Shortly prior to the Arab Spring the Kuwaiti authorities had also begun cracking down on public gatherings, most notably in December 2010 when security forces attacked a group of opposition MPs and other Kuwaiti nationals that had convened a public meeting to discuss a ‘government plot to amend the 1962 constitution in order to suppress public freedoms’. At least a dozen gatherers were injured and hospitalised, prompting a fifty-two person petition to be signed by Kuwaiti intellectuals and activists that ‘expressed regret and condemned the excessive use of force against Kuwaiti citizens’. Opposition MPs also filed a motion requesting the questioning of the prime minister on the grounds that he was ‘suppressing freedoms’. The petitioners and the MPs further claimed in their statements that the Kuwaiti government had an active policy of ‘suppressing media coverage’ and linked the crackdown to Kuwait’s recent blocking of Qatar’s Al-Jazeera news network in the emirate.[650]
Saudi Arabia’s response to censorship more or less mirrors the UAE and Kuwait, but with a new, clearer set of internet regulations having been introduced in early 2011. Apparently to ‘protect society from erroneous practices in electronic publishing,’ the new regulations are wideranging but also ambiguous, covering all forms of “electronic journalism” from blogs to chat rooms and archives, in addition to ‘any other form of electronic publishing that the Ministry may choose to add’. Seemingly recognising the difficulty of getting bloggers and other internet activists to register their sites with the Ministry in the same way that online newspapers and other more established fora have had to, the rules instead require their ‘voluntary registration’. Crucially, under the new regulations the Ministry has the right to request details from website owners of their servers — even if outside the country — thus allowing government officials in theory to take offensive websites offline entirely if required.[651] Meanwhile, much like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has continued to arrest countless activists and intellectuals who have spoken or written in a critical manner about the government or the ruling family. In later 2010 for example, a Saudi law professor[652] was seized after he published an online article that questioned the ruling family’s legitimacy and speculated about divisions within the family and what they could mean for the future of the monarchy. He was reportedly taken from his family home by four men who did not have a court-issued arrest warrant and then held without charge.[653]
Of all the Gulf monarchies, Qatar has had the least to worry about with regard to censorship, given its economic circumstances and the general popularity enjoyed by its ruling family. Moreover, as the home of the Al-Jazeera network — which is widely regarded as enjoying relatively free speech — Qatar’s credentials have been further strengthened. Nevertheless, as with its neighbours, the government has ensured that it has powerful mechanisms to monitor and control most forms of media, including electronic and internet communications. A few activists and bloggers have recently been arrested, which indicates the structural similarities between Qatar and the other Gulf monarchies. The biggest problem so far seems to have been the very public embarrassment over a high profile attempt by the ruling family to brand Qatar as a regional haven of free expression. Launched in 2008 by the ruler’s wife — perhaps to allow the ruler to enjoy a little distance from the project, if need be[654]—the Doha Centre for Media Freedom appointed Robert Ménard, former director of the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders, as its founding director. The Centre then established two safe houses in Doha for journalists fleeing from neighbouring countries and positioned itself to pay the legal fees of such refugees.
But only months after the launch, Ménard sent an open letter to the ruler’s wife claiming that visas to such journalists were being denied by Qatari officials and that ‘…some people close to you and others you have appointed to senior positions at the centre are obstructing its activities’. Furthermore, Ménard had fired a Qatari national at the Centre, allegedly for this reason, and he argued that Qatar’s media was operating ‘under orders’.[655] Unsurprisingly Ménard resigned from the Centre shortly afterwards, and was quoted in the international media as follows: ‘How can we have any credibility if we keep quiet about problems in the country that is our host?’[656] He also explained that ‘…the Centre has been suffocated. We no longer have either the freedom or the resources to do our work’ and argued that ‘…some Qatari officials never wanted an independent Centre, free to speak out without concern for politics or diplomacy, free to criticise even Qatar’. Finally, he turned attention to Qatar itself, complaining that ‘Qatar has still not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, despite frequent promises… and the committee that was supposed to discuss a new law on the media — and on which I had been invited to sit — has still not held any meetings’.[657]
5
MOUNTING EXTERNAL PRESSURES
Although the external survival strategies employed by the Gulf monarchies have generally succeeded in securing their position in a volatile environment and boosting their status and influence in more powerful states, they remain prey to pressures and weaknesses that are either byproducts of these relationships or that result from the mismanagement of external forces impacting on the region. Among the latter are efforts to diversify their economic bases away from hydrocarbons that have precipitated the development of new economic sectors geared towards foreign investors, tourists, or simply an increased number of expatriates. In many cases this has led to economy-driven, top-down changes and relaxations in the Gulf monarchies’ societies, especially with regard to cultural and religious practices. Already these are leading to mounting frustration and resentment from some sections of the national populations, especially those who believe that their governments and ruling families are not doing enough to preserve their values and traditions. In turn this is eroding the monarchies’ legitimacy resources, especially relating to traditional authority and Islam.
654
193. As Fromherz describes ‘[the ruler] can support initiatives such as press freedom through [his wife] while distancing himself somewhat from the risks associated with such ventures’. See Fromherz, Allen J.,