Unfortunately, things didn’t work out that way. Two helicopters were forced to turn back due to mechanical difficulties between the carrier and Desert One. A third helicopter was found to have a total hydraulic failure at Desert One. An ad hoc decision was made to reembark the troops, return to Masirah, and have the helicopters return to the Nimitz and reprogram the effort for the following evening. While refueling one of the helicopters, a collision occurred resulting in a fire and explosion, and all of the helicopters and one C-130 were destroyed or badly damaged and had to be abandoned.
Although U.S. citizens had to presume that a rescue attempt was being planned, there had been no leaks of this expedition, and the first news of a military operation into Iran hit the morning papers on the twenty-fourth. The news reports accurately reported that a major rescue attempt had failed because of a breakdown in helicopters and a crash in the desert. They made it clear that the mission had been aborted with some loss of life after the fiery collision in the desert between a troop helicopter and a C-130 tanker.
With an operation of this size, under the direction of the chairman of the JCS and the personal oversight of the president, the prestige of the nation was at stake. Such a disaster was bound to ignite a firestorm of public indignation and demand for an explanation by the White House of the cause of the failure. However, the answers were not forthcoming. It was difficult to pinpoint the real cause of the abort and the ensuing disaster at Desert One. To analyze the operation and to determine the causes of the failures, the DoD ordered formation of the Special Operations Review Group, to be supported by the Joint Staff. With typical efficiency, the JS had put together an organization for the review group, appointed a chairman — myself — named the six principal members of the group, and ordered in a supporting staff from the JS organization. There would be minimum time in which to conduct the review and produce a report as there was great pressure from the White House to move rapidly. The report of the Special Operations Review Group would be the first official statement made concerning what had really occurred during the operation. The public, stimulated by the media, were pressing for answers on a daily basis. I agreed with the Joint Staff that by working our group six days a week plus overtime, and with open-ended support from the JS, we could produce a comprehensive report for the JCS in two months.
The review group itself consisted of six senior officers, with myself and two retired lieutenant generals from the Army and the Air Force — both with extensive experience in intelligence and special operations— and three active-duty general officers assigned to represent the three services. They were Maj. Gen. James C. Smith, USA; Maj. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, USAF; and Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gray Jr., USMC. All of these were absolutely topnotch officers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had fulfilled their obligation to give us the finest support available.
By late July the investigation had been completed and a comprehensive analysis performed. I had assumed for myself the responsibility of drafting the conclusions, based upon the recommendations of the other officers in the review group. There were two general conclusions. The principal conclusion was frankly critical of the planning process, specifically the chairman’s decision to conduct the planning with an ad hoc organization outside of the JCS structure. The conclusion also faulted the secretary of defense for not exercising the adequate oversight expected of the National Command Authority in allowing this faulty planning process to go on for several months before the JCS and the Joint Staff were brought in — as should have been from the beginning. Although this lapse in judgment concerning the planning process did not have a direct impact on the aborted helicopter extraction and the crash on the desert, it did delay the entire operation, and it demonstrated that too much secrecy in the guise of OpSec (Operational Security) would exclude certain very senior and experienced officers in the military structure with key responsibilities — such as the theater commanders — who would be involved in the execution of such an operation. The Operations Review Group considered that this failure to utilize the organization within the DoD and the JCS, and an attempt to plan such a complex operation with grossly inadequate planning resources, was a dangerous precedent and should be highlighted to prevent, insofar as possible, such a lapse from being repeated in a future situation.
In drafting this conclusion, I did not try to soften the criticism but was straightforward as to exactly what the faulty actions were, the problems they caused, and who was responsible for those decisions. I knew that the press in these cases was prone to accuse military officers investigating their comrades in uniform of a “whitewash.” I felt we owed it to our colleagues to be scrupulously honest.
The draft conclusions were circulated to the members of the review group for their concurrence or comments. One of the retired officers initially declined to sign because of the critical nature of the conclusions. But he eventually came around when he became aware of the positive attitude of the three active-duty major generals.
Al Gray, John Piotrowski, and Jim Smith, as a group, had come to see me privately in my office. Gen. Al Gray acted as their spokesman. His words went something like this: “We fully agree with the recommendations found by our group and the way you have expressed these views in your draft. We are all ready to sign this report, but we want you to know that we do it knowing that this will probably be the end of our military careers. We are criticizing the chairman of the JCS and the secretary of defense, and although it is important to make the point clear in the general conclusion, we recognize that this could make life very difficult for us in the future. But we are all ready to sign the smooth copy of the conclusions and recommendations as soon as they are ready, and we do it on our own free will, without any reservation and in full agreement with the wording.” With that, the three generals left the office without giving me a chance to say anything. This was probably for the best. It would have been hard for me to know what I could have said to adequately express my appreciation for their integrity.
There was, however, a happy ending. The generals’ fears did not materialize. Al Gray went on to become a distinguished commandant of the Marine Corps. John Piotrowski’s career included promotion to four stars and service both as head of the Air Force Materiel Command and as commander of the Space Command in a position of joint responsibility. Jim Smith also continued his illustrious career as an Army aviator.
THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORISM
The night of 10 October was black and moonless, as the Egypt Air Boeing jet 737 cruised along the coast of Crete at thirty-six thousand feet, en route from Cairo to Tunis. Suddenly the navigation running lights of seven U.S. Navy F-14 fighters blinked on in a circle around the airliner. The Egyptian pilots, who had thought they were alone in the sky, were startled and confused — until the F-14s rocked their wings, the international signal to “follow me and land.” The Egypt Air 737 was escorted to the U.S. Naval Air Station at Sigonella, Italy, and forced to land. As the passengers were disembarked, among them were the Arab terrorists who had hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro and killed an American passenger. They were immediately taken into custody. They had expected to be landing in Tunis, where they would have disappeared in the Casbah and escaped arrest and trial for their hijacking and murder. The entire action had taken seven hours from the Tomcats’ launch from the carrier Saratoga to their landing back on board, without at any time leaving international waters or airspace.