According to World Bank and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data on total military spending, Saudi Arabia devoted somewhere between 10 and 11 per cent of GDP in 2010 to its military. This was the highest such proportion in the world and more than double the military spending of major military powers such as the US and Russia, and nearly five times greater than that of Britain, France, and China. Incredibly, the comparatively indigent state of Oman is the second biggest spender as a proportion of its GDP, with close to 10 per cent having been devoted to its military in 2009. The UAE is in third place among the Gulf monarchies, spending somewhere between 5 and 6 per cent of GDP on its military in recent years — still higher than the US and Russia. Meanwhile the other Gulf monarchies have all been spending between 3 and 5 per cent on their militaries — a significantly higher proportion than other parts of the developing world.[698]
Most of the purchases have been valued at several billion dollars at a time, and have ranged from tanks and warplanes to naval vessels and missile systems. The Saudi and UAE procurements have tended to win the highest profile headlines given their commensurately higher GDPs than other Gulf monarchies and correspondingly greater ability to buy the very latest equipment. In 2009 alone it was reported that the UAE had purchased nearly $8 billion of US military equipment, making it the US’ biggest arms customer that year, while Saudi Arabia had purchased about $3.3 billion of American hardware.[699] And in late 2010, after having invited fifty US-based arms manufactures to the country to ‘see the opportunities for growth first hand’,[700] it was reported that the UAE had spent close to $70 billion on arms in recent years and had accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the Gulf states’ total purchases of tanks and rockets between 2005 and 2009. In addition to American arms, these imports are thought to have also been sourced from France, Russia, and Italy, and have included corvettes, frigates, and air defence systems.[701] Moreover, with Abu Dhabi hosting the annual International Defence Exhibition (IDEX) and with Dubai hosting the biannual Dubai Air Show, the UAE has cemented its role as the region’s premier arms bazaar, with scores of major international weapons suppliers using these events to showcase their latest products to representatives from all of the Gulf monarchies and other nearby states.
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and increased conflict in the broader region it is likely that all six states are increasing their military spending further. In December 2011 the US government announced it had finalised a $30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F15 fighter jets to the Saudi Royal Air Force.[702] With regards the UAE, following 2011’s IDEX it was announced that Boeing would be delivering new military transport aircraft, while France’s Nexter Corporation would provide support for the UAE’s LeClerc battle tanks and the US’ Goodrich Corporation would provide spare parts for its air force. Most controversially, it was also reported that a partnership was planned between a UAE-based company and the US-based General Atomics Aeronautical Systems with the aim of selling Predator drones to the UAE. If successful, this would be the first time that US drone technology has been sold to a foreign buyer.[703]
Unsurprisingly, in addition to stiff criticism from domestic opponents, most of whom argue that the purchases are a colossal waste of precious national resources and send the wrong signals about the intentions of the Gulf monarchies, the recent sales have also generated opposition in the West. In the US, for example, the pro-Israel lobby repeatedly argues that the sale of such high grade equipment to the Gulf monarchies will erode Israel’s ‘qualitative edge’ in the region. Moreover, given the protests and other opposition movements that are stirring the Gulf — as discussed later — some Western governments have sought to stem the supply of equipment to states that are likely to use it to repress their own people. In early 2012 for example several American congressmen sought to block proposed arms sales to Bahrain worth over $50 million, given the pitched battles raging on Bahrain’s streets between protestors and security forces at the time.[704] Although sales were resumed in May 2012, items such as teargas canisters and ‘crowd control’ weapons were withheld from trade.[705] Other Western governments have baulked at the procedures associated with selling arms to the Gulf monarchies, with increasing opposition developing against what are perceived as corrupt practices. The British government’s long-running investigation into allegations of bribery surrounding the massive $86 billion Al-Yamanah arms deal to Saudi Arabia is well known, even though it was eventually called off. But more recently the German government has been forced to investigate alleged bribes and kickbacks connected to the sale of 200 German Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, critics have argued that the sale ‘…contravened Germany’s strict rules on arms exports, which ban the sale of weapons to countries in crisis zones, those engaged in armed conflicts, and those with questionable human rights records’.[706]
Antagonising Iran
The increasing belligerence demonstrated towards Iran in recent years by some Gulf monarchies is symptomatic of the latter’s reliance on Western security guarantees and the presence of Western military bases on their soil; thus they have little choice but to align themselves with Western policies regarding Iran, and if that involves helping to enforce sanctions or otherwise limit Iran’s influence in the region then in practice there is little room for them to manoeuvre. Moreover, given the associated requirement of purchasing massive quantities of armaments from their principal guarantors, it can also be argued that it is in the interests of the governments and military-industrial establishments of the vendor countries to pit the Gulf monarchies against their most powerful neighbour. Ideally, in terms of arms sales, this should develop into a tense and bitter cold war situation where both sides view each other as a posing a military threat, thus encouraging the further militarisation of the region and further expensive procurements. In this light, the Gulf monarchies’ present stance against Iran can be explained in the context of a dependent, core-periphery relationship:[707] even if the centre of gravity of the Gulf monarchies’ economic relations may be steadily shifting eastwards, the Western powers are nevertheless still recognised as their principal security providers and can thus dragoon them into hawkish positions.
There are increasing signs that the posturing against Iran — no matter how dangerous — is also being viewed by certain Gulf monarchies as a convenient mechanism with which to contain domestic opposition. In addition to the routine creation of a nearby bogeyman state with which to frighten their national populations and thus help distract from some of the various socio-economic pathologies and pressures that are building, the branding of Iran as a dangerous and unpredictable Shia-dominated enemy intent on acquiring nuclear weapons also helps to justify the sectarian manipulation that is taking place in several Gulf monarchies. It also serves to delegitimise any revolutionary actors and tarnish protestors on the grounds that they are agents of Iran. Indeed — as will be shown in the following chapter — since the beginning of the Arab Spring the Gulf monarchies’ governments have gone to great lengths to highlight the presence of any Shia in opposition movements, and to some extent this has allowed them to brand their opponents and critics as being fifth columnists rather than as pro-reform activists. Thus far, the strategy has enjoyed some limited success, with large sections of the national Sunni populations being quick to accuse Shia activists of being traitors, and with many Western opinion-makers continuing to lend support to the Gulf monarchies on the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style theocratic, revolutionary and anti-Western governments. Such opinions have helped fuel what some writers have described as the ‘geopolitical fantasy’ of a ‘Shia crescent’ that would extend all the way from Afghanistan to the Lebanon, including the Gulf states, which would be headquartered in Tehran.[708]
698
41. World Bank 2011 data derived from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database.
707
50. For dependency theory in the context of the Arab world see for example Amin, Samir,
708
51. Filiu, Jean-Pierre,