“DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE”
In 1986, the secretary of defense asked the Honorable Fred Ikle to convene a commission of private citizens to develop a long-term integrated strategy for the period from 1990 to 2010. John Lehman, who was secretary of the Navy at that time, was instrumental in having me named a member of this commission. It would be within the context of this strategic philosophy and the world of the future it would forecast that our nuclear-powered carriers would be employed. Both the proposed strategy and the evolving politico-military environment envisioned over the next twenty years could forcefully argue for a maritime strategy. The collapse of our overseas basing structure, the emergence of militarily powerful Third World nations, and the proliferation of nuclear powers would all tend to drive the United States toward an increasing reliance on sea-based forces.
The commission itself, which was sponsored jointly by the secretary of defense and the national security advisor to the president, numbered only a dozen members. It contained no members active in the government except for Dr. Fred Ikle, the undersecretary of defense for policy, who served as the official link between the commission and the administration. The commissioners themselves were an unusually balanced representation. They included the Republican secretary of state and former presidential national security advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger, as well as his Democratic counterpart, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Other commissioners were distinguished non-defense civilians such as the Honorable Anne Armstrong and intellectuals such as Dr. Joshua Letterberg, a Nobel chemist. And then there were retired military officers like Gen. Jack Vessey, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and myself, a former service chief.
Most strategic policy documents had dealt with a very limited time frame — the secretary of defense’s annual posture statement, for example— and seldom extended beyond the four years of a presidential term. “Discriminate Deterrence,” the title of the commission’s report, looked at a much longer time period — the next twenty years.
The strategy proposed by the commission was all-inclusive. It covered the spectrum of warfare, from low-intensity conflict to the general nuclear exchange. It explored the geopolitical and technological trends for twenty years into the future. It dealt with arms control as well as war fighting and proposed that both be considered together in an integrated approach to arms limitation policies.
“Discriminate Deterrence” received mixed reviews from the press. The New York Times conceded that the approach was sound and the principles valid. An extensive commentary by Public Broadcasting TV characterized the report as having the potential to be one of the most important strategic guideposts over the next decade. The European press was almost without exception supportive of the commission’s report. The basis for the general acceptance appears to be not so much any revolutionary ideas — there were few of these — but the fact that it was a single, all-inclusive, coherent national security policy statement developed by a bipartisan group of diverse background but extensive experience in toplevel national policy positions.
It was time for a new look at our national strategy, in spite of the fact that many critics of our defense establishment continued to allege that the United States had no coherent strategy. The truth is that we did have an established and operating strategy and that it had been successful and enduring. This strategy had been installed more than forty years before, and over that period there had been no Soviet military aggression against our NATO partners or our Korean or Japanese allies. It is interesting that this basic strategy had existed since the end of the Korean War essentially intact, with the only adjustments being made at the margins. This strategy had worked and worked well. All of our original alliance partners were still free nations.
Nevertheless, it was time for a reexamination of our basic strategic concepts. Some circumstances had changed. The United States had lost its nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union. The overseas base structure upon which our forward deployments had been so dependent had progressively eroded to become only a small fraction of our basing system that existed after World War II.
It is important to understand that the commission was developing a strategy and not programs — that is, a philosophy rather than a shopping list. In principle, the commission’s recommended strategy emphasized this nation’s strengths. It proposed that the United States place more emphasis on forces that are versatile, are provided with the most technologically advanced equipment, have the mobility to respond to crises around the globe without reliance on overseas bases, and are still be capable of military operations across the spectrum of warfare, from low-intensity conflict to nuclear operations. This thinking was reflected in remarkably similar terms in the most recent Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) that was issued in 2004.
“Discriminate Deterrence” developed broad concepts in the formulation of the overall strategy at the different levels of warfare intensity. In dealing with wars on the periphery, the commission recommended that the United States emphasize mobile forces, which would require making major improvements in our strategic lift capability, mainly sealift. The continuing decline of our overseas base structure was exerting increasing pressure to revise our strategy. The loss of land bases had to be compensated for, and the exploitation of strategic sea- and airlift was urged. Again, this concern has proved accurate, and DPG 2004 has as a primary focus the naval forces to compensate for these reversals through sea basing.
The commission was particularly sensitive to the need of a wider public recognition that the Persian Gulf is crucial to the free world’s economy and security. It had to be made clear to the world that the United States’ leadership as a matter of national policy considered the Persian Gulf critical to our most sensitive and important security interests and that the United States would be prepared to fight to maintain access to this vital area. Current international events have certainly been responsive to this recommendation.
Technologically, the United States must exploit its strength in the field of accurate long-range guided weapons. In this way, important economies could be achieved by improving existing platforms through equipping them with better arms. This concept was not new; it is really a refurbishment of the philosophy that has been around for some time: put the performance in the weapon rather than in the platform. However, our report did not intend to imply that the development of currently programmed ships and aircraft such as the CVN-21 class of carrier and the advanced tactical fighter should not proceed. The emphasis should be on reaching a reasonable balance between platform and missile performance. The very word “discriminate” in the title of the commission’s report emphasized a continued reliance on manned systems. Even with the greatly expanded availability of long-range guided missiles, manned aircraft will continue to be essential in a future world of many powerful antagonists with complex alliances, where the rules of engagement will demand positive target identification to avoid starting bloody conflicts through error or miscalculation.