What’s up there?
How many enemy?
What’s the weather going to be like?
How much time do I have?
How much equipment?
How much food?
What’s my ammunition supply rate?
What’s the enemy doing?
How dug in is he?
What’s his ability to reinforce?
Once you assess your opponent’s ability, Powell explained, you devise a plan that includes tactics and timelines. Your success in taking that hill will depend on having asked the right questions so you have the most accurate “estimate of the situation” possible.
As Powell rose in the ranks, his world expanded well beyond the hill to be taken. Increasingly, he had to think about winning the war, not just the battle. He developed strategic questions designed to look at the big picture, articulate goals, and challenge his thinking and that of his commanders. Powell’s strategic questions asked decision-makers to peel back groupthink and conventional wisdom, recognizing Vermeulen’s definition of strategy and the stakes of “complex decisions under uncertainty, with substantive, long-term consequences.”
Eight Yeses
Powell’s big test as a military leader came after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Saddam Hussein’s invasion was a sledge-hammered move in a fragile region, a dictator’s crass grab for power and territory. By occupying Kuwait, he also posed a threat to Saudi Arabia, America’s oil-rich ally. President George H. W. Bush declared that the aggression “will not stand.” The president wanted a recommendation. The first questions, Powell explained to me, sought to define the mission.
“The early argument was what do you want to do? Do you just want to protect Saudi Arabia so that the Iraqis can’t move south? Or do you want to kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait? And is there anything else you want to do? You want to go to Baghdad? And we needed to get those questions answered … before we made a plan,” he said.
There was no appetite to go to Baghdad, least of all from Powell. He told the president that if the United States pursued Saddam and marched into Baghdad, “You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people. You will own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems. You’ll own it all.”
So the Pentagon went to work, putting together a military campaign, Operation Desert Storm, to liberate Kuwait. Planners considered Iraq’s military capacity, topography, roads, ports, waterways, weather, and the location of civilian populations. They looked at American capabilities and the contributions allied forces could make. Before proposing to the president the deployment of half a million American troops to push Saddam Hussein back across the desert, however, Powell asked his strategic questions to see what they would reveal through the long lens of diplomacy, politics, and war. He wanted to know about goals, resources, consequences, rationale, and risk. Having experienced Vietnam, he asked whether the American public would stand by a war in Iraq if it got costly and difficult.
Powell posed eight strategic questions looking at the big picture, challenging assumptions, and defining success. Only if the answers to all were positive, he believed, could the president confidently launch a full-scale invasion to liberate Kuwait.
Is a vital national security interest threatened?
Is the action supported by the American people?
Do we have genuine, broad international support?
Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
Do we have a clear, attainable objective?
Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
The answers were all compelling and affirmative. The big-picture questions made clear the threats to national and global security. Iraq had broken international law and was sowing instability in a region that provided much of the world’s oil and access to some of its most important shipping lanes. Public support appeared solid, with the U.S. Congress voting for military force and three in four of Americans supporting it, according to a Gallup survey at the time. The international community was on board, too. UN Resolution 678 authorized all necessary means to push Iraq out of Kuwait. Several countries in the region, even some that were normally hostile to Washington, signed on as active coalition partners.
Powell’s challenge questions drew definitive responses as well. Intelligence from U.S. sources, as well as from Iraq’s neighbors and America’s closest allies, painted a consistent picture of Saddam’s intentions and capabilities. The option of diplomacy had been tried through intermediaries, the United Nations, and direct talks with the Iraqi foreign minister. America had consulted every country in the region, along with more than two dozen coalition partners. Military and political leaders had considered every contingency they could think of, down to the frightening scenario that Iraq might sabotage its oil fields, which ultimately, it did.
Finally, Powell’s questions intended to define success produced clear answers and finite, achievable goals with a realistic exit strategy. The result was a mission—Operation Desert Storm—designed to push Saddam out of Kuwait and force him to comply with international law and UN resolutions. This would not be an open-ended occupation or an exercise in nation building.
The war began with a punishing barrage from the air. American and coalition bombing pounded Iraq’s air defenses, military installations, and government headquarters, which were quickly destroyed. By the time U.S. and coalition forces rolled into Kuwait on the ground, Iraqi forces were on the run. Though Saddam hung on to power, the mission had been a success.
The ground war lasted just 100 hours. Colin Powell’s star was never higher.
Failure Is an Option
When a leader fails to know where he is going, refuses to listen to what he doesn’t want to hear, or relies on faulty information, bad things happen. If nobody asks or answers challenging questions, flawed thinking may go unnoticed or unaddressed. Colin Powell experienced the dark side of decision-making when he and others didn’t ask enough tough questions leading up to the second Iraq war.
In the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Powell, then Secretary of State, was surrounded by hard-liners, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and several influential senior policy makers. Cheney and the others argued for a muscular American military response. After Afghanistan, home to Al Qaeda, they viewed Iraq as a logical target. They accused Iraq of harboring weapons of mass destruction, in direct violation of commitments to destroy them made after the first Gulf War.
Still reeling from the 9/11 attacks on New York’s World Trade Towers and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the public strongly supported this administration’s plans for military action against Iraq. The administration assured the world that the intelligence was credible and the Iraqi threat with respect to weapons of mass destruction was real. But behind the scenes, the really tough strategic questions that should have been asked were unwelcome.
Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?