In 2010 there were signs that the campaign may have been gaining traction, as Abu Dhabi’s ruling family seemingly allowed the former crown prince to return from exile in order to visit his father, who was being treated in a hospital in Abu Dhabi. He was reportedly also allowed to stay in his wife’s palace in Kalba — a town controlled by Sharjah. Given Abu Dhabi’s increasingly hawkish position on Iran, some observers believed that Abu Dhabi was unwilling to allow Ra’s al-Khaimah to retain links to Tehran. However, when the ruler finally died in October 2010 several hours of confusion ensued. The former crown prince had reentered Ra’s al-Khaimah and installed himself in his pre-2003 palace with approximately 150 heavily armed guards and a larger number of loyal tribesmen. He believed he had Abu Dhabi’s blessing to attend his father’s funeral and had concluded that he would be installed as ruler later that day. By early evening, however, a brief announcement was made by the UAE’s Ministry for Presidential Affairs in Abu Dhabi that his younger brother was after all going to be the new ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah. Tanks were again deployed on the outskirts of Ra’s al-Khaimah and all of the former crown prince’s retainers — including two of his cousins, several Omani citizens, and a Canadian military advisor — were arrested and detained for questioning.[782] Two months later the emirate’s new ruler was invited to a banquet in Abu Dhabi held in his honour, where the ruler of Abu Dhabi congratulated him and his new crown prince — one of his sons — on their successes. The new ruler was then described as ‘… expressing happiness over meeting the president [the ruler of Abu Dhabi] and assuring that he would work with dedication and honesty in the shade of the directives of the president and his wise leadership’.[783]
The immediate future is likely to be marked by more such coup attempts in the region, as a number of the Gulf monarchies now have very aged rulers and — given the ever increasing size of the ruling families — powerful factions have coalesced around rival candidates. In each of these cases it is likely that internecine contests will develop and, given the high stakes involved, the discreet involvement of foreign powers is all but inevitable. In Oman, for example, the seventy-one year-old Qaboos bin Said Al-Said has no children or other natural heirs and has always shied away from appointing a crown prince. Moreover, given the exclusion of most ruling family members from senior government positions, no real candidate has emerged as a potential successor, as nobody has been able to accumulate the necessary administrative or military experience and expertise normally expected of an heir apparent in a Gulf monarchy. At present, much seems to hang on a clause in Oman’s constitution[784] that permits the non-appointment of a crown prince, thereby allowing a ‘ruling family council’ to meet after the ruler’s death to decide upon the succession process. Indeed, Qaboos has stated his intention that such a council should meet after his death, but that if the council fails to reach a consensus then it should open a sealed envelope containing his two recommended candidates, in descending order. Two copies of these recommendations are believed to have been made, and are kept in safekeeping in two different places. Their contents are the subject of much speculation, with most Omanis believing them to name at least one of the sons of a popular uncle of Qaboos who died in 1980.[785] The obvious concern in Oman — and currently the subject of great speculation — is that should the family council be divided over its decision and then pursue one of Qaboos’ posthumous recommendations, then the newly installed ruler would have little personal legitimacy and thus be vulnerable to rivals.
The situation in Abu Dhabi — and thus the UAE presidency — is also worthy of attention. In late 2010 the sixty-four year-old ruler, Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, returned to the country after a lengthy period of medical treatment in Switzerland, having failed to return in time for the Eid Al-Fitr festival — the attendance of which is customary for a Gulf ruler. Moreover, he appeared to have suffered considerable weight loss, and the state-backed media published little or no information about his condition. Having been unable to appoint one of his own sons as crown prince, his heir apparent is instead one of his younger half brothers, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. Now fifty-one, and crown prince since 2004, Muhammad enjoys considerable clout in the emirate and is in de facto control of the UAE’s military in addition to the aforementioned Mubadala Development Company and several other state-backed entities. Moreover, Muhammad has the advantage of having five full brothers and a still influential mother[786] who was always considered the favourite of the late ruler’s many wives and is now officially referred to as ‘Mother of the Nation’.[787] Among them, these brothers control several further key portfolios in the Abu Dhabi and federal governments, and Muhammad’s eldest son is now seemingly in control of internal security. When Khalifa dies, however, all may not be smooth for Muhammad and his full brothers, as despite their strong influence they do not yet control all of the strings in Abu Dhabi. Notably the all-important Supreme Petroleum Council, the massive Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and several other key institutions still remain beyond their collective reach. Furthermore, although Muhammad and his brothers undoubtedly enjoy popularity within some circles in Abu Dhabi, it seems that in other emirates as many UAE nationals fear him as love him. Certainly, with the described hawkish stance on Iran, the relations with Israel, and — as discussed later in this book — a recent crackdown on opponents by the UAE’s security services — the fear factor is likely to keep building. Although critics and potential rivals within the extended ruling family have kept a low profile, they nevertheless exist, and there are some individuals who enjoy discreet support and — courtesy of their maternal ancestry and marriage links — are believed to be favourably viewed by some of the UAE’s largest and most influential tribes.
The most recent bout of speculation centres on succession in Saudi Arabia, as the main players are all very elderly and in some cases are perceived as having differing viewpoints on key issues such as relations with the US, the influence of the religious establishment, and women’s rights. A spate of deaths at the top of the establishment, which already seems to have begun, could see an unpopular king being installed and will likely expose deep divisions within the ruling family. In turn, this could easily force a stalemate or prompt a coup d’état in the kingdom. The current king, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, is fairly well liked. However, he is now believed to be about eighty-eight, having outlived a number of his younger brothers and relatives. Notably, his crown prince since 2005, Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, died in 2011 aged eighty-three. Seemingly with little choice, Abdullah then appointed another of his younger brothers, Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud as his crown prince and successor.
782
125. Oxford Analytica briefing paper on Ra’s Al-Khaimah, 28 October 2010. Written by the author;