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Although several hundred protestors were imprisoned during this period, only a small handful was kept in custody.[880] Nevertheless, with fresh demonstrations in May 2011 there were reports of much greater heavy-handedness from the security forces — including armoured vehicles being deployed to evict protestors from their tents and dismantle roadblocks, and with shots being fired into the air. Hundreds more prisoners were taken and two protestors were reported to have been shot. Protestors in Salalah claimed that the government was ‘trying to crush [their] movement’[881] and dozens of activists were given one year prison sentences for ‘damaging public property’ and ‘attacking public employees’.[882] Seven were even sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, having been charged with ‘shutting down work at a government organisation’.[883] In turn the wave of arrests led to further protests in summer 2011 when demonstrators in Sohar called for the release of these prisoners in addition to the meeting of their other, earlier demands. Although the ‘young protesters’ were reported to have decided to end their demonstration and return home so as to ‘avoid confrontation with security forces that could have bad consequences’, security forces were nonetheless described as having been ‘present in big numbers’ and teargas and baton charges were used to disperse the remaining crowds.[884]

In parallel to the security clampdown, the Omani authorities also began encouraging loyalist rallies, which often involved motorcades of several hundred cars driving around Muscat. Although the state-backed media claimed these were spontaneous displays of affection for the ruler, opposition activists claim that the state-owned telecommunications company[885] had been sending out multiple SMS messages during the nights preceding the rallies, urging Omani nationals to join in. Since the beginning of the protests the authorities have also sought to limit further the actions of existing civil society organisations, especially those relating to human rights. As with most of the other Gulf monarchies a state-backed human rights organisation was set up, and although it did offer support and advice to protestors and political prisoners, its lack of independence and neutrality has been criticised by many observers. Moreover, in 2011 there was a noticeable rise in media censorship, with journalists and bloggers having been arrested. Most significantly, in August 2011 one of Oman’s few independent newspapers—Al-Zaman—was threatened with closure following the publication of an article alleging corruption in the Ministry for Interior. The newspaper’s editor-in-chief was interrogated while the article’s author[886]—a prominent Omani journalist and filmmaker, and a participant in some of the protests — was arrested and brought in for questioning. Without access to a lawyer he was charged with ‘insulting the minister for justice and his deputy’, ‘attempting to create a division in society’, ‘abusing the judiciary in Oman’, ‘violating the publications and publishing law’, and ‘practising a profession without a permit from the Ministry for Information’. Representatives for the Committee to Project Journalists explained the writer’s subsequent trial was due to ‘the Omani authorities engaging in retaliatory tactics against [the accused] for his critical writing’ and that ‘the steps taken by the Omani judiciary suggest that this is a political vendetta rather than an effort to apply justice’. Similarly a group of Omani intellectuals, journalists, and activists issued a statement condemning the closure of Al-Zaman, stating that it would ‘… take us back to a world of repression and restriction of freedoms’.[887]

By autumn 2011 the situation in Oman appeared to have stabilised, following scheduled elections in October for its Consultative Council and promises from the ruler that the Council would be granted more legislative power and that 50,000 new jobs would be created, mostly in the public sector. On this latter promise it became clear that Oman had sought assistance from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, as a GCC rescue package of about $10 billion — to be spread out over ten years — had earlier been allocated to Oman,[888] in much the same way as Bahrain’s abovementioned financial assistance. But over the course of 2012 there have been several further arrests, with a round-up of several bloggers and internet activists in May 2012. Including a well-known Omani photographer and a female student who writes under the pen name ‘Rose of Dhofar’, they were accused of defaming the ruler and given prison sentences of between twelve and eighteen months.[889]

Saudi Arabia: the cracks appearing

Having intervened militarily in Bahrain and having now positioned itself as the de facto bank-roller of the Bahraini and Omani ruling families in order to help them stave off riots and revolution, any political instability in Saudi Arabia itself will have major ramifications for all of the Gulf monarchies. Indeed, while it can be argued that a revolution or civil war within one of the smaller Gulf monarchies could be contained by its neighbours, any significant strife in Saudi Arabia would quickly spread across its borders. Although still in command of substantial resources, the kingdom is nevertheless under increasing strain, with several of the mounting pressures discussed in this book — including high youth unemployment, poverty, and a growing sectarian divide between its Sunni and Shia populations — reducing its ruling family’s room for manoeuvre. As with Bahrain and Oman there have been protests and numerous killings in the wake of the Arab Spring, but given the kingdom’s much more repressive police apparatus, its even stronger controls over the media, and its generally inhospitable atmosphere for foreign journalists and international non-government organisations, these have not yet received the attention they deserve.

Described as ‘Arabia’s silent protests’ and later as ‘the Middle East’s most under-reported conflict’,[890] the Saudi protests began at about the same time as those in Bahrain and not long after crowds began congregating in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. In a direct rebuttal of the Grand Mufti’s position on the Arab Spring, in early February 2011 several senior Saudi scholars and religious leaders openly called on Mubarak to step down in order to ‘prevent further bloodshed’ and to respect ‘the thousands protesting for social and political reforms’.[891] The same week a Facebook group was set up by Saudi activists focusing on their own country’s plight. Entitled ‘The People Want to Reform the Regime’ the group soon attracted several thousand followers, most of whom seemed to be Saudi nationals. In addition to demanding ‘the equal distribution of wealth’ and ‘seriously addressing the problem of unemployment’, the group also called for an independent judicial system, anti-corruption measures, and ‘respect for human and women’s rights’. More formally, after Mubarak’s ousting several petitions began circulating in Saudi Arabia. Signed by thousands of prominent Islamists and liberal figures ‘from across the political spectrum’,[892] the documents included a ‘Declaration of National Reform’ and one entitled ‘Towards the State of Rights and Institutions’. As with the Facebook group the documents focused on the need for further political and social liberties and improved management of the economy.[893] In mid-February a political party was even launched by opposition figures, despite such organisations remaining illegal in the kingdom. Described as ‘an act of protest’, the new ‘Islamic Umma Party’ was made up of not only Islamists, but also many secular academics, human rights activists, and lawyers. In a letter sent to the king and posted on their website, the party wrote to the king that ‘You know well what big political developments and improvements of freedom and human rights are currently happening in the Islamic world’ and bluntly stated that ‘… it’s time to bring this development to the kingdom’. Meanwhile in an unprecedented public attack on the monarchy a party member and prominent Saudi lawyer[894] told Reuters that ‘You cannot just have the royal party governing the country. We want to raise this issue with government officials and persuade them’.[895]

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880

84. Gulf News, 8 May 2011.

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881

85. Al-Arabiya, 14 May 2011.

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882

86. Gulf News, 20 June 2011.

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883

87. Reuters, 29 June 2011.

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884

88. Gulf News, 22 July 2011.

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885

89. Referring to Omantel.

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886

90. Youssef Al-Haj.

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887

91. Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 12 August 2011.

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888

92. The National, 11 March 2011.

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889

93. Gulf News, 17 July 2012.

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890

94. The Guardian, 23 January 2012.

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891

95. Al-Basheer News, 6 February 2011.

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892

96. Washington Post, 20 April 2012. Quoting Waleed Abu Alkhair.

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893

97. Nolan, May 2011.

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894

98. Abdul-Aziz Al-Wahhabi.

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895

99. Reuters, 10 February 2011.