Such spying and bilateral regional security deals with other regional powers — whether real or fictional — understandably attenuate any sense of trust in the GCC and its capabilities. Certainly, there is little doubt that all six of the Gulf monarchies’ governments continue to view separate, international security guarantees as their only effective safety net. Some of the Western powers have seized the opportunities presented by these weaknesses and have now begun to explore the possibility of widening their individual alliances and agreements to form sub-groups of Gulf monarchies. In other words, if two or three Gulf monarchies can be brought together under the umbrella of one Western power, then a sense of collective security can be created for those countries even if it is sponsored by a foreign power and involves bypassing the GCC and its Peninsula Shield Force. Following the founding of the French military base in Abu Dhabi in 2009, the French president’s opinion-editorial in Abu Dhabi’s state-backed English language newspaper hinted at such a possibility. Explaining that ‘…with this first French military base in the Middle East, our country also shows that it intends to be fully engaged in the security and stability of this region’ he then went on to state that ‘France has many allies in the region; our presence in Abu Dhabi will enable us to reinforce our strategic partnership with them’ and that ‘we [France] hope that solid multilateral defence co-operation will develop among our allies in the region’. He concluded that ‘For this reason, we want to fully involve Qatar in the recent French-Emirates “Gulf Shield” military exercise. In a region as troubled as yours, it is essential that the countries defending the same values work together to reinforce their common security’.[767]
Interference and coups d’état
The bitter quarrels and differences between the Gulf monarchies have sometimes even led to attempts to alter the course of dynastic succession in each other. When opportunities have arisen in one Gulf monarchy — perhaps following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute — it is now commonplace for the other Gulf monarchies to interfere, either by discreetly backing a preferred candidate or, in more extreme cases, even sponsoring a coup d’état. Moreover, with the six monarchies failing to present a united front and often being divided over their choice of candidate in these ‘succession contests’, the resulting vacuums have often allowed foreign, non-regional powers to get involved. In some ways this is nothing new, as during Britain’s period of influence in the Persian Gulf there were frequent cases of the political resident stepping in to shape the future of certain monarchies. As described, the colonial representative eased the transfer of power in Abu Dhabi in 1966 from one brother to another, while in 1970 Britain ensured that control of Oman passed from father to son. In most of these situations Britain was playing the role of facilitator rather than meddler, usually consulting members of the ruling family in question and helping the dynasty install its preferred successor at the expense of unpopular or overly cautious incumbents. The squabbles and coups of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have, however, been quite different, as when neighbouring monarchies or foreign powers have been involved there has rarely been any effort to identify the most suitable or popular candidate, with most of the focus being on installing a ruler that will be the most amenable to their interests.
In the late 1980s, for example, the coup in the UAE’s Sharjah — where one brother[768] ousted another[769] on the grounds of economic mismanagement and squandering — was only reversed following interference by neighbouring Dubai, which had provided accommodation for the ousted ruler and published newspaper stories supporting him.[770] Similarly in 1995 Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia tried to re-install the ousted ruler of Qatar[771] who, as discussed, was removed from power by his more popular, pro-reform, son.[772] Although the counter-coup was unsuccessful, fears of a repeat attempt continued to dog Qatar for several more years. Indeed, the following year some 6000 tribesmen were disenfranchised and several ruling family members were arrested after being linked to a Saudibacked coup plot.[773] And in 2009 it was reported by Stratfor that a major coup in the emirate had been attempted, involving members of the Qatari military and the ruling family. Most of the subsequent press coverage hinted that the coup had Saudi Arabia’s support.[774] Similarly, in February 2011 the Jordan and UAE-based Al-Bawaba news agency reported that another coup had been attempted in Qatar, with thirty military personnel being arrested. This had supposedly coincided with a statement signed by sixty-six opposition figures including sixteen members of the ruling family who were backing the ruler’s exiled brother in France[775] and which claimed that the ruler and his wife were involved in ‘cases of corruption and social injustice’.[776] Gaining traction, this time the story was even covered in bulletins issued to various UN agencies. Whether true or not, the foreign-sourced report proved damaging for the ruler and has kept the spectre of future coup attempts in the minds of most Qataris and resident expatriates. Indeed, in April 2012 Iran’s Fars News Agency and Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya reported that yet another attempt had taken place, with high-ranking military officers being rounded up and placed under house arrest after clashes between Royal Guard troops and regular military personnel outside one of the ruler’s palaces. Perhaps works of fiction, the reports claimed that the ruler and his wife were transported by American helicopters to a safe location.[777]
By far the best example of a modern-day coup and resulting foreign interference has been in the UAE’s northernmost emirate of Ra’s al-Khaimah. In 2003, after having allegedly burned an American flag at the head of an anti-Iraq war demonstration, the emirate’s long-serving crown prince[778] was replaced by one of his younger brothers.[779] A decree was signed by their very elderly father in support of this change, but at the time many analysts questioned the ruler’s decision-making abilities given his advanced age and poor state of health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing of Abu Dhabi, as tanks belonging to the federal UAE Armed Forces were moved from Abu Dhabi to Ra’s al-Khaimah and positioned on street corners. The ousted crown prince’s supporters demonstrated, chanting his name and holding flags, and thus indicating he still enjoyed popular support — but they were fired on by water cannon and dispersed. He was duly exiled, first crossing the border to Oman, and then living in the US and Britain.
However, with the emirate’s Dubai-like development programme beginning to flounder in 2008, the new crown prince was becoming increasingly vulnerable to criticism. There were also widespread allegations of corruption in his administration, specifically relating to kickbacks in the construction industry. Still in exile, the deposed crown prince enlisted a US public relations company and a British solicitor to conduct an international media campaign with the dual aims of persuading Abu Dhabi and then the international community that the incumbent crown prince was a liability. In particular the campaign claimed that the 2003 decree was never authenticated, and that a later 2004 decree had in fact been signed by the aging ruler, which overturned the 2003 decision. In an effort to appeal to Abu Dhabi’s stance on Iran, the campaign also focused on the new crown prince’s apparent connections to Tehran, claiming that his effective deputy — a Shia Lebanese businessman — had major commercial interests, including factories, in the Islamic Republic. In 2009 the campaign even claimed that Ra’s al-Khaimah’s port was being visited by Iranian customs officers and that the emirate was being used as a conduit for nuclear materials destined for Iran. Connections were also highlighted in the media between Ra’s al-Khaimah and al-Qaeda, with claims being made that recent terror plots in the UAE, including a 2009 attempt to blow up Dubai’s then incomplete Burj Khalifa skyscraper, had originated in Ra’s al-Khaimah.[780] And at one point it seemed that the campaign team had even tried to enlist the support of Israel, with it being reported that the exiled crown prince had met Israel’s ambassador to Britain and, according to documents seen by The Guardian, that the ambassador had promised that he was ‘…working with certain people from his side’ and ‘promised that the matter will be solved in his [the former crown prince’s] favour’.[781]
773
116. Kamrava, Mehran. ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’,
780
123. Oxford Analytica briefing paper on Ra’s Al-Khaimah, 28 October 2010. Written by the author.