The weather on the morning of 19 October was unfavourable as there was a fog. Nevertheless, during that morning the German 17th Infantry Regiment was dispatched to Dago, supported by 7th Battery, 8th Field Artillery. These forces were under the orders of the commander of 17 Regt, Oberst von Kaweczynski. The units were to be transported in two parts from Ösel, near Murrik, to Serro, on Dago. However, due to the bad weather, ferrying the troops was delayed and they only began arriving on Dago Island during the afternoon. Luckily there was no serious clash with the Russians. The advance proceeded rapidly and before dark the I and III Battalions, 17 Regt, had reached Vaimel, and the II Battalion reached Keinis. The previously-landed II Cyclist Battalion also continued their advance and by nightfall they had reached Grossenhof, whilst one company had penetrated to the east coast at Helterma, and another had even reached Hellama.
Kontreadmiral Razvozov fully realized the importance of holding Dago, for not only was it the last foothold on the Baltic Islands, which commanded the entrance to the Riga Gulf, it was also the cornerstone of the defence of the ‘Forward Position’, and therefore the outer defense on the Finnish Gulf and St Petersburg. Razvozov then telegrammed the commanders of batteries No 38 and No 39: ‘While the fleet remains in Moon Sound, its security depends exclusively on the fortitude of your batteries’. However, the fleet commander had greatly underestimated the situation and his order at 1100hrs to the battery, ‘If the enemy appears before the batteries, immediately open fire and fight up until the last shell’, was ill judged.
At the same time he dispatched a message to Senior Lieutenant Elachich and Colonel Veselago:
Convey to the troops, that they must hold up the enemy’s advance to the Tachkona batteries, for the fate of the fleet in Moon Sound depends on this. That is why everything transportable has been transferred to Lekhtmu, and in the case that it is hopeless to hold the south, the regiment [the 427th] is to withdraw to Simperness, and defend it, where it may be supported by the fire of the fleet units.
Lieutenant Elachich replied with the following:
The regiment no longer exists, there remains only a riotous gang, ready to raise their bayonets against their officers in their anxiety to get across to the mainland. If possible it is necessary to evacuate them from the island soon. They will prevent the crew collected from the batteries from holding back the enemy. The batteries are ready for action with people enough to send a company, battle ready and with machine guns, to do as much as possible.
And Colonel Veselago reported:
The regiment no longer remains on the island. Several hundred men of the command begin rebellion and it is necessary to immediately cancel the orders and forward transport to Helterma and Kertel. Vehicles, machine guns and field guns have been abandoned. Stores are devastated. Only the new part of disciplined troops can save the battery position. The fate of the officers is dependent on this decision, and all around death rages.
However, Admiral Razvozov’s fears that the Naval Forces of the Riga Gulf would be cut off in the Moon Sound were not realized on this day. Owing to the poor weather on 18 October, the minesweeping that was a necessary precursor for the operation in the north had been postponed by one day. The failure to sweep a route to the north meant that a quick appearance by the IV Battle Squadron was not possible. The ‘Northern Operation’ was only to be conducted under favourable circumstances. At about 1800hrs on 19 October the Special Unit received a wireless message from the Admiralty Staff stating that on orders from the Kaiser the ‘Northern Operation’ was not to be carried out. The Russian sea forces had been let off the hook.
Nonetheless, Kontreadmiral Razvozov was unaware of this development and the dangerous situation of the forces in Moon Sound forced him to a difficult decision. He came to the conclusion that if the Germans appeared off the Forward Position of the Finnish Gulf then he would enter into battle with them. With this in mind he ordered the 1st Brigade of Battleships from Helsingfors to Porkala Udde, the 2nd Cruiser Brigade to Lapvik and the 2nd Brigade of Battleships were dispatched to Reval. These orders were relayed to the Tachkona batteries to bolster their faltering spirits. The orders were also sent to the Commander of the Northern Front, General Cheremisov, who entirely approved of this decision.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief thought otherwise and Kontreadmiral Bubnov telegrammed the fleet commander’s staff:
The key problem of the Baltic Fleet is to fight on the Central Position, with its flank cover. By accepting the fleet commander’s noble decision, a disadvantageous outcome of the battle would have effect on all our positions in the Finnish Gulf and bring about the capture of the Central Position by the enemy. The noble purpose of the rescue of the small battle units is not absolved by the risk of catastrophe, with the power to affect the outcome of the war. Without the participation of those on Dago the Forward Position does not exist, and actually the fleet commander would be forced to accept battle in the open sea, and as has happened in the Riga Gulf, the likely outcome can not be favourable for us.
Rear Admiral Bubnov and the Supreme Command were therefore acknowledging the importance of holding the Baltic Islands, and their immense strategical value.
On the other hand, Vice Admiral Bakhirev had a different opinion about abandoning the Moon Sound. He believed that at least some of the forces should remain there. He thought that leaving the gunboats, some older torpedoboats and shallow-draught vessels behind represented little risk, as if they were lost it would not be significant for the fleet. From this position they could impede German minesweepers, and lay defensive mine barriers. The Germans were hardly likely to risk important forces to deal with these obsolete units. Vice Admiral Bakhirev thought that even larger units should remain behind and later wrote:
In general I considered that the loss of the northern part of the Moon Sound by us would greatly affect the defence of the Finnish Gulf and our ‘Forward position’ would lose any value. The departure of all the fleet from Moon Sound would certainly affect the morale condition of the local armies. In my opinion it was possible for even the large units to remain there, certainly with the support of the fleet.
Nevertheless, in view of the categorical orders to withdraw, at 1400hrs the general signal ‘B’ was hoist on Bayan, ordering the Naval Forces of the Riga Gulf to raise anchor and depart to the north. The order of march was as follows: four minesweepers escorted by torpedoboat-destroyers of the I Division Torpedoboat-Destroyers leading; all the remaining torpedoboat-destroyers of the Novik type, that is Desna, Samson, Leitenant Il’in, Pobeditel, Zabiyaka, Gavriil and Konstantin; the cruiser Bayan as flagship, accompanied by the torpedoboats Donski Kazak and Zabaikalets; the cruiser Admiral Makarov with the torpedoboats Steregushchi and Voiskovoi; the cruiser Diana and the torpedoboat Moskvityanin; the battleship Graschdanin, escorted by the torpedoboats General Kondratenko and Pogranitschnik; then came the gunboats Chivinetz, Chrabry and Grozyashchi with the torpedoboats Deyatel’nyi and Storozhevoi; the minelayer Volga and the transports Olga and Izhe in company with the torpedoboats Lichoi and Sil’nyi; and finally, bringing up the rear was the minelayer Amur escorted by the torpedoboats Turkmenets Stravropolski and Ukraina.