Выбрать главу

The ships committees wished to interfere with everything, not only military matters, and even demanded their presence be allowed to read and analyze operational telegrams…. The cheap politics was easily spread: there were nearly daily gatherings of the ships delegates and eternally messages were passed by semaphore and signal lamp…. The failing discipline of the crews was expressed in many apparent trifles, but these had tremendous value to life aboard the ships. Leave was given freely and there were unaccountable political and economic business trips given freely to essential crew.

Despite this I was still sure of the crews of those ships that had been in the Riga Gulf since the early spring, and sincerely believed they would be able to repulse the enemy and successfully defend the Gulf from being mastered by the enemy.

Nevertheless, a period of bad weather intervened towards the end of September as autumn storms raged and the German operation had to be postponed. The Germans had planned preparatory air attacks but many of these could not be carried out. There were some successes however. As the Russian torpedoboat destroyer Okhotnik carried out picket duty in the manoeuvre basin near buoy number 4 on 26 September, she struck a German mine. This mine had been laid by a German aircraft and Okhotnik carried the dubious distinction of being the first warship sunk by an aerial mine. Neither the commander nor officers wished to abandon ship. Harald Graf described the situation as follows:

Soon all the boats were overflowing with sailors and nobody thought to offer the officers a place. They considered it improper to ask for a place and remained aboard the torpedoboat, silently observing the leaving of the boats. The torpedoboat sank, and soon water flooded over the deck on which the officers stood…. With Okhotnik two more officers were lost, the commander Senior Leitenant V. A. Fok, and Leitenant V. K. Panferov.

At the beginning of October the German air offensive was stepped up and during the nights of 1, 5, 9 and 10 October a total of 5,900 kilograms of bombs were dropped on Zerel, Hainasch and Pernau. During the night of 30 September/1 October a bombing raid was conducted against the 12-inch gun battery at Zerel. The results were devastating. The following is from a copy of the telephone conversation between Captain 1st Rank Knüpfer (formerly commander of the torpedoboat Voiskovoi and now the commander of the Zerel Battery) and Captain 2nd Rank Muromtsev, the one and only Staff Officer of Vice Admiral Bakhirev.

Captain Knüpfer asks Captain Muromtsev to come to the telephone. ‘Captain Muromtsev on the telephone’.

Knüpfer speaks: ‘I request to report to the Admiral on the following. I have ordered Leitenant Stepanov to make inquiries to find the reason for the explosion of the magazine and he has already started and given the following picture: the bomb has fallen before the door of the magazine and a splinter has punched a hole, the powder was ignited and a fire started inside the magazine; cases of powder were thrown out by the explosion and set fire to a shed and a mill.

Captain 2nd Rank Loman, Leitenants Timofeev, Maksutin, Ensign Voskresensky, Sub-Leitenants Polikarpov, Grigorev, Manikhin, Leitenant Bartinev, Ensigns Volsky and Razdenov and most of the crew of Battery No 43 and the other batteries tried in every way possible to extinguish the fire inside the magazine, smothering it with earth and turf and pouring water through the ventilation pipes. A moment after there were no more flames visible, there was an explosion of one shell and after that 44 shells all at once. The forward wall of the magazine was taken out and the roof was wrecked. Logs and splinters rose to a very significant height and, for example, the body of Captain Loman was found two hundred sazhen [426 yards] from the place where he faced the magazine. Besides Loman, Timofeev and Maksutin, whose body has not yet been found, were also killed. Sub-Leitenant Manikhin, Leitenant Bartinev, Sub-Leitenant V B Polikarpov and Ensign Voskresensky are wounded and contused. I have replaced most of the sailors from separate Guards Regiments, but it is extremely desirable to promptly replace the experts and officers.’

Captain Knüpfer went on request a work crew of 300 men to complete concreting of the magazines. Captain Muromtsev continued: ‘I ask him to explain: firstly whether it is established the bomb was incendiary or ordinary; and secondly whether the fire detonated the charges or the shells.

