Читать онлайн "After the Sheikhs : The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies" - Davidson Christopher Michael - RuLit

In an almost mirror image of the funding of cultural institutions strategy, the Gulf monarchies’ funding of Western universities and research programmes has now also been taking place in reverse, with several leading US and British higher education institutions having been invited to set up branch campuses in the region. It is important to differentiate, however, between those Western universities (usually mid-or low-ranking institutions) that have set up campuses in free zone operations — such as those in Dubai’s Knowledge Village — which have sought commercial success and have usually not received financial inducements from the governments involved,[415] and those higher ranked institutions that have been building much larger, more lavish campuses — most notably in Abu Dhabi and Qatar. It is the latter category of universities which matter, as these are receiving massive funding from the governments in question and are now tied in to these monarchies’ soft power strategies. After all, if a monarchy can claim to have a working and highly visible relationship with a big brand university from one of the world’s most established democracies, one with a powerful military, then any reputational price that is being paid — no matter how high — is certainly deemed to be a wise investment. In Abu Dhabi both New York University and La Sorbonne have established operations, with one of Abu Dhabi government’s key personalities now sitting on the former’s board of trustees back in New York.[416] While in Qatar a whole host of universities are establishing themselves in ‘Education City’—a giant complex funded by the Qatar Foundation, the aforementioned vehicle of the ruler’s wife. Described as ‘five star universities imported profectus in totum from abroad’,[417] these currently include Georgetown University, Texas A&M University, Virginia Commonwealth University, the Weill Cornell Medical College, Carnegie Mellon University, Northwestern University, and University College London. In many cases, with generous salaries to offer, they have attracted leading academics in their given specialities. It is difficult to ascertain the real running costs of these campuses; however it is likely that Education City’s total cost is about $33 billion dollars, with the individual campuses costing between $100 and $200 million each.[418] While there are very few UAE national students attending NYU[419] or La Sorbonne in Abu Dhabi,[420] there are at least a modest number of Qatari nationals attending the various Education City institutions.[421] However, most students are expatriates (either those from families resident in the Gulf states or the wider region or, in Abu Dhabi’s case, those flown in on very generous scholarships),[422] and with the exception of Georgetown University[423] very little academic attention is currently being paid to the Gulf monarchies themselves — especially in the field of political science.

Soft power in the East: China and Japan

Although the Gulf monarchies have little shared modern economic history with the principal Pacific Asian powers[424]—notably China and Japan — their economies are now becoming increasingly intertwined. What began as a simple, mid-twentieth century marriage of convenience based on hydrocarbon imports and exports is rapidly evolving into a comprehensive, long-term mutual commitment that is not only continuing to capitalise on the Gulf’s rich energy resources and Pacific Asia’s massive energy needs, but is seeking also to develop strong non-hydrocarbon bilateral trade and is facilitating sizeable sovereign wealth investments. Although this increasingly extensive relationship does not yet encompass the Gulf monarchies’ military security arrangements — which remain predominantly with the Western powers — and although few serious attempts have been made by either side to replace or balance these with new Pacific Asian alliances, there is nonetheless compelling evidence that the Gulf monarchies are seeking to strengthen their non-hydrocarbon economic ties and even non-economic ties with these states. Indeed, an abundance of state-level visits, often at much higher levels than with western powers, and a plethora of cooperative agreements, gifts, loans, and other incentives are also undoubtedly helping the Gulf monarchies build up a soft power base in the East as well as the West.

China and Japan now have the second and third greatest oil consumption needs in the world, behind only the US, while Japan still has the fifth greatest gas consumption needs in the world, ahead of Germany and Britain.[425] According to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries although Japan’s demand for oil is likely to fall by 15 per cent by 2030, China, South Korea, and other Pacific Asian economies are likely to make up 80 per cent of net global oil demand growth over the same period.[426] Most of this increased Pacific Asian demand is already being met by the Gulf monarchies, with their total hydrocarbon trade now close to $200 billion per annum[427]—a figure likely to increase dramatically over the next decade. The Pacific Asian economies do little to disguise their dependency on hydrocarbon imports from the Persian Gulf, in contrast to many Western powers which are openly trying to reduce their dependency and diversify their sources. Although the non-hydrocarbon trade that takes place between the two regions is on a much smaller scale, there has nevertheless been an historical precedent for the importing of certain goods from Pacific Asia into the Gulf monarchies, especially textiles and electrical goods. And since the substantial rise in per capita wealth on the Arabian Peninsula following the first oil booms, the demand for such imports has increased correspondingly, along with new demands for cars, machinery, building materials, and many other products associated with the region’s oil and construction industries. In total, the Gulf monarchies’ imports from Japan, China, and South Korea could now be worth as much as $63 billion per year.[428] Moreover, there is no longer as much of an imbalance in non-hydrocarbon trade between the two regions as there used to be, as some of the Gulf monarchies’ export-oriented industries — especially those producing metals, plastics, and petrochemicals — are now gearing their sales to Pacific Asian customers.

While the Gulf monarchies’ sovereign wealth investments in the Eastern powers remain much more modest than in the West, this is also slowly changing as investments in Pacific Asia become regarded as realistic and more hospitable alternatives to the more mature western economies. Such an alternative was viewed as being particularly necessary following 9/11, after which many western governments and companies did little to disguise their distrust of Gulf sovereign wealth funds, with many commentators arguing that Gulf investments were not merely commercial and that power politics could be involved.[429] With regards to Japan, Saudi Aramco has, for example, been holding a 15 per cent stake since 2004 in its fifth largest oil company, Showa Shell Sekiyu.[430] In 2007 Dubai International Capital purchased a ‘substantial stake’ in the beleaguered Sony Corporation — the first ever major UAE investment in Japan.[431] And in summer 2009 the Japan External Trade Organisation named the UAE as one of its top three target countries for sourcing FDI.[432] Since JETRO’s drive began, Abu Dhabi’s International Petroleum Investment Company has taken a 21 per cent, $780 million, stake in Japan’s Cosmo Oil Company[433] Although Kuwait’s sovereign wealth investments in Japan are more modest, the Kuwait Investment Authority nonetheless recently stated that it intends to increase by threefold its investments in Japan.[434]