The same comprehensive Reuters report estimated the situation to be little better in other Gulf monarchies, with only 10 per cent of Saudi nationals and 5 per cent of Qatari nationals being employed in the private sector,[503] despite the Saudification programme aiming to replace 10 per cent of the expatriate workforce with unemployed nationals[504] and the Qatarisation programme aiming for 40 per cent labour nationalisation. Speaking in late 2010 the Saudi minister for the interior (and up until recently the crown prince)[505] made it clear that ‘…the government could not keep providing jobs for everyone’ and, according to a Financial Times report, he ‘signalled an impatience with businesses that hire only foreigners and urged the private sector to employ more Saudis’.[506] Speaking a few months later the chairman of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry[507] agreed with the urgency of the situation, calling on the government to ‘appoint an international consultancy firm to help implement the Saudification program more effectively’ and arguing that ‘the problem… is that while [the government] has been relatively successful in creating a very good education sector, they are still not delivering people that are capable of working in the private sector’.[508] As with the UAE, it seems that the problem will be very difficult to solve, with the average expatriate’s earnings in Saudi Arabia’s private sector being about $200 per month compared to over $800 for Saudi nationals.[509] Understandably, the Financial Times’ report concluded pessimistically that ‘many young Saudis fresh out of college [still] feel entitled to a managerial post by virtue of their nationality, and complain that foreign bosses order them around’ and that ‘the government is grappling with the challenge of creating highly paid jobs for a young population with a strong sense of entitlement, poor education and, often, a weak worth ethic’. Similarly negative, and further hinting at the deep-rooted, structural nature of the problem, have been the recent views of chief economists at Saudi-based banks who have explained that ‘the government has to work on changing nationals’ attitudes, which were pretty much cultivated during the first oil boom in the 1970s’ and have questioned ‘how can you create jobs for Saudis if they do not want to join the private sector, and the private sector does not want them?’[510]
In Kuwait, over 12,000 nationals are believed to be waiting for public sector positions, preferring to remain unemployed in the meantime rather than work in the private sector.[511] Bahrain and Oman have suffered much less, but in part this is due to the increase in real unemployment in these states, as discussed later in this chapter. Moreover, there have been some relatively novel labour nationalisation schemes in these countries which have had some success, albeit still quite limited. In 2009, for example, Bahrain increased the charge on visas for foreign workers in an effort to make Bahraini workers more attractive to employers. In the end, however, too many businesses lobbied to protect the status quo and the visa charge was only raised to $27—which was deemed merely a minor obstacle to hiring expatriates. In Oman, the government has required taxi drivers and hotel reception workers to be nationals since the 1980s. This gives visitors to the country the impression that Oman’s labour force is far more nationalised than in the other Gulf monarchies. Nevertheless it is still a narrow example.
Apart from the long term economic consequences of having almost no nationals engaged in the public sector, with many remaining unemployed, and in receipt of (often generous) social security benefits, there are also growing symptoms of the social and political problems in store for the Gulf monarchies. In summer 2010, for example, several hundred frustrated Saudi national university graduates reportedly gathered outside the Ministry for Education carrying posters demanding government jobs and carrying posters with slogans such as ‘Enough Injustice’.[512] The problem is also increasingly being linked to terrorism and security concerns, with some analysts remarking that ‘…the Saudi government believes that the question of unemployment is a major problem with huge implications on security… and the great majority of those recruited for terrorist activities are the unemployed’.[513] Crime rates among Gulf nationals have also soared over the past few decades — mostly connected to acts of delinquency such as joyriding and shoplifting. Although official statistics are unavailable, given the sensitivities prevalent in conservative societies, alcohol and drug abuse have risen dramatically among the indigenous populations, despite the harsh penalties associated with narcotics. Most Gulf monarchies now have extensive rehabilitation centres. In Dubai, for example, the emirate’s Training and Rehabilitation Centre — available only to nationals — has been described by the New York Times as ‘a lush facility complete with swimming, art classes and a gym, deep in the desert’. In Saudi Arabia there are now television programmes that openly discuss drug abuse, while in Bahrain and Kuwait clerics increasingly preach about the dangers of narcotics. As a representative of Mentor Arabia — an organisation that aims to help regional governments formulate anti-drug policies — has claimed ‘the taboo around drug addiction is fading because the problem is becoming too scary’ and that ‘there are many indicators that suggest this is going to be a big problem… what shows it is that the governments are beginning to ask for help’. Meanwhile, a former UAE national drug user has explained that ‘…the drug problem here is really an invasion… there is money, the place is open, so it’s bound to happen here’.[514]
Squandering wealth
Although a pathology resulting from the opacity of politics in the Gulf monarchies rather than a side effect of the distributive economy, the massive squandering of national resources — sometimes to benefit ruling family members — is arguably just as damaging for these countries. For many years the most visible example of the problem was the ‘copycat spending’ of competing monarchies, as each seemed to try to out-do the other by buying or constructing better versions of the same, often prestigious article or totemic building. In many cases this led to a noticeable duplication of high profile investments in the region, usually with little cooperation between neighbours and with minimal regard for long term planning. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the air, as in addition to having at least one international airport, each Gulf monarchy now also has at least one international airline, despite the relatively small populations of these countries. Jointly owned by the UAE (specifically Abu Dhabi), Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, Gulf Air was originally intended to be the principal carrier for these countries, before Dubai established Emirates Airlines, Qatar established Qatar Airways, Oman established Oman Air, and — eventually — Abu Dhabi established Etihad Airways. Today, therefore, Gulf Air is effectively the national carrier only of Bahrain, with its aeronautical siblings competing with each other along with other established Gulf carriers such as Kuwait Airways and Saudi Arabia Airlines. There are countless other examples, most of which connected to soft power strategies or diversification efforts, including the monarchies competing to acquire European football clubs and scrambling to host the most spectacular Formula One Grand Prix. Both Bahrain and Abu Dhabi now stage such events, despite their very close proximity, and back in 1981 Dubai held an unofficial ‘Dubai Grand Prix’—the posters for which displayed the face of the emirate’s ruler[515] more prominently than any driver or car.
510
49.