To some extent, the Gulf monarchies have employed conventional strategies to achieve these aims: building up military defensive capabilities with equipment primarily sourced from the West; joining regional organisations such as the Arab League; and attempts to build collective security arrangements between themselves — most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council. As will be discussed later, despite much scholarly attention having been paid to these strategies, they have been fraught with risks and their successes remain limited. Instead a number of other, subtler, policies perhaps better explain the external survival of the Gulf monarchies.
First, as a natural extension of the domestic rentier state and their popular wealth distribution strategies, the Gulf monarchies have become increasingly keen to distribute some of their resources to less fortunate neighbours, mostly in the form of development aid, charity, or gifts to other Arab, Muslim, or nearby states. Second, efforts have been made by most Gulf monarchies to use their location and resources to position themselves as useful ‘active neutrals’—either by despatching peace-keeping missions or mediating regional disputes. This strategy has usually allowed them to avoid taking sides in nearby conflicts, while also consolidating a reputation of benevolence and peacefulness in less stable or potentially threatening states. Also it has helped deflect broader Arab public opinion away from their difficult-to-disguise dependency on Western military protection. Third, there have been long-running efforts to fund museums, universities, and other cultural projects and institutions in the Western powers — and increasingly their Eastern counterparts — in order to improve recognition and opinion of the Gulf monarchies, and thus help build up their ‘soft power’ base in these influential states. In some cases even development aid has been channelled into these countries for this purpose. As with the domestic survival strategies, there are again significant divergences in these sets of policies, depending on the individual circumstances of each Gulf monarchy. Nevertheless, a pattern is clearly evident, with at least some aspects of each strategy being visible in each monarchy.
Development assistance and international charity
Since the 1970s the wealthier Gulf monarchies — notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait — have been among the biggest donors of development aid to the poorer Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa. More recently they have been joined by gas-rich Qatar, and their aid programmes have now reached out much further, with countless donations to communities in East Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, and even Eastern Europe. Most of the aid has been carefully controlled by the Gulf monarchies’ respective ministries for foreign affairs or by well-established state-controlled institutions such as the Saudi Fund for Development (set up in 1974), the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (which dates from 1971 under the name Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development),[310] and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (established in 1961, making it the first foreign aid vehicle set up by a developing state). However, such official development assistance (ODA) is only part of the story, given the many individual ruling family members and other state-sponsored charities in the Gulf monarchies also involved in such activities. The UAE has probably gone the furthest in trying to organise its various efforts under one umbrella, by setting up an External Aid Liaison Bureau in 2008. This was partly a response to disbelief and criticism from various United Nations representatives following a potentially accurate claim from a UAE minister that 3.6 per cent of GDP was allocated to development aid.[311] Unsurprisingly, given the various rulers’ described efforts to boost their personal legitimacy, many of the more tangible results of development assistance (such as hospitals, mosques, and schools) in recipient countries are named after the monarch in question.
Overall, throughout the period 1976–2006 it was estimated that over 4.2 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s GDP or about $49 billion was devoted to development aid,[312] while in the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar it is thought that aid has often been over 3 per cent of GDP. Although this is still much less than the Gulf monarchies spend on military hardware — which is usually between 4 and 11 per cent of GDP[313]—the gap does seem to be narrowing as ODA becomes an increasingly central pillar of foreign policy for these states. It is important to appreciate that Gulf ODA as a percentage of GDP is often higher than in the West, including the United States. In the Arab world, Palestine has unsurprisingly been the oldest and most generously targeted ODA destination. Over the past decade Saudi Arabia has supplied the Palestinian Authority with nearly $500 million in aid, and in addition has channelled hundreds of millions of dollars to help Palestinian refugees through both the Arab League and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Today it is thought that Saudi Arabia alone provides Palestine with between $14 million and $17 million per month.[314] Likewise, the UAE has supplied Palestine with considerable aid over the years and in the past decade it is thought that over $4 billion has been provided, including a $62 million residential complex built in 2004 and named after Abu Dhabi’s late ruler, Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, and the $70 million rebuilding of the Jenin Camp after its destruction in 2002.[315] Crucially, despite Hamas’ surprise election victory in 2006, Gulf ODA to Palestine has not slowed. If anything, it has accelerated — perhaps best symbolised by the Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Mosque in Bethany, named after Abu Dhabi’s current ruler. At a cost of nearly $5 million, the mosque will have the tallest minarets in Palestine when complete.[316] This response contrasts with other donors such as the US — which has been reviewing its aid programme given Hamas’ ostensible ties to terror organisations.[317] As such, the Gulf monarchies’ role in Palestine’s development is now unparalleled.
The Lebanon has been another major Gulf ODA destination, given its similar centrality and relevance to regional politics. After the resolution of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, the UAE injected between $500 and $700 million into the stricken country, and funding was provided for the Lebanese Army to purchase high-tech mine-clearing equipment.[318] Following the 2006 conflict with Israel, the UAE Red Crescent Society provided Lebanon with a further $300 million as part of the Emirates Solidarity Project. Most of the money has been spent on rebuilding physical infrastructure damaged by Israeli bombing and constructing new hospitals and schools.[319] Since then the UAE is believed to have pledged and delivered a further $300 million in aid to Lebanon.[320] In 2006 and 2007 Saudi Arabia provided the Lebanese Central Bank with nearly $2.7 billion, including $500 million to be spent on reconstruction.[321] Qatar has been equally keen to assist, having ploughed an estimated $250 million into rebuilding Bin Jbeil — the most badly damaged Lebanese town in the 2006 war. Much of this money was used to construct 12,000 new houses and repair 470 places of worship — including Sunni and Shia mosques and Christian churches.[322]
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2. Wheatcroft, Andrew,
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5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database. In 2010 Saudi Arabia was at 11.2 per cent, UAE 7.3 per cent, and Kuwait 4.4 per cent.
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