“The Russians must realize what they lost when the Soviet Union broke apart and Turkmenistan became independent.”
“I’d agree,” Morgan said. “The Russians still have a few fighter bases in Turkmenistan, and the Turkmen still use Russian officers on contract for their own military. But living and working in Turkmenistan was considered a hardship tour for the Russians — never more than ten percent of the population was Russian, and we know that the climate in Turkmenistan is so inhospitable that even the Russians had a hard time extracting oil and natural gas from there — and the Russians have developed oil fields in nasty places like Siberia.”
“But oil has a funny way of bringing out the worst in governments,” the president mused. “Go on, Douglas.”
“From 1985 to 2002, Saparmurad Niyazov was in charge of the country, initially as the Soviet first secretary and then as its president,” Morgan went on. “He played all sides and swung with the winds more than a weather vane in a tornado. He was a staunch Russian supporter when the Russians controlled the government; when the Soviet Union broke apart and nationalist forces started to gain in strength, Niyazov became a nationalist — replacing Russian with Turkmen as the official language, setting up Muslim religious schools, and so on. When the Taliban took over Afghanistan and threatened to take over some fundamentalist provinces in the east, Niyazov brought some pro-Taliban mullahs into his government. He ruled with an iron fist. Every member of the Turkmen parliament had to be approved by the president; the president appointed his own censors and editors in every media outlet in the country — the list goes on and on. It was Niyazov who inked the big TransCal oil deal, the first large-scale production deal in Turkmenistan and potentially one of the wealthiest oil deals in history.
“Niyazov finally retired in 2001 and held elections, but there was only one candidate: Kurban Gurizev, the leader of their parliament and deputy chairman of the Democratic Party, what used to be the Communist Party. Like Niyazov, he ruled with absolute authority. He continued to outlaw opposition parties, had to approve all candidates for public office, and created a virtual police state. He is strongly antiforeigner, anti-Muslim, and staunchly pro-Russian.”
“The military must hate Gurizev,” Goff observed.
“The Turkmen military is practically nonexistent,” Morgan said. “Maybe forty thousand troops in all, including paramilitary and reserves; four-fifths conscripts, lots of ex-Soviet equipment in very poor condition. Most of the officer corps is Russian — the officers who wanted to stay simply kept their posts and are being paid by the Turkmen government. Naturally, they have the best equipment.”
“I wonder who they take their orders from once the shit starts hitting the fan?” Busick asked.
“My bet would be with Russia,” Morgan said. “Kurban Gurizev was born and educated in Russia, not Turkmenistan — we think Kurban is not his real first name, but an adopted Turkmen name, part of Niyazov’s nationalist movement. He speaks no Turkmen. He had been known to butt heads with Niyazov on occasion in matters dealing with oil and gas development. Gurizev thought it best to maintain close ties between Russia’s oil infrastructure and Turkmenistan; Niyazov signed agreements with several different developers at the same time. Turkmenistan has deals with several Western companies to transport oil and gas across Afghanistan to Pakistan, with Azerbaijan to transport oil to the Black Sea, with Russia to transport oil to Russia, and even with Iran to transport oil to the Arabian Sea. On the face of it, it’s pretty smart. They get money from several sources and can supply oil to markets around the world regardless of geopolitical concerns. Although there are several development projects ongoing in Turkmenistan, in various states of progress, right now the country exports oil only to Russia, at cut-rate prices.”
“I think it would be a good idea to start monitoring events in Turkmenistan — perhaps put some intelligence assets on the ground,” Kercheval said. “My concern is the ongoing oil projects by Western, primarily American, companies — we don’t want them in the way if the Russians decide to move back in or, worse, if they storm on in, like they tried to do in the Balkans.” He turned to Franklin Sellers, the secretary of the treasury who served also as the secretary of commerce and the U.S. trade representative in the Thorn administration. “Can I get a briefing on the status of any approved projects in Central Asia, Franklin?”
“Sure, Edward.” Sellers, a former vice chairman of Nasdaq, was one of the youngest ever to hold that position; he was also, along with Secretary of Defense Robert Goff, one of the few members of Thorn’s Jeffersonian Party serving in the cabinet. “Just off the top of my head, the current project that I’m most familiar with is TransCal Petroleum’s proposed three-billion-dollar oil and natural-gas line that would pump and ship oil and gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to ports in Pakistan. With the elimination of the Taliban from Afghanistan, their project is back on. They also have a one-billion-dollar project to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Uzbekistan for the Central Asian and Indian markets — this one was designed to placate India, who was upset with the idea of the U.S. involved in a project that could make Pakistan rich.” He paused, then added, “From a political aspect, it certainly wouldn’t hurt to back TransCal’s projects either, sir. I think they could be very valuable financial supporters for the upcoming reelection campaign.”
“I’m not concerned about the reelection campaign, Franklin,” Thorn snapped. “My job is to do what’s best for the nation, not for TransCal.”
Sellers nodded and fell quiet, then glanced over at Robert Goff with an unspoken question. Robert Goff nodded that he understood Sellers’s query but indicated that he wanted to wait. “However,” Goff interjected, “I think the United States government has a duty to get involved if a foreign government reneges or interferes with the performance of a contract, or if that government is unable to protect the U.S. company from outside interference or from danger to American citizens working overseas. I think that’s what I’m hearing from State and Intelligence — that the Taliban’s actions and Russia’s possible reaction could threaten U.S. citizens and interests in Turkmenistan.”
“That’s a pretty long stretch, in my estimation,” Thorn said. “Companies like TransCal take a risk by investing in countries like Turkmenistan. I won’t automatically commit troops to action in Turkmenistan simply to protect an American company’s risky overseas investment. If Gurizev cancels the contract or Russian troops move into Turkmenistan on Gurizev’s invitation and shut down work on TransCal’s pipelines, I’m not going to send in the Marines to take it back. Let’s move on. Next I want to hear—”
“Excuse me, Mr. President, but is that going to be your official public position — that the U.S. won’t protect American interests in Turkmenistan or anywhere else in the world?” Secretary of State Kercheval asked incredulously. “With all due respect, sir — what kind of policy is that?”
“It’s a realistic one,” Thorn said. “It’s a responsible one. I’m not going to force any country to sell oil to the United States, and I’m not going to send American fighting men and women to protect a company’s right to make money overseas. If it’s too dangerous to be in the business of drilling and shipping oil in Turkmenistan, then perhaps we shouldn’t be over there doing it.”