The risks of such rabid elite-level anti-Iranianism in the Gulf monarchies are undoubtedly serious, and possibly existential. Self-evidently these states are allowing themselves to be considered legitimate targets, or the ‘front line’, of any fresh conflict in the Persian Gulf. In this sense, their external survival strategies — in particular relating to the distribution of development aid in the region and the long-running efforts to position themselves as benign, active neutrals and peace-brokers — are being badly undermined by the current generation of Gulf rulers. It is unlikely that their fathers would have allowed such an escalation to have taken place, no matter how much they distrusted Iran. Most previous confrontations — including even the 1971 seizure of three UAE islands by the Shah’s Iran — were usually sidelined in favour of shared economic interests or the substantial Iranian-origin expatriate populations resident in many Gulf monarchies.
At the forefront of the antagonism are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE — or more specifically sections of the Abu Dhabi ruling family. According to a recently leaked US diplomatic cable, in 2008 the Saudi king had ‘repeatedly exhorted the US to cut off the head of the snake’ in reference to Iran, its perceived military capabilities, and the nuclear weapon-building programme that Iranian officials continue to deny exists.[709] The former Saudi intelligence chief has gone on the record stating that Saudi Arabia should ‘consider acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran…’,[710] and in another leaked cable from 2008 the veteran Saudi minister for foreign affairs[711] suggested a US or NATO-backed offensive in southern Lebanon to end the Iranian-backed Hezbollah’s grip on power. Warning US officials that a Hezbollah victory in Lebanese elections would likely lead to an ‘Iranian takeover’ of the state, he claimed that the situation in Beirut was ‘entirely military… and the solution must be military as well’. He also argued that of all the regional fronts on which Iran was advancing, Lebanon would be the ‘easiest battle to win’ for the ‘anti-Iranian allies’.[712] Similarly, in a cable despatched in 2009 the Bahraini king had urged US military officials to ‘forcefully take action to terminate Iran’s nuclear programme, by whatever means necessary’. Moreover, he argued that ‘…the danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it’.[713] Closely connected to the sectarian policies in Bahrain and in particular the discrimination against its Shia population, the kingdom took maximum advantage of the region’s anti-Iranian sentiments in early 2011 by announcing that it would deport all those Shia ‘with links to Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard’. In practice, this meant expelling hundreds of long-serving Lebanese expatriates, much as the UAE had been doing since 2009, suspending all flights between Manama and Beirut, and warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to ‘threats and interference by terrorists’.[714]
The reaction from Abu Dhabi appears originally to have been more hesitant — perhaps because the more moderate policies of its former ruler still prevailed. In a leaked cable from 2006 the American Embassy in Abu Dhabi claimed that the UAE believed ‘the threat from al-Qaeda would be minor compared to if Iran had nukes… but that it was reluctant to take any action that might provoke its neighbour’. The cable also explained that UAE officials had asked US officials to ‘…only seek their help as a very last resort’ and had stated that ‘if you can solve something without involving the UAE, please do so’.[715] Nevertheless, as Abu Dhabi’s forceful crown prince, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and his five full brothers gained control over most aspects of foreign policy and the security establishment, the emirate’s views quickly began to fall into line with those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Since 2007 Western embassy officials have been repeatedly encouraged by the crown prince’s circle to get more troops on the ground in an effort to counter Iranian hegemony. And in summer 2009, as recorded in another leaked US diplomatic cable, the crown prince had warned the US of appeasing Iran and had stated that ‘Ahmedinejad is Hitler’.[716] A few months later, the Qatar-based commander of US CENTCOM appeared to express his agreement with the UAE’s new stance, stating on the record at a major security conference in Bahrain that ‘the Emirati Air Force itself could take out the entire Iranian Air Force, I believe, given that it’s got… somewhere around 70 Block 60 F-16 fighters, which are better than the US’ F-16 fighters’.[717] Even more belligerently, in a summer 2010 interview with the American magazine The Atlantic, the UAE’s ambassador to the US (an Abu Dhabi national)[718] openly stated his country’s preference for war. When asked ‘Do you want the US to stop the Iranian nuclear program by force?’ he replied on the record with ‘Absolutely, absolutely. I think we are at risk of an Iranian nuclear program far more than you [the US] are at risk… I am suggesting that I think out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran. Our military, who has existed for the past forty years, wake up, dream, breathe, eat, sleep the Iranian threat. It’s the only conventional military threat our military plans for, trains for, equips for, that’s it, there’s no other threat, there’s no country in the region that is a threat to the UAE, it’s only Iran’.[719]
More broadly, the apparent nuclearisation of the UAE and other Gulf monarchies can also be interpreted as part of the strengthening anti-Iran front. This began in late 2009 with Abu Dhabi’s awarding of a $20 billion contract to a South Korea-led consortium[720] to build four nuclear plants by 2020,[721] and has since gathered pace with Kuwait[722] and Saudi Arabia[723] also in discussion with foreign nuclear companies. Although the UAE programme is strictly civilian and rational in terms of diversifying its energy supplies, given declining hydrocarbon reserves and rising domestic energy consumption, the manner in which the programme was initiated was nonetheless also intended to signal a warning to Iran. There was a keenness to seek approval for the programme not only from the International Atomic Energy Agency, but also from the world’s major nuclear powers. The UAE did not move ahead with its contract until it received approval from the US Congress, even though its intention was likely never to award it to the bidding US-Japan consortium.[724] This is in sharp contrast to Iran’s efforts to press ahead with an indigenous programme that has not sought approval from the US or other nuclear powers.
720
63. The consortium comprising the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO), Samsung, Hyundai, Doosan, and Westinghouse.