STAGE 2: HUMANITARIAN POLICIES
The rising prominence of human rights in international law has given rise to a “humanitarian dimension” in Russian foreign policy that constitutes the second stage of the trajectory. To date, this humanitarian dimension has been understudied. The very understanding of “humanitarian” policies differs in the West and Russia, where gumanitarnoye sotrudnichestvo (humanitarian cooperation) is used interchangeably with “public diplomacy” and refers to “people to people” policies, “NGO diplomacy,” and “cultural diplomacy.”29 The most recent Russian Foreign Policy Review of 2007 noted four aspects of the “humanitarian trend” of foreign policy: consular issues, human rights protection, cultural and scientific cooperation, and compatriot policies.30 However, to elaborate my proposed reimperialization paradigm, I will examine Russia’s humanitarian policies separately from complementary tools like soft power, compatriot policies, and consular efforts like passportization. Instead, I will include here Moscow’s escalation of human rights questions of Russian compatriots, assistance to the Russian diaspora abroad, and even peacekeeping operations.
The relationship of the Russian Federation to human rights has been somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, Moscow has rejected outside criticisms of its own human rights violations. It has called for regional standards of human rights to meet the cultural and historical needs of particular societies, rather than standards imposed from the outside. On the other hand, Moscow still proclaims the universal nature of such rights. In practice, Russia mainly raises the issue of human rights on the international stage in relation to the rights of ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, or Russian citizens residing in the countries of its near abroad. In contrast to the norms of the international humanitarian community that stipulate that humanitarian assistance should be guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence from political, economic, military, and other objectives, Russia’s efforts to protect human rights are closely intertwined with the notion of assisting and protecting the rights of its compatriots.31 Most often, humanitarian efforts serve as a pretext to advance Russia’s geopolitical aims. Indeed, like Russia’s version of soft power, Russia’s humanitarian policies are also a unique construct.
Exactly as human rights have increasingly become important in international relations and Russia itself has faced criticism for its domestic human rights record, Moscow has increasingly turned to humanitarian policies as an element of its foreign policy.32 According to the 2009 study The “Humanitarian Dimension” of the Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, “Russia has chosen an offensive approach to human rights issues as the best form of defense.”33 As a result, Russia has sought out “artificial pseudo-problems” of human rights in the states of its near abroad.34 This counterattack serves several purposes. First, it distracts the attention of the international community from Russia’s own human rights violations. Second, it questions the extent to which states like the Baltics or Ukraine can protect the rights of their minorities, thus challenging the legitimacy of these national governments and seeking to “discredit those countries in eyes of international society.”35 Moscow’s vocal campaign over Russian diaspora rights enables it to internationalize and even legitimize the issue. Finally, Russian foreign policy has embraced the protection of human rights at times when it could not use international law to advance its interests. For instance, the evident weakness of Russia’s arguments under international law regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine has resulted in Moscow’s decision to defend its actions by broad notions of compatriot protection, legitimacy, justice, and above all national interest.36
Certainly, since 1991, various minorities in the post-Soviet space, including ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, have faced occasional and in some cases arguably systemic though not explicit discrimination, potential economic hardships, and cultural integration difficulties. However, since the mid-1990s Moscow has packaged the issues of multicultural, transitional societies as “human rights violations,” tying them together with accusations of “fascism” when this suited its foreign policy aims.37 Moscow’s antifascist rhetoric targeting alleged abusers of the Russian compatriots’ rights is even more paradoxical when viewed in light of the fact that Putin regime’s close ties to Europe’s neofascist and extreme right parties are well documented and include floating the French far right National Front with a €9 million loan in 2014.38 But Moscow’s perplexing efforts to “fight fascism” in the former Soviet republics serve a purpose. By seeking to portray its opponents in the Baltic States or in Kiev as “fascists,” the Russian government and its proxies by definition appear “antifascist.” For instance, Putin compared the 2014 conflict between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian militias in the Ukrainian city of Donetsk with the heroic antifascist struggle of the Russians during the epic two-year siege of Leningrad in the Second World War.39 Paradoxically, in early 2015, the supposedly antifascist pro-Russian leader of the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk, Alexander Zakharchenko, declared that Kiev is actually run by “miserable Jews.”40 Rhetoric aside, present-day Russian “antifascism” has nothing to do with genuine antifascism, which is characterized by adherence to democratic principles, respect for international law, and the protection of human rights.41
To date Russia has sought out existing international organizations and created ones of its own to pursue the issue of violations of human rights of Russian compatriots. Among international organizations, Russia raised and faced the issue of human rights violations in the United Nations, the UN Human Rights Council, the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights.42 Russia was particularly vocal in denouncing the alleged human rights violations of the Baltic States and also tried to hinder their accession to such international organizations as the Council of Europe and the European Union.43 However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful as various commissions concluded that the three Baltic countries were in fact complying with all human rights standards.44 Possibly the most important Russian organization working on human rights is the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation (IDC), established in 2007 and funded by “private donors” who remain absolutely clandestine.45 Headquartered in New York, this NGO is officially described as a “non-governmental think-tank dedicated to analyzing, defining, and promoting mutual understanding between Russia and the United States.”46 The Institute publishes reports of human rights violations in Western democracies, such as The State of Human Rights in the U.S. (October 2013). Its Paris branch focuses on “the relationship between state sovereignty and human rights,” “interpretation of human rights and the way they are applied in different countries,” and “the way in which historical memory is used in contemporary politics.”47 The organization’s research had a geopolitical tone in 2013, 2014, and 2015 with pieces like “The West’s Post-Modernism and the New Cultural Cold War,” “The Geopolitics of New Multipolarity,” “The United Nations Report Is Neither Realistic Nor Credible” (regarding the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria), and “Ideology and Geopolitics in Two Cold Wars.”48 In contrast to Russia’s own agenda of criticizing human rights conditions in the United States or the EU, a number of respected, international organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch condemn Russia for mistreatment of ethnic minorities within its borders.