidents, the apparently steadfast Gulf monarchies have, at first glance, re-affirmed their status as the Middle East’s only real bastion of stability. Even when violence and unrest erupted in some of their cities, this was largely contained, and the integrity of monarchy as a legitimate political system was ostensibly maintained. After all, as the lickspittle spokesmen and legions of public relations consultants employed by the Gulf monarchies are usually quick to point out, these states are somehow different: they are not ‘dictatorships’ and should thus be immune from precipitate political upheaval.
The near future, however, is far less predictable for the kings, emirs, and sultans currently in power. Serious internal and external pressures have been accumulating in the Gulf monarchies, in some cases long preceding 2011. Although these have had an uneven impact on the region due to significant socio-economic and political disparities, there are nonetheless important patterns and commonalities in these pressures which mean they will soon affect all six states. Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that these regimes are now, more than ever, only as strong as the weakest link in their chain. If an especially brittle monarchy succumbed to a popular revolution or fell into a state of anarchy, then a veritable ‘domino effect’ could unfold, as the erstwhile illusion of stability or invincibility that has distinguished the Gulf monarchies from the floundering Arab republics would be swiftly dispelled. In this scenario, if one Gulf state failed, then even the wealthiest and most confident of rulers would find their positions, or at least their legitimacy, under threat.
1
1. According to International Monetary Fund data from 2010, the six Gulf monarchies had a combined GDP of $993 billion. This was more than half of the $1903 billion total GDP for all twenty-two Arab League member states at the time. Most dramatically, Saudi Arabia and the UAE together accounted for 35 per cent of the Arab League total. International Monetary Fund 2010; author calculations.