The review was undertaken on an ad hoc basis by Ken McGinley and a small group of researchers from the Open University who were looking for evidence which might be useful to nuclear veterans fighting for pensions through the notoriously slow Pensions Tribunals system.
The Australian tests, the so-called “dirty bombs” that had grabbed all the headlines in the 1980s, were once again examined, but there was little fresh evidence about these tests: it had all been said before, so it was decided to put the Christmas Island tests, of which little was known, under the microscope.
These tests had made only sporadic appearances in the headlines, and Grapple Y had made the least impression of all. Even in Lorna Arnold’s seminal work on the hydrogen bomb tests Britain and the H-Bomb published in 2001, Grapple Y is given the least billing. But she did make one very interesting observation: buried away in her account of the bomb is a passage about the task force commander Air Vice Marshal Grandy reporting to his political masters in Whitehalclass="underline" -
Immediately after the shot the weather had deteriorated and had there been any further delay the operation could not have taken place during the rest of that week. As it was, cloud conditions reduced the number and quality of the photographs obtained.
She doesn’t say precisely what the “deteriorating weather” was but, Penney’s deputy, Bill Cook, reveals another strong clue in an interview he gave to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published not long after he returned from Christmas Island. The magazine’s correspondent notes:-
When the test took place Cook showed no sign of excitement. On one crucial occasion when the weather was highly doubtful he carried on seemingly unworried… when it was over, his characteristic smile broke, but only later did he admit that he had been concerned.
Does the weather being “highly doubtful” mean that it rained? And if it didn’t why had he been “concerned?” But these clues were slim pickings and too obscure for the nuclear veterans to make anything of.
Much more was needed. It was decided to probe deeper, and further signs of “suspicious behaviour” by Grapple Y were soon forthcoming.
A trawl of Hansard, the official parliamentary record, revealed that Grapple Y had been the subject of a fierce debate back in 1991. This followed allegations that something had gone wrong with the April 28, 1958 explosion, and that troops had apparently been caught in a deluge of heavy rain.
This had been denied by the Ministry of Defence, but Sapper Arthur Thomas told in an interview for a TV programme: “Suddenly over the loud-speaker system came the order to get under cover quickly and to clear the open ground. Apparently the wind had changed and the fallout cloud was heading back to Christmas Island. I dashed to my motor vehicle and sat in the cab compartment, closed the doors and windows and remained there for half an hour. Shortly afterwards, however, the wind direction reversed and the men were ordered back to their positions.”
Another soldier’s account of what happened is even more dramatic. Tom Birch told the Dispatches programme: “The explosion and the enormity of the cloud left me speechless. I thought, my God what the hell’s going on? We were all quite amazed, you were frightened; all sorts of emotions came out.
“As I walked back to the Port Camp I suddenly became aware of a very thick black cloud approaching inland from the sea. It was as black as pitch. The cloud came over part of the island then retreated back out to sea again. By that time we had all been showered in rain which was as big as ten-pence pieces.
“We all ran like mad to get away from the rain. Lots of men were caught out in the open though. Immediately after the detonation there was panic among the boffins. From the way they were acting it was clear that something had gone far wrong. The whole thing appeared abnormal, unusual.”
The importance of whether or not it rained after the blast was not lost on Labour MP Jack Ashley who went on to ask specific questions in Parliament about the height the bomb exploded, protective clothing worn by the men, and the allegations of rainfall. His questions obviously hit a raw nerve judging by the tetchy reply from Defence Minister Archie Hamilton:-
I must say at the outset that the irresponsible and sometimes misleading allegations made by the “Dispatches” television programme, from which the right hon. Gentleman drew many of his points, were based on a series of factual inaccuracies. The unfounded allegations made by the programme can only add unnecessarily to the concern and anxiety of those who participated in the nuclear test programme and their relatives.
After brushing aside doubts concerning the height the bomb exploded, the protective clothing worn by the servicemen and the distance they were from the blast, Hamilton really gets into his stride. In a high dudgeon he professes to being “mystified” by the allegations about whether or not it rained after the blast:-
The Dispatches programme alleges that there was heavy rain off Christmas Island on 28 April 1958 which substantially increased the amount of radioactive fallout. All that I can say is that shortly after the test extensive environmental monitoring did not measure any deposition of radioactive materials from the detonation. On the basis of that evidence therefore there could have been no exposure to internal contamination as a result of inhalation.
It is interesting that Hamilton does not actually say that it didn’t rain, just that there was no radioactive fallout. He goes to great lengths, over six pages, to rubbish the points raised by veterans over the years, but the crucial question of whether or not it rained is dodged.
The same pugnacious stance (and evasiveness) was evident in the reaction of another defence minister called upon to answer similar allegations nearly 15 years later.
Labour MP Dr Lewis Moonie was in combative mood when he replied to a letter sent to his department in 2003 by Labour MP Siobahn McDonagh. She had written to Moonie demanding answers to questions raised by her constituent Shirley Denson, whose husband had piloted one of the sampling aircraft that flew through the mushroom cloud created by Grapple Y.
In a seven-page reply Dr Mooney insisted that Mrs Denson’s late husband had never been placed in any danger while carrying out his duties:-
The Canberra aircraft used for sampling had pressurised cabins which prevented the ingress of air… and no significant levels of contamination were ever detected…
But when the question of rainfall is raised Dr Mooney is as indignant as Hamilton:-
Some of the assertions made by Mrs Denson have been raised by members of the British Nuclear Tests Veterans’ Association before on many occasions over the years. The Ministry of Defence has addressed these points time and again but the BNTVA chooses to lend credence to certain misapprehensions.
When he finally gets round to answering the question, Mooney shows he is every bit as nimble-footed as Hamilton. The following passage quoted verbatim from his letter is a master-class in dissembling:-
Environmental recordings for Main Camp on Christmas Island for the date of the trial and subsequent days showed that sticky paper and air samples were below the level of detection for contamination, and also that there was no rainfall. The first measurable rainfall at the Main Camp following the detonation occurred on 2 May 1958. There is a meteorology report giving observations of precipitation 5km from station 2057Z, which was a surface wind monitoring position, two hours after the detonation. However, environmental testing on Christmas Island during and after the Grapple operations showed no measurable fallout on the island. AWE Aldermaston has no evidence to show that water contaminated with radiation was precipitated out over the island.