Выбрать главу

The UAE offers even clearer examples, not least because it is usually perceived as a wealthy state. After several summers of blackouts in Sharjah, due to increased demand and its government’s inability to meet electricity costs, the Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority announced in 2009 that electricity charges were to be increased by 50 per cent — including those levied on UAE nationals. This led to much complaint, mainly from nationals, who claimed that the authorities were unable to cope with an expanding population. Since then blackouts have continued in the emirate, often forcing businesses to close due to lack of air-conditioning.[484] The Dubai and Abu Dhabi governments have also begun to falter, especially with regards to subsidising state-backed retail petrol companies such as the Emirates National Oil Company and the Emirates Petroleum Products Company (both owned by Dubai) and Emarat (owned by Abu Dhabi). In 2010 these companies’ roadside petrol stations began to experience fuel shortages — a situation that continued well into 2011. Initially the shortages were blamed on logistical problems, but it later transpired that deliveries were not being made due to the companies’ inability to make payments. Although fuel price hikes have taken place in recent years, most of which proved extremely unpopular with UAE nationals, there appeared to be no alternative as the various emirate-level governments had begun to phase out fuel subsidies on the grounds that they were costing the country hundreds of millions of dollars per year.[485] Indeed, at a secret meeting with Ministry for Finance and Industry officials both ENOC and EPPCO recommended removing the cap on fuel prices completely, which would have led to an immediate tripling of petrol prices from nearly $2 per gallon to nearly $6 per gallon. In 2011, however, due to the perceived political backlash of further price hikes in the wake of the Arab Spring, and the rising popularity of various opposition groups in the UAE, the Abu Dhabi authorities performed a u-turn by providing Emarat with even more capital. Meanwhile the federal government cancelled the licences of both ENOC and EPPCO given the Dubai government’s inability to provide a comparable bailout, with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company eventually taking over the running of their petrol stations.[486] Moreover, ministry officials even suggested introducing a new $550 fuel allowance specifically for UAE national families in order to cover future increases.

Voluntary unemployment

Although the poorer Gulf monarchies — which have fewer resources to finance public sector jobs for nationals or to provide incentives for their private sector employment — tend to have a more balanced workforce, the wealthier monarchies are increasingly faced with high levels of voluntary unemployment among their young national populations. In many ways, although there are some exceptions, the described cultivation of a national elite over the past four decades by these states has led to citizenries that are now not only accustomed to material benefits and to no forms of extraction, but are also — with all the various sponsorship systems, soft loans, and public sector employment opportunities — being deprived of any motivation to gain meaningful qualifications or enter into a more competitive job market, or even any form of private sector job. In other words, there is an increasingly significant drawback to the political benefits derived from cosseting the national population, and in many ways this is already leading to nationals in the Gulf monarchies’ largest cities becoming little more than bystanders on the sidelines of their countries’ development. Furthermore, there is evidence that this may be leading to a generation of Gulf nationals that are frustrated, bored, restless, and on occasion even delinquent.

In the mid-1990s even the ruler of Abu Dhabi warned of the phenomenon — seemingly oblivious that it was a problem partly of his government’s creation — by criticising the inactivity of young nationals who should be gainfully employed. He stated that he ‘could not understand how physically fit young men can sit idle and accept the humiliation of depending on others for their livelihood’.[487] Similarly, in the late 1990s the crown prince of Dubai seemed unaware of the root causes of the problem when he complained of ‘voluntary unemployment’ in his emirate, stating that ‘unemployment is a waste of natural resources and is wrong when the UAE is providing all its sons and daughters with opportunities that were unattainable a generation ago’.[488] Writing in his memoires at about the same time, one of Dubai’s veteran merchants predicted that ‘…of Dubai’s young nationals, probably only 20 per cent will be worthwhile, becoming academics and professionals, and businessmen. About 60 per cent can probably be written off, the consequences of the all-too-easy acceptance of the pleasures which will be handed out to them’.[489] Similarly realistic, when the former ruler of Qatar[490] fell ill in the mid-1990s he reportedly expressed more shock at the fact that his paramedic was actually a Qatari national than over the actual heart attack he had just suffered.[491]

