External pressures are having a similarly negative impact on the Gulf monarchies’ ruling bargains or socio-economic contracts. The dangers of rapid economic liberalisation in many of these states — and most particularly those that have opened up to foreign direct investment and tourism — are already apparent. Various relaxations have taken place, often without the consent of citizens, as governments have tried to make their countries more appealing to foreign investors, residents, and visitors, despite necessarily eroding religious and tribal heritage legitimacy resources. The monarchies’ close military relationships with the Western and other non-Muslim powers are becoming another major source of concern for citizens as there are a growing number of foreign military bases being established on their soil and there has been accelerating spending on imported armaments. Also disquieting is the hawkish and seemingly dangerous stance being taken on Iran, and the monarchies’ discreet efforts to improve relations with Israel, despite official boycotts being in place and again regardless of public opinion, Meanwhile the lack of collective security and basic unity between the six monarchies, in particular their inability to settle long-running disputes and strengthen the existing Gulf Co-operation Council, and the frequent coup attempts in the region, all continue to expose these states to malicious neighbours and other foreign interests.
Most of the earlier opposition groups that challenged the Gulf monarchies were successfully contained, as the various regimes were able to co-opt most of the modernising forces impacting on the region and keep the number of dissidents small. But the post-2011 opposition has been markedly different, with new pro-reform and pro-democracy figures and movements emerging in the region that can no longer be placed into the old categories. In particular, the impact of new, ‘greater’ modernising forces on the Gulf monarchies is becoming vitally important, especially relating to improved education and more advanced communication technologies. These include satellite television, and crucially social media and other peer-to-peer networking. Despite their best efforts the regimes seem unable to co-opt these effectively. Connecting back to the modernisation theory debate, these new forces may soon validate earlier lines of thinking, in addition to more recent writings such as Ronald Inglehart’s co-authored 2005 book Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,[976] as an increasing number of Gulf nationals are now able to share information freely amongst themselves in an educated manner, and can communicate more easily with activists in revolutionary Arab states and with the rest of the international community. Added to this, the Arab Spring revolutions elsewhere in the Middle East seem to be serving as catalysts for the beginning of the new movements in the Gulf, or at the very least have emboldened hitherto frightened opposition voices. Further eroding their stability, many of the Gulf monarchies have erred in their foreign policy since the onset of the Arab Spring, having openly positioned themselves on the side of other Arab authoritarian regimes and thus presented themselves as ‘status quo powers’—essentially trying to counter the pro-reform momentum that has been building in the region.
Of the six monarchies, Bahrain’s has by far the bleakest future, with little hope that the ruling family can restore sufficient legitimacy to ever govern again without resorting to martial law and extensive repression. It is currently being kept afloat by its regional allies — namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE — which will have to continue committing troops and supplying the kingdom with financial assistance. Although — unlike the other regimes that have faced Arab Spring revolutions — the Bahraini ruling family is not yet facing significant pressure from the international community, this will change within the next year or so, as the weight of evidence against the authorities grows. But for the time being the US and other Western powers are still willing to treat the revolution as an exceptional case, mainly due to the presence of the US Navy base in Bahrain and its potential front line role in any regional conflict with Iran. As described, the temporary block on the US arms trade to Bahrain has been lifted, and senior British and American police advisors have now been appointed by the king.[977] Dozens of ill-researched opinion pieces have also been appearing in Western newspapers highlighting the supposed connection between Bahrain’s opposition and Iran. As a good example of the kingdom’s latest soft power strategy, these fear-mongering pieces have usually been written by Western academics, former diplomats, and other distinguished personalities who have been approached and paid by public relations companies employed by the Bahraini government. In most cases they have presented a skewed and inaccurate picture of the Bahraini opposition and have made unsubstantiated claims about Iran’s intentions in the Gulf monarchies. References to the Bassiouni report’s findings on the lack of Iranian connections are never discussed, and explanations are rarely made that most Bahraini Shia do not subscribe to the Iranian doctrine of wilayet-e-faqih or rule by clerics, and instead look to Iraqi Shia clerics,[978] rather than Iranians, for direction.[979]
Although the Omani ruling family’s outlook is less precarious than Bahrain’s, with the state not suffering from the same levels of sectarian strife or discrimination, nor having had to invite troops from neighbouring countries to assist in suppressing protests, there are nonetheless serious concerns about political stability. As with Bahrain, Oman only has limited resources and cannot rely indefinitely on creating public sector opportunities for its citizens in order to appease protests and demands. Indeed, Oman’s stability already rests on external assistance, mostly from Saudi Arabia, and over the next year or two this will serve to delegitimise the aging, heirless ruler and his government. Moreover, when fresh protests erupt — either as a result of continuing government corruption or the state’s likely failure to deliver on its economic promises — these will undoubtedly be met with an even heavier response than the 2011 riots, as the ruler’s new backers will be unwilling to tolerate fresh challenges to another monarchy on its doorstep.
In many ways the kingpin of the Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia’s ruling family may appear more stable than its Bahraini and Omani neighbours given that its government still has the ability to keep distributing wealth in order to appease citizens; but in reality the Saudi system is equally unsustainable and probably prone to implosion within the next couple of years. With ongoing demonstrations regardless of the new subsidies and job creation schemes, and with increasingly repressive tactics being used to suppress freedom of expression, the kingdom is now looking very brittle. If, as is likely, conditions in Bahrain deteriorate further, then more serious protests and even revolutionary activity will occur, especially in Saudi’s Shia-dominated Eastern Province. And if unemployment, the wealth gap, and other socio-economic problems remain unchecked it is probable that insurgency will spread further across Sunni communities, thus helping the reform movement gain much broader support beyond the Shia population.
The most recent Saudi protests and demands have already been quite varied, occurring all over the country. They have ranged from men[980] being arrested for filming and then uploading onto YouTube a video about widespread poverty among Saudi nationals in Riyadh — a video which has now been watched by more than 1 million,[981] to women in Jeddah, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province filming themselves driving on motorways — a flagrant act of civil disobedience given the prevailing ban on women driving. The women involved tweeted that they were carrying their belongings as they were ‘ready to go to prison without fear’ while others told the international media that ‘this is a right for women that no law or religion bans… [we] went out to get our rights, so that it would be up to us to drive or not’.[982] As expected, Facebook and Twitter are also playing a key role, with leading activists claiming that ‘they can now speak to thousands across the world… without the strict censorship they live under in the off-line world’ and that ‘we’re so thirsty for freedom of expression and a forum for expression that you see [we] are far more involved [in social media] than our neighbours’. Certainly, as the aforementioned Muhammad Fahad Al-Qahtani has claimed, ‘the government has underestimated the power of social media in Saudi Arabia and now it’s too widespread to censor’.[983]
976
3. Inglehart, Ronald, and Welzel, Christian,
977
4. Kinninmont, Jane,