Tactical air support for the UN ground forces was provided by two commands, the ground-based squadrons in South Korea under the Fifth Air Force, and the carrier air groups under commander, Seventh Fleet, specifically, commander, Task Force 77. To minimize interference and delineate clear lines of responsibility and authority, Korea was divided by a longitude line running down the approximate center of the peninsula. The area east of the line was the Navy’s responsibility; that to the west belonged to the Air Force, which had control of all land-based aircraft in Korea, regardless of nationality or service. This system worked well, without any significant interference in operations or problems in authority and responsibility.
NAVAL CARRIER DEPLOYMENTS
Carrier-based air was one of the two major components of the tactical aviation forces in Korea. The other component air force was FAFIK. The Navy squadrons flew from carriers attached to Task Force 77, the fast carrier striking force of the Seventh Fleet. Commander, Seventh Fleet and commander, Fifth Air Force were under the direct operational control of General MacArthur. TF 77 normally included two Essex-class carriers, each with a standard air wing of two jet fighter squadrons of F9F-2 Panthers, an F4U-4 Corsair squadron, and a squadron of AD Skyraiders. Occasionally the air group would include F2H-2 Banshees instead of Panthers, but this was an exception (usually occurring when an Atlantic Fleet carrier was deployed to the western Pacific).
Shortly after the outbreak of the war, Adm. Forrest Sherman, the chief of naval operations, was determined to commit the maximum possible number of carriers to the Korean theater. Already the United States had agreed to the full commitment of two attack carriers (CVAs) in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean in support of NATO. The difficulties of maintaining two CVAs forward deployed in the Sixth Fleet, in addition to supporting a force of carriers in the western Pacific conducting combat operations, were formidable. Carrier force levels were still in the building stage. Ships were being reactivated from the mothball fleet and planes were being transferred from the Naval Reserves and coming out of mothballs in the desert. The buildup was beginning to exceed the Navy’s capacity to man the additional ships and squadrons.
In balancing the Navy’s carrier assets, the decision was made to keep four CVAs in the western Pacific assigned to Seventh Fleet. This would allow two carriers to be in TF 77 at all times. Each carrier would have thirty days at sea on the line conducting combat operations. After a two-day transit to the U.S. Naval Bases at Sasebo or Yokosuka, nine days in port would be available for maintenance and repair and for rest and recreation (R&R) for the crew. Then two days of transit back to TF 77 and another line-period cycle would begin.
To keep four CVAs deployed forward in the western Pacific required a total force of twelve carriers, based upon the three-to-one ratio that was the planning thumb rule at that time: Only one-third of the total carrier force in the active fleet can be kept forward deployed in the standard peacetime cycle of repair and maintenance, training, CONUS operations, transit, and forward deployment. There were not enough CVAs in the national inventory to assign twelve to the Pacific Fleet and at the same time satisfy the mandatory NATO commitments. There was to be no backing down on NATO; the Soviets remained the real threat to the United States and its allies. The Korean War, in fact, was seen by the NATO leadership as a machination by the Kremlin to squeeze the Western powers. The allocation of four CVAs to the Seventh Fleet would have to be sustained by getting some help from the Atlantic Fleet and cutting short on the carriers’ maintenance and training schedules.
Some difficult measures were employed. One of these was cross-decking, the only solution to critical shortages in certain key ratings. When a carrier departed the western Pacific for CONUS at the end of its deployment, some of its crew were transferred in Japan and assigned to an incoming CVA. These were ratings that were in short supply, mainly ship engineers and flight-deck personneclass="underline" catapult crews and plane directors. Without these experienced petty officers on board, the carrier couldn’t steam or conduct flight operations. Whenever possible, the necessary cross-decking was done in CONUS. After a carrier returned from deployment in the western Pacific, critical ratings would be given one or two weeks leave, depending upon how much time was available until the next carrier sailed, and then ordered to the next deploying CVA. Cross-decking was a serious blow to morale. Two seven-month cruises, back to back, with only the break of a week’s leave was terribly hard on the overworked ratings. It was not as bad for morale as the 1st Marine Division being sent back into action immediately following their breakout from the Chosin Reservoir, however, or the thousands of soldiers killed in action by the Chinese who would never come home. But the sailors didn’t see this. There were no televisions or newsreels in the carriers. They only saw their civilian neighbors in San Diego and Alameda bringing home fat paychecks from the aircraft factory or the shipyard and enjoying life in California with their families. The war was being fought on a guns-and-butter economy. As morale in these particular ratings suffered, so did reenlistments. When experienced petty officers left the Navy in large numbers, the situation became even worse. Eventually the shortages corrected themselves, thanks to the quality of the American bluejacket. The new sailors and petty officers learned the skills of their ratings quickly and within their first enlistment were beginning to fill the petty officer leadership positions on the flight decks and in the ships’ engine rooms.
Task Force 77’s operations continued without a diminution of performance as the newly recommissioned carriers joined the force and the old ones returned with fresh air groups. A total of eleven different CVAs served in TF 77 during the war and all performed up to fleet standards.
After the first year of the war, when the front lines had become stabilized, TF 77 developed a standard pattern of operations, highly effective for their current mission. The two carriers conducted flight operations from 0500 to 2100, a sixteen-hour day. Every hour and a half, aircraft would be launched and then recovered following launch. The first and last cycles — from 0500 to 0630 and 1930 to 2100—were flown by the night fighters and night-attack detachments in F4U-4N and AD-2N aircraft. The flight and hangar deck crews had a long day. Flight quarters was sounded at 0400 and secured at 2200. Men were given half-hour breaks for meals and personal needs but no time off for rest.
Task Force 77 air operations were conducted in a localized area around a geographical reference point called Point Oboe, about 125 miles due east of Wonsan Harbor. Oboe was conveniently located to cover most targets in northeast Korea from Wonsan to Chongjin. It was far enough at sea to not be visible to the highest flying enemy planes over the Korean and Asian landmass. The task force would depart Point Oboe as necessary, whenever the carriers were needed to concentrate on a single target area, or to conduct special operations. Although the carriers tried to remain in the vicinity of Oboe, flight operations could cause TF 77 to move some distance from this reference point. A light prevailing wind and a long, drawn-out launch and recovery cycle could have the carriers steaming at thirty knots for three hours — away from Point Oboe. The carriers then had to make high speed between subsequent launch and recovery cycles to close Point Oboe. Sometimes TF 77 would not be able to return to Oboe until nighttime, after flight operations were completed.