Half a platoon of the Telephone Section with two medium and two small wireless stations
At midday General von Kathen gave orders to immediately ferry the forces to Moon Island. At 1645hrs the artillery batteries opened fire and 6th Company, 138 Regt began to cross to Moon in rowing boats and land in the area of Kegova. The boats were screened from the enemy by a smoke screen and were supported by the fire of the A-boats. The landing did not meet any resistance and the troops began to advance, but immediately came upon the northern positions of the Russians to the west of the highway that crossed Moon.
Other parts of the II Battalion, 138 Regt, crossed behind 6th Company. They set up a bridgehead to cover the landing of subsequent battalions of the same regiment. An assault by the companies of the II Battalion was made during the evening. In the twilight the infantry advanced but were halted by Russian machine gun fire and a bombardment. The firing continued for about an hour.
Meanwhile, Hauptmann von Winterfeld’s Sturmkompanie 18 lay in readiness to attack across the stone dam, in coordination with the 138 Regt. The agreed signal from the 138 Regt that the sturmkompanie was to attack was to be three white star shells.
For support of the 6th Company, 138 Regt, and also to create a diversion, the German artillery conducted a fire raid on the bridgehead on Moon at 1645hrs. A house at the base of the stone dam which contained ammunition was soon set ablaze. A huge explosion followed which half destroyed a Russian armoured car hidden behind the house.
The agreed signal was yet to be seen, but ambition got the better of the sturmkompanie and they began to advance across the dam. As they neared to within 500 metres of Moon a murderous Russian fire was opened on them from several sides, which forced Hauptmann von Winterfeld’s men to ground. They were trapped on the 4 to 5 metre wide dam in a vicious firefight. The flames from the house illuminated the dam leaving the Germans no chance of advancing further.
However, the Russian bridgehead on Moon was under great pressure, caught between Sturmkompanie 18 and the 6th Company, 138 Regt. Finally at 0145hrs they began to retreat to positions between Linust and Nauze. At last the star shell signal was given and Section Winterfeld advanced onto Moon, capturing two guns, a machine gun and a burnt-out armoured car.
The Russian resistance by the Death Battalion had been resolute. When, during the day, the commander of the Moon garrison, General Martynov, had observed the retreat of the naval forces from the southern Moon Sound, he had requested permission to retreat, but the reply came that all forces should hold on. Then at 1600hrs Martynov repeated his request, and this time permission was given to retire to Rauga. Nevertheless, despite some of the Death Battalion also retreating from the dam to Rauga, the stubborn defence had continued well into the night and morning. However, as previously related, Vice Admiral Bakhirev had already been ordered to implement measures to evacuate the garrison.
The evening of 17 October saw the German sea forces in command of the southern Moon Sound, the north and south Kleinen Sound and the Kassar Wiek. Unloading work in the Tagga Bay was complete and all subsequent transport would be via Arensburg. A bridgehead had been established on Moon and preparations were complete for a further landing on Dagö. In addition there now seemed a possibility for German sea forces to push north to the entrance to the Finnish Gulf and completely cut off Vice Admiral Bakhirev’s forces in the Moon Sound. Therefore, at 1900hrs on 17 October, Vizeadmiral Schmidt gave the following order to the Special Unit:
The IV Squadron, II AG, VI TBF, 13th Half Flotilla, 4th Minesweeper Half Flotilla and II MS Div should cut off the line of retreat of Russian forces in the northern Moon Sound exit. The IV Squadron and 19th Half Flotilla are to hasten reprovisioning and march to point Gamma. Kaiser remain in Soelo Sound. Withdrawal of 13th Half Flotilla and VI Torpedoboat Flotilla boats from Kassar Wiek ordered. Refer to Leader II AG for positions for Sweeper Flotilla marker boats.
At the same time as the staffs began detailed preparations, the plan was referred to the Admiralty Staff (Admiralstab), as the Kaiser’s approval had to be obtained for this further extension to the terms of the operation.
CHAPTER EIGHT
18 October: The Capture of Moon Island
During the night of 17/18 October the Russian Sea Forces of the Riga Gulf remained at anchor in the northern Moon Sound. The torpedoboat Razyashchi patrolled near Kumor buoy with the three gunboats, Chivinetz, Chrabry and Grozyashchi anchored in single file along this meridian. Further to the north the, I, II, III and IV Division Torpedoboat-Destroyers were anchored on this meridian in two lines. The four torpedoboats of the VI Division Torpedoboat-Destroyers patrolled the dredged channel to the north of the scuttled steamers. After taking mines from the minelayer Volga, the V Division Torpedoboat Destroyers spent the night near Rukeraga. The cruiser Admiral Makarov and torpedoboat-destroyer Likhoi remained near the entrance to the Kassar Wiek. Bayan, Graschdanin and the minelayers Amur and Volga lay near Rukeraga with Kharilaid to the east. The hospital ship Tovarishch also lay near Kharilaid together with the II, III, IV and V Division Minesweepers and the XI Division Torpedoboat-Destroyers.
In the early hours of 18 October, Vice Admiral Bakhirev received orders from Kontre Admiral Razvozov to begin evacuating his forces from the Moon Sound, remove everything valuable from Rogekul and prepare the base for demolition. Then at 0300hrs he received another wireless message from the fleet commander: ‘The enemy intends to baffle you by appearing in the north’. The Russian intelligence service had obviously deciphered the wireless message of Vizeadmiral Schmidt at 1900hrs the previous evening ordering preparations for the operation in the north. Vice Admiral Bakhirev said of this message: ‘This telegram soon became known to the men, and certainly did not bring calm to the nervously-adjusted crews’.
At dawn on 18 October the German torpedoboats again took up their patrol positions in the Kassar Wiek and the minesweeper divisions resumed their minesweeping work. The Germans could see the cruiser Admiral Makarov and the gunboats in their positions. Shortly before 1200hrs Kommodore Heinrich took V100 to Tagga bay to personally report to Vizeadmiral Schmidt and to receive further orders. Whilst he was absent the boat B111 ran onto another of the mines laid by Pripyat. The foreship was rent off, but the boat remained afloat with the loss of two dead, three missing and sixteen wounded. Although the German boats had frequently passed over this area previously without loss, it is certain that the mine was one from the northwest wing of the mine barrier. The crippled boat was brought to anchor near Pavasterort and the following day was towed to Libau by a tug. In the meantime, Vizeadmiral Schmidt granted the I FdT full freedom of action to undertake such offensive operations as he thought appropriate.
On this day the landing operations on Dago gained momentum. Before dawn Emden weighed anchor and took up a bombardment position so that from 0715hrs to 0800hrs she was able to take the area around Emmast under fire with 170 shells. This bombardment forced the Russian defenders to retreat. Later on in the morning T144, A-boats, trawlers and drifters landed the II Cyclist Battalion near Serro so that the toehold on Dago was secure enough to begin landing field batteries and other heavy equipment.