‘The bomb was not incendiary, but ordinary, with few suffocating gases, and fell outside the door of the magazine. The fire burned for almost 30 minutes and I almost had time to reach the battery before the explosion. It was possible to extinguish the fire so that it could hardly be seen, and I think that an intermediate wall has burnt through, a shell was heated, which then resulted in the first explosion. Instantly after this there was a very big explosion which meant that the other 43 shells detonated, and this is quite possible according to the experiences of the scientific technical laboratory in Petrograd.’

The loss of the experienced officers could not be made good and replacements had not been found by the time the Germans attacked. The morale of the crew was also badly affected.

A further bombing raid on Zerel during the night of 8/9 October caused little additional damage, but three bombs badly damaged the steamer General Zimmerman, which was lying off Mento.

On 8 October German aerial reconnaissance reported two steamers lying off Zerel, which were thought to be minelayers. The first, of approximately 800 gross register tonnage (GRT) , lay off Zerel, whilst the other, of around 1500 GRT, lay off Mento. The I Torpedo Flugzeug Staffel at Windau were ordered to attack with their five torpedo-carrying aircraft. Each torpedo plane would be escorted by a single-seat fighter seaplane, whilst other seaplanes would fly at high altitude overhead to attempt to distract the anticipated heavy anti-aircraft fire. The targets lay about 1,000 metres from shore, in a water depth of 5 metres, but with a firing range of 1,500 to 2,000 metres the aircraft would be launching their torpedoes in a depth of approximately 10 to 11 metres, according to the charts; Torpedo Trial Kommand stated that although a greater depth was desirable, torpedoes could be launched normally in this depth of water. At this critical phase of preparations for Operation Albion, the destruction of two minelayers had great military importance, and Kapitänleutnant Mans, commander of the Windau Airstation, did not hesitate to order the attack, even though it would expend half the staffel’s available supply of ten aerial torpedoes.

Towards 1330hrs the five Gotha WD 11 torpedo-bombers lumbered into the air, led by Leutnant zur See Stinsky in aircraft 1378. Following close behind were aircraft 1372, 1374, 1376 and 1377. Although visibility was good, there was a strong wind and swell, and the weather threatened to turn bad. The port squad, comprising aircraft 1372 and 1374, took course NNW towards the lighthouse at Zerel, initially at an altitude of 600 feet but later reducing to 300 feet. The smaller steamer lay on a north-northwest heading and therefore the staffel took up an attack course of northeast, further reducing altitude to avoid anti-aircraft gun fire from the battery near Zerel. About 1427hrs Leutnant zur See Tornau, in aircraft 1372, launched his torpedo at a range of 1,700 metres. It broke surface twice and then appeared to run normally. Shortly after, Leutnant der Reserve (Marine Artillerie) Esser launched his torpedo but the track of this torpedo could not be seen. The aircraft flying high above the scene observed one torpedo pass behind the stern of the steamer, whilst the track of the other was not sighted.

Meanwhile, Leutnant zur See Stinsky led the other aircraft in the attack on the larger steamer off Mento. This vessel lay on an east-southeast heading. The torpedo-bombers reduced their altitude to just 30 to 60 feet, flying en echelon to starboard, and began their attack run. At about 1430hrs the lead aircraft launched her torpedo at a range of 1,700 metres. The torpedo went straight to the bottom. Next Leutnant zur See der Reserve Schurer in aircraft 1377 launched his torpedo. After breaking surface several times it ran normally, but after traveling just 800 metres it suddenly veered off to port. At around 1432hrs Leutnant zur See der Reserve Rowehl, flying the last aircraft, dropped his torpedo. According to observation aircraft this missile passed 10 metres behind the stern of the steamer and later detonated on the bottom. After launching their torpedoes and whilst flying away the staffel were subjected to a violent anti-aircraft fire by guns ranging from 15cm artillery to machine guns, but without success. By 1530hrs all aircraft had safely landed in Windau.