Co-opting religion
Viewed as a double-edged sword, religion — and most especially Islam — has been considered both a threat and an opportunity for the Gulf monarchies. As will be discussed later, Islamist movements — both intellectual and militant — have frequently questioned the status quo in these states. Most have highlighted the un-Islamic behaviour of the various ruling families, the slide into autocracy, the reliance on non-Islamic foreign powers for security, and rampant corruption among other matters. As such, these groups have often represented a powerful alternative and sometimes dissenting voice on the Arabian Peninsula, and in some cases have even been joined by establishment figures. Indeed, as has been noted, ‘…because Islam is a transcendent religion that can never be fully co-opted, [even such autocratic] governments must cede some autonomy to state-supported religious institutions or elites, thereby raising the prospect that elements of the religious establishment could defect to the Islamist opposition’.[286]
The Saudi ruling family has always been in the tightest position, given its described alliance with the Wahhabi movement, given the presence of two of Islam’s holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina, and given its hosting of millions of Muslim pilgrims each year. Since 1986 the king of Saudi Arabia even changed his official title to ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’[287]—reviving a pious title formerly used by the caliphs, the Ottoman sultans, and Egypt’s Mamluk sultans. But the smaller Gulf monarchies, even though none claim such specific religious credentials, are also wary. Much like Saudi Arabia, all rely on non-Islamic powers — namely the US — for their security guarantees, with most also physically hosting such troops on their territory. And since 9/11, and the Anglo-American invasions on nearby Muslim countries — Afghanistan and Iraq — their position has clearly become more precarious.
The strategies for containing and co-opting Islam have varied in each of the monarchies, depending on their circumstances, although there are some common patterns. In a similar manner to the recently deposed leaders of the Arab authoritarian republics, loyal clerics of the Gulf’s ruling families have from time to time invoked certain Koranic passages in order to justify absolute power. As per a late-2011 statement by Al-Azhar University on the Arab Spring, this has usually been done by narrowly interpreting a verse[288] which states ‘O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you’. The verse has frequently been cited in isolation, but as the Al-Azhar statement contends, it should never have been cited out of context, and especially without considering the preceding verse,[289] which states ‘Indeed Allah commands you to render the trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice’.[290] The Saudi ruling family has probably gone the furthest with this strategy, with the Wahhabi religious establishment and its government representatives claiming that the Al-Saud enjoy ‘rightful leadership’ or wali al-ahd on this very basis.
The smaller Gulf monarchies, notably Qatar and the UAE have instead concentrated on using their resources to police and fund their mosques and domestic religious establishments. Almost all clerics are government employees, and these are quite closely monitored. Most have to carry photo identification cards, and their sermons usually have to be chosen from an official list of approved topics, drawn up by the relevant government body each week. A 2006 cable from the US embassy in Abu Dhabi confirms this practice, describing how ‘UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques’.[291] As well as providing generous salaries to clerics, thus slotting them into the rentier state’s giant public sector, wealth in these monarchies has also been used to build large and often lavish mosques, religious schools, and other institutions. Unsurprisingly some of the biggest mosques in the world are now in the Gulf monarchies — such as Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, which was built by the government and can accommodate 40,000 worshippers. Taking several years to complete, it cost more than $540 million and is the burial place of the late Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. Although there are some exceptions — such as Qatar’s largest mosque, which is simply called ‘Qatar Mosque’ or ‘Fanar’,[292] and the proposed new Al-Farooq Mosque in Dubai — most of the largest mosques in the Gulf monarchies usually carry the name of a key ruling family member, despite invariably having been built using state funds. There are of course countless other projects connecting Islam to the largesse of the ruling families or the state, some of them highly innovative and often winning positive headlines for the sponsors. In the UAE, for example, the Dubai International Holy Koran Award Committee has begun planning and designing a holy book collection or mushaf named after Abu Dhabi’s ruler — the ‘Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan Mushaf’. The aim is to produce a million of these volumes which will then be freely distributed ‘under orders of the prime minister’.[293] Set on its own island and designed by the same architect as the contemporary section of the Paris Louvre, Qatar’s enormous Islamic Arts Museum is another powerful example; one closely associated with the ruler and his high-profile wife Moza bint Nasser Al-Misnad. It opened in late 2008 and has been featured in dozens of international newspapers and magazines.
Also providing ruling families with religious legitimacy, or more accurately allowing rulers to portray themselves as tolerant, benevolent monarchs, there has been much support for other religions in some Gulf monarchies. With the exception of Saudi Arabia — where all other religions are banned — Christianity is booming in the Gulf monarchies, courtesy of substantial Indian and Filipino expatriate populations. Churches for almost all denominations exist in the five smaller Gulf states, including even evangelical chapels. Prime land, usually donated by a ruling family member, continues to be gifted to these churches to aid in their expansion. In Abu Dhabi, an ancient Nestorian Christian monastery which had been discovered on one of the emirate’s outlying islands was even opened to the public in 2010 by the government’s Tourism and Development Investment Company[294]—thus acknowledging and celebrating the country’s pre-Islamic past. Hindu and Sikh temples also exist in some of these states, as does a Zoroastrian tower of silence in Dubai, which has on occasion been the location of Zoroastrian world congresses. Although, as discussed in the following chapter, there remains a nominal boycott on Israel by the Gulf monarchies and synagogues are not permitted in any of these states, there are nonetheless some pockets of tolerance for Jews. In Bahrain for example, there exists a tiny community of Bahraini Jews. Although their number has dwindled from several hundred to just a few dozen, they are reportedly well respected and have served in the upper house of the parliament. In 2008 the king even appointed a Jew as Bahrain’s joint ambassador to the US, Canada, and Brazil.[295]
286
65. Brumberg, Daniel, ‘The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy’,
290
69. Al-Azhar Statement in Support for the Arab Revolutions, released on 31 October 2011.
292
71.
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74.