“I’m saying that I’m very suspicious, Admiral Balakin,” replied Lavrov tersely. Moving on to the next slide, he pointed to the announced search area. “The area where the Americans claim the Toledo was probably lost straddles one of the entrances to the Barents Sea. Their submarines have often used it in the past. Thus, this location wouldn’t seem strange to us at all.”
“A diversion?” suggested Komeyev.
“A distinct possibility, sir. The Americans are very capable of a coordinated disinformation campaign to try and pull our attention away from another location, another target.”
“But the Prima Ice Station is…” began Komeyev.
“Some seven hundred fifty nautical miles to the southeast, yes, sir. But can you think of a more worthy target?”
“Captain Lavrov,” Balakin snarled, “all I’m hearing is conjecture. Do you have any concrete evidence to support this theory of yours?”
Sighing, the captain replied, “I do not have what the Americans would call a ‘smoking gun,’ Admiral. However, let me put all the facts before you. First, the U.S. Navy last lost a submarine to a peacetime casualty fifty-three years ago. Their safety record is exemplary. Second, a well-equipped spy submarine that is normally part of the Pacific fleet mysteriously shows up at an Atlantic fleet base. Third, said submarine traveled thousands of miles farther to reach this base than would be required to reach the search area.
“Fourth, the area where the Americans claim Toledo was lost is a known approach to our waters, just on the edge of the Arctic Ocean. Fifth, if the Jimmy Carter is deployed to the search area, it is less than two days travel at moderate speeds to the Prima Polar Station. Furthermore, this route can take advantage of the unfriendly environment that will negate the use of surface and airborne antisubmarine forces. And finally, the absolute best reconnaissance asset to employ against the Prima station is a submarine because of the station’s high latitude and typically overcast skies. If these factors are entered into our standard risk assessment algorithm, even with conservative values, then there is sixty-five percent probability that the Drakon launch facility will be discovered and identified for what it is.”
Lavrov fell silent and awaited the judgment of his superiors. Balakin had an unconvinced smirk on his face, but Komeyev was more sober, clearly weighing the implications.
“You paint an ugly picture, Vasiliy,” remarked the Russian Navy CINC. “And I appreciate your candor concerning what you know, and what you don’t know. But I have some questions for you.”
“Of course, sir.”
“Do you believe that USS Toledo was indeed lost? Could all this noise be just part of the deception?”
“We have numerous and varied sources all telling us that a U.S. submarine by the name of Toledo is overdue and presumed lost.”
Komeyev nodded, then pressed on. “And yet, you acknowledge the Americans have a stellar safety history during peacetime, how do you reconcile these two facts?”
“There is always a slight probability for a fatal accident, sir.”
“How slight?”
“If one only looks at just historical occurrences over time, there is a five percent probability. However, this is likely on the high side. Without looking at the submarine’s operational and maintenance history, it is impossible to give a precise answer, but I suspect the probability is less than three percent.”
“And are you comfortable with that value, Captain?” Komeyev leaned forward, his voice harder.
Lavrov swallowed hard, before answering. “No, sir, I am not. I have difficulty accepting the sinking of USS Toledo as just an unfortunate circumstance independent of our activities in the Arctic Ocean. Simply put, I do not believe this is an amazing collection of highly improbable, independent events — the odds are enormously against it. They must be related!
“That is why I have been considering other scenarios that assume a relationship between the events. Scenarios that require a different explanation for the loss of the U.S. submarine.”
“Such as?”
Lavrov paused, and then licked his lips. “This is pure conjecture, Admiral Komeyev, I have nothing to substantiate this theory.”
“So noted, Captain, continue.”
“Yes, sir,” replied Lavrov. His uneasiness growing, he swallowed again before he spoke. “The theory I’ve been contemplating is the possibility that USS Toledo was engaged and sunk.”
“Engaged? Sunk?” shouted Balakin. “By whom? We haven’t had any contact reports on a foreign submarine sighting in weeks, let alone a report of an actual attack!”
“That is correct, Admiral Balakin. However, a minefield does not normally report back that it has conducted an attack.”
Komeyev rose quickly from the couch, his face tense. “That’s an alarming theory, Captain. Do you realize what you’re saying?”
“As I said, Admiral, this theory is pure conjecture using what facts we have at the moment and the assumption of a worst-case outcome to our current military strategy.”
“If we accept the ‘worst case,’ then it’s entirely possible the Americans already know about Project Drakon!” replied Komeyev brusquely.
“Not necessarily, sir,” Lavrov countered firmly. “We know the Americans are suspicious about something going on up north — it had to pique their interest when we closed the station to tourists and visiting scientists. The location is, at most, three days away from their routine Barents Sea deployment areas, so a submarine could have been sent up to the Prima base just to have a look around. If Toledo did investigate, and was engaged by our minefield and sunk, then whatever information they gathered likely died with them. In contrast to our practice, the U.S. Navy strongly discourages its submarines from communicating while on station… especially while off a hostile coast. Furthermore, the ice cover would be too dense, even if were broken, to use a communications buoy. The ice floes have been a major nuisance to our construction crews for the last couple of weeks.”
Komeyev’s expression eased as Lavrov explained. Still, the Russian Navy CINC wasn’t thrilled. “The minefield was positioned inside our territorial waters. It was a purely defensive measure to protect the construction site. If the Toledo violated our borders, then she got only what she deserved.”
“What about the Carter? Isn’t it possible that she could have already been to the Prima area?” interrupted Balakin, his voice anxious.
“I seriously doubt it, Admiral. If the American spy submarine were where the GRU thought she was, it would take about a week just to get to the station at a high average cruising speed. Anything faster has too great a detection risk, they are well aware of the location of our Arctic hydroacoustic arrays. Even if the Carter were closer than estimated, she’d still need about four days. When you add in the ten to eleven days to make the journey to Groton, this leaves only two, perhaps three days at most to conduct a search. While the Americans are good, they are not that good.”
“But that assumes you accept the Americans’ timeline, when they claim they started searching, doesn’t it?” Komeyev inquired.
“Yes, sir, it does. However, message traffic analysis and communications intercepts strongly suggest that the earliest the order went out was late on twenty-one June. This is consistent with the U.S. Navy’s announcement, albeit a little misleading, as the first units didn’t sortie until early on the twenty-second.
“But even if we take a more generous view and spot the Americans a couple of days more, it is still highly unlikely they would find the downed submarine in less than a week. I’ve been working with our own rescue service; they estimate at least two weeks would be necessary to find the sunken boat. The Americans simply don’t have enough time to do all that has to be done and pull into the Groton submarine base yesterday.”