Experts on the Russian media propaganda apparatus even argue that it has become “the central mechanism of a new type of authoritarianism far subtler than 20th-century strains.”105 The Russian political activist and chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov commented on the role of the opposition in the face of state propaganda in 2014: “Unfortunately, we have to reiterate that white is white and black is black. Because today the country is living in complete lies, which are broadcast 24/7 by the state propaganda machine.”106
Russian propaganda has also been evolving to combine popular culture with information warfare. For example in late 2014, a well-known Russian actor was shown with a machine gun shooting or pretending to shoot at Ukrainian forces during a cease-fire, while wearing a press helmet. This incident was unanimously condemned by the Ukrainian authorities, who described the actor as an “accomplice in terrorist activities” following the incident.107 He was also criticized at home by Russia’s Union of Journalists and the head of the union’s Moscow branch.108 The participation of a popular Russian figure in the Ukrainian war was likely intended to boost morale and support for the war in Russia.
In addition to the state-dominated news media, the Russian government has established organizations to provide a Kremlin-approved view of history. In 2009 the paradoxically named President’s Commission to Prevent Falsification of History was established. The organization aims at promulgating history as set out by the Soviet regime if not outright historical revisionism. As with Russkiy Mir, top-level officials from the President’s administration, the FSB, the Federal Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs support this organization. The commission has sought both to “explain” history and to “prevent attempts to rewrite history [that] are becoming more and more harsh, depraved and aggressive.”109 Contentious historical topics include Stalinist repressions, Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In late 2014, Putin himself attempted on several occasions to rehabilitate the previously condemned pact, which sought to carve up Eastern Europe. During a meeting with young historians in Moscow, Putin stated, “The Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany. People say: ‘Ach, that’s bad.’ But what’s bad about that if the Soviet Union didn’t want to fight, what’s bad about it?”110 Also, in 2008 the Historical Memory Foundation was established in Moscow with the official goal of countering the efforts of European states to “rewrite the history” of the twentieth century, when in reality these states seek greater acknowledgment of Soviet-era atrocities both at home and abroad. The foundation is guided by the controversial figure Alexander Dyukov, who has made a name for himself by seeking to deny or diminish Soviet repressions. He is banned from a number of European Schengen zone countries.111
Just as Russia’s human rights agenda is focused on the idea of fascism, so too does the issue of fascism color Russia’s information warfare and its views of history. Certainly, the struggle against Nazi forces during the Second World War left an indelible imprint on the Soviet and Russian psyche. In the war against the fascists, some 20 to 30 million Soviet citizens of various nationalities died—more deaths than any single country suffered. Since the 2000s, however, the Russian government has increasingly turned the idea of fascism into a political tool and Russian historians are increasingly promoting this Kremlin line.112 Indeed, fascism has served the Kremlin as a useful label to pin on its opponents—whether the Baltic States, the West in general, or since 2014 the Ukrainian government. This process of manufacturing enemies out of foreign states and peoples via the media has been demonstrated in the case of Latvia by American-Latvian political scientist and Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks, but a similar process can be seen vis-à-vis other states as well.113 These efforts to manufacture “self” versus “other” also serve to unify Russian society with ideological conceptions which are centered on three pillars of Russian national identity: Christian Orthodoxy, victory against fascism in the Second World War, and anti-Americanism.114
Two possible motives drive Russia’s efforts in the historical sphere. First, Putin’s regime has been consciously rehabilitating Soviet-era leaders as symbols as well as returning to a Soviet interpretation of history.115 Second, Moscow’s historical revisionism seeks to counter the efforts of Central and Eastern Europe to study Soviet persecutions and deportations against both the Russian people and other nations. In the EU, there has been a movement to recognize Soviet historical crimes equally with those of the Nazis. In April 2009, with the support of Baltic and Polish members, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the European conscience and totalitarianism that came just short of equating Soviet and Nazi crimes.116 Likewise, the EU has created Black Ribbon Day or the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, and an educational project, the Platform of European Memory and Conscience. However, the regime of Vladimir Putin relies on disinformation and historical reinterpretations not to reassess the past but instead to push forward its foreign policy agenda in the present—particularly when it comes to “protecting” its so-called compatriots and claiming people and territories that are perceived as historically Russian.
STAGE 6: PROTECTION
The previous five stages of the reimperialization trajectory would traditionally represent softer forms of a state’s influence. In the case of Russia, however, these soft instruments have been highly securitized, reflecting “soft coercion” rather than traditional soft power. The sixth stage, that of “protecting” Russian compatriots, marks a concrete departure from softer methods toward hard power. This is the stage where military campaigns could commence, though hybrid warfare is possibly more likely to play a role than conventional warfare.
The implicit notion of protecting Russian compatriots is present at nearly all of the five previous stages of the trajectory. Humanitarian policies deal specifically with seeking to ensure and protect the rights of the Russian compatriots. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Russia’s laws, policies, and strategies on compatriot issues enshrine, institutionalize, and legalize this protection even when such a practice is unusual in international law. An offer of a passport is in its very essence an offer of state protection—both inside and outside Russia’s borders. Finally, information warfare often focuses on the alleged violations of Russian human rights, threats of fascism, and even preposterous accusations of genocide of the Russian diaspora, as voiced by the main federal investigative authority, the Russian Investigative Committee, during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in late 2014.117 Thus, Moscow-led protection of compatriots becomes the natural extension of earlier Russian policies.
The Russian notion of protection is very broad, as Moscow has reserved for itself almost all its forms in response to various levels of threat. Moscow’s earliest conceptualizations of how to defend its compatriots abroad via military intervention were established in a draft military doctrine published in May 1992. It defined one of the basic tasks of the military as defense of the “rights and interests of citizens of Russia and people linked with it ethnically and culturally abroad.”118 While the final text of the military doctrine, published in 1993, narrowed the group to be defended to just citizens, it still defined “the suppression of the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states as a source of military danger.”119 In recent times, Russia’s policies in Georgia and particularly in Ukraine have established two criteria according to which the Kremlin can use military force to protect Russian compatriots. First, when there is a presumed threat to their security (their lives or physical well-being).120 Second, when Russian compatriots (but not necessarily their legal representatives) request Russia’s assistance.121 However, the Russian government has declared on more than one occasion that it seeks to protect Russian compatriots and citizens abroad not only in the face of danger but during any infringements of their “dignity” and “honor.” For example, during the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, Medvedev reiterated that “protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country.”122 Russia’s use of military force in South Ossetia was also justified as defense of “the dignity and honor of the Russian citizens.”123 Finally, as the case of Ukraine demonstrated in 2014, this protection need not be officially requested or even approved by the compatriots. The Kremlin has seemingly called to protect compatriots in eastern Ukraine from the new government in Kiev by its own decision. For instance, a month after the annexation of Crimea, in April 2014, the Gallup Organization conducted polls in Ukraine and found that only 8 percent of the population in eastern Ukraine responded “definitely yes” to wanting protection by the Russian army. In contrast, 52 percent of eastern Ukrainians responded “definitely no.” Likewise, 11 percent responded “rather yes” while 17 percent responded “rather no.”124 While the accuracy of the sample in this or any poll can always be questioned, there was no evidence to suggest that (beyond the small number of separatist insurgents supported by Russian militias) eastern Ukrainians sought Moscow’s protection.