Although a number of labour nationalisation strategies have been implemented in the more resource-rich monarchies—‘Saudification’, ‘Emiratisation’, ‘Kuwaitification’, and ‘Qatarisation’—they have in many ways only compounded the problem. In most cases they have avoided addressing the structural problem of most citizens being dependent on a distributive economy, and have served only to keep pricing nationals out of the market, which in turn has made them even less attractive employees. In particular, labour laws guaranteeing access to special pension funds and limiting working hours have greatly increased the cost of hiring nationals.[492] Even more heavy handed have been the aforementioned quota systems and job protection schemes for nationals imposed on certain industries.[493] These have often made expatriate colleagues resentful of their Gulf national counterparts and have made employers increasingly wary. As one recent report observed ‘…across the Gulf, and especially in states where rapid growth is driven by oil and gas, locals rarely have hands-on jobs in health — or anywhere in the private sector. In an unspoken pact between rulers and ruled, Gulf citizens seem all too happy to fill plush government jobs, where the pay is high, the hours short, and the work sometimes nonexistent. In the private sector, job after job is filled by South Asians, non-Gulf Arabs and Westerners’.[494]

In the UAE’s case, conservative estimates according to Tanmia are that nationals make up only 9 per cent of the total workforce[495] and just 1 per cent of the private sector workforce,[496] and that there are currently 17,000 unemployed UAE national adults.[497] Other estimates have put the figure as high as 35,000,[498] with many of these being degree holders.[499] The majority of these are likely to be in Abu Dhabi and probably fit into the category of voluntary unemployment. Indeed, latest official reports claim that the UAE has an unemployment rate of 23 per cent, with the government simply stating that the majority are ‘jobless by choice’.[500] More broadly, it is thought that at least half of those nationals in receipt of generous social security benefits are able-bodied and capable of work.[501] Interviewed by Reuters in 2010, one young UAE national explained that he ‘couldn’t not see the obvious’ and was willing to ‘hold out for up to a year for a government post rather than take a job with a private firm’. He also claimed that ‘I can work in a bank from at least 8am to 5pm, and get half the salary that I would get in a government job working 8pm to 2pm. Anyone would choose the better option’. Similarly, another national stated that ‘I will move to the government sector, I see it as a duty to my country’ before explaining that ‘You tell me, who wouldn’t wish to just sit there and get paid lots of money?’[502]

вернуться

484

23. Gulf News, 1 October 2009.

вернуться

485

24. The National, 7 June 2011.

вернуться

486

25. Gulf News, 5 July 2011.

вернуться

487

26. Wilson, Graeme, Rashid’s Legacy: The Genesis of the Maktoum Family and the History of Dubai (Dubai: Media Prima, 2006), p. 528.

вернуться

488

27. Ibid., p. 529.

вернуться

489

28. Al-Gurg, Easa Saleh, The Wells of Memory (London: John Murray, 1998), p. 219.

вернуться

490

29. Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani.

вернуться

491

30. Reuters, 21 October 2010.

вернуться

492

31. A labour law was introduced in 2002 in an effort to regulate the employment of nationals in the private sector. As part of the law, nationals were to benefit from a special pensions fund and were to be ‘guaranteed better rights as employees’ including a maximum number of working hours per week and a guaranteed finishing time of four o’clock in the afternoon for women with children of school age.

вернуться

493

32. Notably banking and insurance companies. Gulf News, 23 September 2004; Gulf News, 8 December 2006.

вернуться

494

33. Reuters, 21 October 2010.

вернуться

495

34. Oxford Business Group, ‘Abu Dhabi: The Report 2007’. p. 51.

вернуться

496

35. Reuters, 21 October 2010.

вернуться

497

36. The National, 27 July 2008.

вернуться

498

37. Gulf News, 8 December 2006.

вернуться

499

38. Gulf News, 28 July 2008.

вернуться

500

39. Reuters, 21 October 2010.

вернуться

501

40. Oxford Analytica, February 2007.

вернуться

502

41. Reuters, 21 October 2010.