EARLY AIR OPERATIONS
In the early days of the Korean War, after the North Korean invasion and President Truman’s commitment of U.S. military forces to the support of the Republic of Korea, the first significant U.S. forces to engage the enemy were planes of Air Wing 5 flying from the USS Valley Forge. This Essex-class carrier, its construction completed too late for World War II, had deployed to the Seventh Fleet in May 1950 and arrived on scene off Korea to deliver strikes on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on 3 July. As the UN forces withdrew into the shrinking Pusan perimeter during July, the only advantage the beleaguered and outnumbered U.S. and ROK troops could expect was U.S. air power. But air power was limited.
The USAF tactical squadrons in the Far East at the commencement of the conflict were almost entirely F-80 Shooting Star units. The F-80 was primarily an interceptor. It had relatively light external ordnance capacity and was short on endurance, which limited time on station, an essential requirement for effective close air support.
In the first weeks of the war, all of the jet-capable airfields in South Korea had been overrun. The U.S. Air Force fighter bases in southern Japan were so distant from the objective areas in Korea that the F-80 Shooting Stars had less than five minutes on station and could carry only two 5-inch high-velocity aircraft rockets (HVARs).
Navy tactical air was the only heavy air support available to the UN ground force in those early days. Then, and throughout the war, all naval tactical air was carrier based. The principal source was Task Force 77, the fast carrier striking force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, stationed in the western Pacific. TF 77 was made up of Essex-class carriers. Capable of thirty knots and carrying more than seventy aircraft and a commendable combat record from World War II, the Essex class were the Navy’s postwar fleet carriers and the first carrier class able to support and operate jet squadrons.
The nominal air group of the Essex class consisted of two F9F-2 Panther jet squadrons, one F4U-4 Corsair squadron, and one AD-2 Skyraider squadron. Each squadron consisted of fourteen to sixteen aircraft, depending largely upon the availability of aircraft at the time of deployment. In addition there were detachments of photo, radar search, night fighter, and night attack aircraft plus rescue helicopters, bringing the total aircraft complement up to more than seventy planes.
The F9F-2, although classified as a fighter, was really better in the fighter-bomber role. To improve its capability as a ground-attack aircraft in Korea, eight bomb pylons were added on the wings, which reduced its maximum speed by thirty knots. No longer did it have the performance needed for air-to-air combat, but it now carried eight external stores. Initially limited to about five hundred pounds of external ordnance, the F9F-2 had its bomb-load capacity further increased through the installation of stall fences, narrow fore-and-aft fins mounted on the dorsal surface of each wing to decrease a plane’s stalling speed while loaded. After the installation of the wing fences in 1951, the Panther routinely carried twelve hundred pounds of bombs and rockets. A typical load for air support would be four 260-pound fragmentation bombs and two antitank aircraft rockets (ATARs).
The real heavy hitters of the air group were the propeller-driven Skyraiders, capable of lugging eight thousand pounds of ordnance to any target in Korea, and delivering their armament, one bomb at a time, with precision accuracy. The World War II — vintage F4U-4 Corsairs could routinely handle three thousand pounds of ordnance on carrier-based sorties.
The USS Valley Forge, an Essex-class carrier, had been instrumental in slowing the North Korean advance during the first month of the war. Its planes were in demand in all sectors and for every kind of mission from close air support of troops to far-ranging strikes on the North Korean supply routes, destroying truck convoys of war material and killing hundreds of North Korean regular troops. But its air group would have been even more effective had there been proper air-ground communications. The roles and missions agreements after World War II had made the Air Force responsible for aviation support of the Army, including tactical air support of the ground war. The air-control system was geared to a European-type conflict with elaborate control facilities such as the Army and Air Force JOC and TACC. In NATO, these command centers were in place and operating. In Korea, both of these facilities had to be startups, with all of the associated flail. All Navy missions in support of the ground forces had to be scheduled and controlled by the Air Force, which then passed them on to the Army forward controllers. Unfortunately, the communications were totally inadequate and the system just wasn’t working. With the front lines in a state of flux, pilots were often unsure of the identity of the troops on the ground under them. It was essential that close support missions be under positive control to avoid hitting friendlies.
By August, the military situation of the hard-pressed UN ground forces had become so perilous that the commanding general of the Eighth Army, General Walker, authorized the Navy to arrange missions and conduct strikes by communicating directly with the ground forces being supported. Commander, Air Force Far East, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, was not pleased with this arrangement but acceded because of the desperate need for close air support.
In early August the Valley Forge was joined by the Philippine Sea. Later in the month, the Leyte and Boxer reported on station to substantially reinforce TF 77 and give some relief to Air Group Five.
Also in August 1950, the 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Iwakuni, Japan, from CONUS, and two Corsair F4U-4 squadrons were immediately embarked in the escort carriers Badoeng Strait and Sicily, which constituted Task Element 96.23. The Marine squadrons were equipped with the B-versions of the F4U-4, which mounted four 20mm guns, especially effective for ground support with their explosive shells. Also, the Marines did not suffer from the impediments imposed by the roles and missions policy. The mission of the 1st Marine Air Wing was to support the 1st Marine Division, which was currently engaged in combat in Korea. There were no problems in their air support mission planning or execution. Close support for the Marines was always available from Marine aircraft, and most of the ground tactical air parties had trained in the United States with the squadrons they were now controlling. The carriers of Task Element 96.23 moved around the Korean coastal waters as needed, to be as close to the Marines’ battlefield as possible, reducing reaction intervals and increasing aircraft time on station.
By September 1950, just two months after the war had begun, the Navy was sustaining a force of four carriers in the Seventh Fleet with two or three on station in TF 77, “Carrier Striking Force, Seventh Fleet,” off Korea on a continuing basis. Carrier force levels were continuing to grow with the introduction of newly overhauled carriers from the mothballed reserve fleet. During the Korean War eleven Essex-class carriers served in combat, most of them more than once. Some, like the Valley Forge, Philippine Sea, and Princeton, made three deployments, and the Boxer made four.
During the Korean War a total of six escort carriers, with Marine Corsairs embarked, were deployed with Task Element 96.23. A force of never less than two, and sometimes three, escort carriers was maintained in the western Pacific. The Bataan, Badoeng Strait, and Sicily all made three seven-month deployments during the two-year conflict.