At 1230hrs the minelayers were dispatched to complete their missions and by 1320hrs they had completed their allotted tasks. Bureya laid eighty-four mines in four lines to produce an effective field.
Meanwhile Bayan and Graschdanin had anchored in the dredged channel. Vice Admiral Bakhirev convened a conference, which Kontre Admiral Stark attended, to coordinate further action. The chief of the VI Div TBD aboard the torpedoboat-destroyer Turkmenets Stravropski, was dispatched to Rogekul with orders to assemble all shallow-draft vessels to evacuate the garrison of Moon. Major-General Hendrikhson had authorized the abandonment and destruction of this base, and had already determined that it would be impossible to retake Ösel, in light of the breakdown in discipline among the troops, and therefore the further defense of Moon was pointless. Therefore he instead determined to evacuate the island and requested that it be done during the night. Consequently Kontre Admiral Razvozov sent a wireless-gram to Vice Admiral Bakhirev reading ‘Get all measures underway for the troops on Moon’. The admiral understood this as an order to evacuate Moon and he replied, ‘This situation allows this at dawn’.
When the I FdT returned to his flotilla with V100, he held a conference with Kapitänleutnant Zander to discuss the possibility of making a night torpedoboat attack into the southern Moon Sound, with the 13th Torpedoboat Half Flotilla, later that night. Kapitänleutnant Zander agreed that a torpedoboat attack was possible through the narrow channels into the Moon Sound and also suggested that he push north to hinder traffic between Moon and the mainland. However, he only had four boats available for the task as S63 was in the Tagga Bay, and one of those, S50, would have to remain in the entrance to the Moon Sound as a navigation mark. That left just S61, S64 and V74 to conduct the raid. Kommodore Heinrich justified himself in his war diary as follows:
Firstly the attack of the torpedoboat group would hinder the escape of Slava. I supposed that owing to her draught she could not pass into the northern Moon Sound, and was being repaired to reduce her draught… If the Russian escaped I feared eternal reproachment for not ensuring her destruction. Therefore my orders to Kapitänleutnant Zander. A torpedoboat thrust into the northern Moon Sound during the clear night against the gunboats in the narrow channel east of Krukhlom, observed during the day, was considered by me as hopeless.
At about 2200hrs Kapitänleutnant Zander began his advance into the Moon Sound. Earlier he had questioned Vizeadmiral Behncke as to whether any of his forces were in the southern Moon Sound and received an answer in the negative, therefore any forces he might encounter would be Russian and he could attack without hesitation. The marker boat, S50, took up her position. The sea was quiet, the wind from the southwest and the visibility good as the torpedoboats advanced in line ahead in the order S61, S64 and V74, at low speed and taking continuous soundings. Towards 2230hrs they sighted a light to starboard ahead, seemingly one of the navigation marks on Schildau Island. Then just after midnight, the second boot, S64, was shaken by a heavy mine detonation, between the second and third boilers; she had run onto one of Bureya’s mines. The boat was immediately rendered unmanoeuvrable but was still capable of remaining afloat. The half flotilla’s chief immediately turned S61 back towards the damaged boat, with the intension of towing her from the minefield stern first. Now several floating mines were sighted from the crow’s nest where previously none had been seen; it seemed likely that the detonation had rent them free and they had floated to the surface. Despite this, a tow line was successfully passed and S61 began towing the crippled S64 towards the west, where the other boat, V74, had anchored as a marker, clear of the dangerous area. However, after making just 100 metres, S64 ran aground and it was decided to abandon her. Now, despite the danger from floating mines in the vicinity, S61 went alongside and took off the crew. Considerable skill was required to complete this manoeuvre. As S64 was not completely sunken, two explosive charges were detonated towards 0100hrs and the boat finally sank. The crew of the first boiler room, a total of six men, lost their lives and a further five were wounded. To Kapitänleutnant Zander it appeared that the western part of the channel was totally blocked with mines and therefore he abandoned the undertaking and returned to V100.
When S61 went alongside S64 she suffered a slight leak on the waterline, whilst V74 had damaged a propeller blade, so that both boats were no longer capable of unlimited action, especially not in the open sea.
The chief of the Special Unit, Vizeadmiral Schmidt, remained in full support of the torpedoboat operation and later wrote in his war diary:
The sortie was, and remains, necessary as only with the full command of the Kassar Wiek can the Army’s assault on Moon be given the required support. The sortie also had a reward. Without the support of the A-boats of Flotilla Rosenberg, Section Winterfeld could not have held the bridgehead at Orrisar. The Russians were pushed southeast to Moon and the fleeing Russians were then encircled. The appearance of the A-boats in the Kleinen Sound was, however, only possible as long as the torpedoboat forces of the I FdT held the eastern side of the Kassar Wiek.
Finally it was of greater significance to hold the Kassar Wiek and Kleinen Sound whilst the III Squadron pushed into the southern Moon Sound so as to fully encircle Moon and hinder the escape of the Russians across the sea… only by battle and similar operations is the advantage of sea mastery obtained.
This day, 17 October, also saw events in the Kleinen Sound progress well for the Germans, and they realized their secondary objective of landing on Moon Island. During the morning Fregattenkapitän Rosenberg, aboard T144, escorted the hospital ship Viola into the Kleinen Sound where she immediately began the embarkation and evacuation of the wounded. The S-Flotilla chief then transferred to A28 and began preparations for a further bombardment of the stone dam that ran between Ösel and Moon. By about 0800hrs, the boats A32, A27 and A29 had completed replenishment of their ammunition stocks and were in position in the Kleinen Sound, so that at 0850hrs they were able to comply with a request from 138th Infantry Regiment for an immediate bombardment of the base of the stone dam on Moon. The Russians reported that the fire was directed by two seaplanes and was very accurate. Many were killed or wounded in the trenches and the telegraph connection to the Death Battalion, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Shishko, was cut.
During the course of the morning, German reconnaissance aircraft reported that there were only small concentrations of Russian troops remaining on Moon. Therefore preparations to land on the island were accelerated. The attack was to be under the command of the commander of the 65th Infantry Brigade, Oberst Matthiass, and was to consist of the following units:
138th Infantry Regiment
255th Reserve Infantry Regiment (except I Battalion)
Sturmkompanie 18 (Section Winterfeld)
V Cyclist Battalion
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th (half of), and 9th Batteries of the 8th Field Artillery Regiment
7th Battery Heavy Howitzers
4th Reserve Heavy Artillery Regiment
3rd Company, 27th Pioneer Regiment
78th Reserve Pioneer Company