The trouble was that events were simplified in order to make the calculations possible within a reasonable time-frame and budget; Hanslip was always parsimonious. It was also anonymised; the assessment programme was unaware which of the scenarios was real, in case natural prejudice on its part influenced its decisions.
The first scenario posited that the presidential election in the United States in 1960 was won by the Republican nominee, Richard Nixon, who defeated his Democratic opponent, a man called John Kennedy. Nixon’s much greater depth and knowledge came through and he won the election by a small margin. The result was inevitable; while Nixon had a good track record and gravitas, Kennedy had little knowledge of government and a reputation (fiercely exposed in the campaign and confirmed in a bitter divorce in 1965) as a playboy. Nixon’s greater experience led him to quash a foolish attempt to invade Cuba in 1961. However, this allowed his enemies to accuse him of weakness, which he tried to counter by ordering troops to Vietnam the following year.
Nixon won the 1964 election, defeating Lyndon Johnson, but by that stage was committed to an all-out war. In 1968 he was replaced by Johnson, who died of appendicitis in 1971 and was replaced in turn by Jimmy Carter, who ended up in jail for gross misconduct. Ultimately the actor Ronald Reagan, Nixon’s vice-president for his second term and by then a man of great experience, became president in 1980.
So far so good. Then the computer programme turned its attention to the second scenario, in which the 1960 election was won by Kennedy, not Nixon. The result, it opined, was narrow but inevitable because of Nixon’s reputation for dishonesty. Kennedy was dashing, young, handsome and fresh. This came across in a television debate in which Kennedy was bright and confident, Nixon unshaven, scruffy and hesitant.
Kennedy’s true potential is unknown, due to his assassination in 1963. He made a badly bungled attempt to invade Cuba in 1961, but redeemed this by defusing the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. After his murder he was succeeded by Lyndon Johnson, who destroyed his presidency by ordering, then losing, a full-scale war in Vietnam. Johnson was replaced by Nixon at a time of political turmoil following the murder of Kennedy’s brother and other high-profile figures. Nixon also destroyed his presidency, this time through illegal activities. There followed Gerald Ford, who declined to run when he could have won, then Jimmy Carter, who destroyed his presidency with another ill-thought-out foreign venture. Finally, Reagan was elected in 1980.
Hanslip was a bit despondent at this, as the simulation suggested very strongly that, although individuals and small events did affect the course of historical development, the influence of even major figures was strictly limited. In the long term, it appeared exceptionally difficult to alter the past except through massive intervention. If any individual was not born, for example, they seemed to be replaced by someone similar.
Even here, though, warning signs should have been spotted by the people running the experiment. For example, the programme changed the parameters of its task all on its own in order to achieve what it called dramatic credibility. It also restructured events to take account of the results it was getting, as it was set up to disregard coincidence. So it changed Nixon’s reputation for decency, based on his Quaker upbringing, to one for duplicity and ruthlessness. It married Kennedy to a dowdy, pious woman rather than a charming and beautiful one, in order to explain his otherwise incomprehensible womanising.
My objection — set out forcefully in a memorandum which was completely ignored — was that the fundamental problem stemmed from Hanslip’s penny-pinching. The programme was instructed to take into account only internal political dynamics. External actions — such as decisions taken by other countries, for example — were ignored, which struck me as unwise, even if it was cheaper.
A clear sign that something was badly wrong came from a small control that had been built in. For the sake of objectivity, the programme analysed both histories — real and alternative — without being informed which was which. It concluded that the second, actual sequence of events was statistically so improbable that it could not possibly happen.
Specifically, it reasoned that there were too many random events whose only purpose seemed to be to get history back on track. History returned to what the programme thought should be its normal path by 1980 only through what it sneeringly referred to as plot devices which even a novelist of the period would have rejected as ludicrously far-fetched.
I quote the conclusion: ‘We are required to believe a) that a drug-addled, womanising, inexperienced Catholic with strong links to criminal organisations could defeat the most experienced politician in the country, and that his dire medical condition and dubious character could be kept secret. Also that he could conduct exceptionally successful diplomacy in 1962 while being as high as a kite on a cocktail of painkillers and stimulants;
b) that a president, his brother and several others could all be murdered in a short space of time, by insane gunmen, each acting alone, for no discernible reason. Also that Kennedy could be shot by someone with known links to the Soviet Union without there being any consequences;
c) that Nixon in office would sanction a pointless burglary, during an election campaign he was bound to win anyway, and that a man of such experience would fail to control the very minor political scandal that resulted;
d) that in 1980 the United States would elect as president an ageing actor with little experience and dyed orange hair.
None of these make any sense whatsoever. In fact the second scenario would have resulted in a nuclear war at some stage in the period covered, in which case history would most certainly not have returned to normal by 1980.’
The only product of merit from this otherwise worthless experiment was the one which was dismissed as a programming error. The implication that, under certain circumstances, not only the future but also the past could and must rearrange itself to fit available events was an extraordinary conclusion, which stuck in my mind simply because of its sheer improbability.
That simulation was run just a week before I left, and I have no doubt whatsoever that no one paid the slightest attention to my objections. The response — that if history could not be changed in small ways, then it might be necessary to explore bigger ones — demonstrated how weak my position already was and strengthened my conviction that flight was the only real option. So that is what I did. I cleared everyone out of the section, locked myself in and set to work.
That didn’t mean I was happy about having to leave, not least because I arrived in Germany in 1936. It was hardly the best time or place, what with one thing and another. But my departure was hurried and, in the circumstances, I think I did pretty well, although it was unfortunate that I hadn’t loaded up the newspapers for the period. I took them for 1960 onwards only, as I thought that would be all I’d need. I didn’t have that much space in my head.
For the first nine months it didn’t matter, as I spent the time in a lunatic asylum. This was not the best introduction to my new world, although if you really want to understand any society, looking at it through the eyes of the mentally deranged is remarkably illuminating. One thing I learned was that the transmission process plays merry hell with your brain, although I suspected this was due to the effects of cerebral implants rather than an inevitable consequence of the shift. Even more unfortunately, I had popped a few hallucinogens before I left, to ramp up my performance; many of the settings I had to do manually, so I needed all the help I could get. As I say, I did pretty well, but I emerged the other end raving and incoherent. Even the little sense I could talk merely convinced people that I was completely nuts.