Cleland was publicly criticized by the Pittsburgh-Cleveland area press for his squadron’s heavy losses. In Cook’s defense I can say that he was not an irresponsible squadron commander. He flew more missions than any of his pilots. He was deeply sensitive to the loss of any one of his officers. To him the Flying Circus was more than a squadron, it was a band of compatriots who did everything together — work, play, and go to war. Cook was a fierce competitor. He wanted to win. When engaged in combat, he wanted his squadron to be better than any other squadron in doing damage to the enemy. His squadron pilots reflected his competitive spirit and desire to get results. The damage-assessment photos were proving that. They didn’t have the aviation ability, or perhaps the luck, that Cleland had, but they were determined to prove their courage and combat skills. Cook counseled them to be prudent in the face of limiting weather or heavy flak. But when he wasn’t leading the flight, he couldn’t hold them back. No one, from the admiral on down, was going to tell the Flying Circus to take it easy on the North Koreans. VF-653 was an asset for the UN side, and its contribution to the air interdiction campaign, both in results and example, was not to be restrained.
With all of his enthusiasm and dare deviltry, Cook Cleland was a warm, friendly, serious person whose hobby was collecting and restoring Early American furniture. In his post-Navy retirement he became an acknowledged expert in that field and for years owned and operated one of the finest antique stores in Pensacola, Florida.
THE JOINT AIR CAMPAIGN IN KOREA
From its inception as a piecemeal stopgap in the summer of 1950, the tactical air campaign in Korea evolved into a pattern of operations that was designed to the specific character of the theater and adapted to the military strategy, operations, and capability of the enemy. The UN air campaign made the best use of all the forces available to the theater.
The superiority of the Navy’s ADs and Corsairs over the Air Force’s F-80s for tactical support of ground forces was not lost on the Air Force commanders. Far East Air Force (FEAF) commander General Stratemyer took quick action to replace the F-80s with more suitable aircraft. With the Navy taking all of the Skyraiders and Corsairs available from new production and the mothballed reserve, the Air Force drew on their large inventory of F-51 Mustangs, a fighter that had proved itself in the ground-attack role in Europe during World War II. On 23 July 1950, less than one month after the war had started, the USS Boxer delivered to Japan 145 F-51 Mustangs pulled from Air National Guard squadrons. By 11 August 1950, six fighter squadrons of the Fifth Air Force in Korea (FAFIK) had converted from the jet F-80s to the propeller-driven F-51s for the air-ground war in Korea.
About that same time, U.S. Air Force headquarters in Washington decided to deploy two wings of F-84 Thunderjets, previously earmarked for NATO, to the Korean theater. The F-84 was not up to F-86 performance for air-to-air combat but was far superior to the F-80 as a fighter-bomber and was considered more survivable than the F-51. The F-84s were transported to Japan on U.S. Navy aircraft transports (CVT), which were converted from World War II escort carriers.
Both the F-51 and F-84 shipments suffered some aircraft corrosion en route. This is a problem almost universally misunderstood outside of naval aviation. Over the years it has plagued foreign air forces attempting to create a sea-based air arm. As recently as 1972 a number of U.S. Navy helicopters were severely damaged by corrosion as the result of efforts to reduce costs and procure “off the shelf” helicopters for cruisers and destroyers.
It had become accepted early in the Korean War that the only fighter in the UN inventory that could successfully take on the Soviet MiG-15 in air-to-air combat was the “E” model of the North American F-86 Sabre. When this became apparent, the Air Force deployed a wing of these first-line fighters from Langley Air Force Base to Kimpo Air Base (K-14) in the vicinity of Seoul. It became the mission of the F-86s to maintain a barrier patrol in the northwest corner of North Korea on the south side of the Yalu River, opposite the airfields on which the Chinese MiG -15s were based. The F-86s were controlled by the UN radar site on Yodo-ri, an island off the west coast of North Korea. This radar, manned by U.S. Air Force personnel, was able to track the MiGs virtually from takeoff at the Chinese airfields and as they flew south over the Yalu. The F-86s, flying from the airfields at Kimpo and Suwon, both in the vicinity of Seoul, were controlled by the Yodo-Ri radar. They flew a barrier patrol in the northwest corner of Korea known as “MiG Alley,” where they could intercept and shoot down any MiGs crossing the Yalu. It was the objective of the Chinese MiGs, on the other hand, to get by this F-86 barrier to attack the slower and less maneuverable tactical fighters providing support to the UN ground forces. Any MiGs that got through the F-86s’ protective screen could create havoc with the slower and heavily loaded attack planes.
THE MIG-15
The MiG -15 was a surprisingly good fighter, thought by some analysts to be superior to the F-86E. It climbed faster, turned more quickly, and in general was more maneuverable. The Sabre could dive faster and had a better gun-sight and cabin-defrosting system. The MiG-15 was Russian designed and produced, and furnished to the Chinese. They flew from Chinese airfields north of the Yalu. According to the F-86 pilots, who were the best fighter jocks in the Air Force, the MiG pilots were very, very good in air-to-air combat. There was always a suspicion that the pilots were European or Russian, but that was not confirmed until about 1995, when an article appeared in the Soviet press describing the MiG pilots as Soviet air force officers, most of whom had World War II experience flying against German pilots in first-line Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. The top Russian World War II ace with sixty-two kills, Ivan Kozhedub, commanded one of the first MiG-15 divisions in the Korean War. It is no wonder that the U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots considered the Chinese MiGs a formidable adversary.
Although aviation assets were being committed to the war in the Pacific — F-51s from the National Guard, F-84s from NATO, and F-86s from CONUS — basing these forces in South Korea was taking time. Except for the airfields inside the Pusan perimeter, the air bases in South Korea remained in danger of being overrun by enemy ground forces during the Communist offensives of August 1950 and January 1951. It was not until the Chinese Spring Offensive of 1951 had been thrown back and the front lines stabilized north of Seoul that the airfields in the Seoul and Taegu areas could be considered secure.
Then much work had to be accomplished by the engineers to repair the extensive damage to the runways and facilities caused by artillery, bombing, and even tank treads. All of these fields had been taken by the enemy at least once, and those around Seoul had been seized twice by the Communists.
The Republic of Korea air force (ROKAF) operated a small squadron of F-51s from a strip at Kangnung on the east coast of South Korea, about twenty miles below the DMZ. There was an advisory group of Americans at Kangnung. Commander, Naval Forces Japan had also furnished a small fleet aircraft service squadron (FASRon) detachment at Kangnung. They were there to take care of TF 77 aircraft unable to make it back to the carriers for reasons such as mechanical trouble, flak damage, or weather conditions. It was the closest friendly airfield to TF 77’s operating area; many Navy planes, and probably a few pilots, were saved by its ready availability. Kangnung was a primitive installation with pierced-metal (Marston matting) runways, and Quonsets, Butler huts, and tents for the support facilities.