As political scientist Alexander Motyl observed in 2001, “[c]ommunities of people do not become nations simply because we wish to imagine them as such; regimes do not become democratic just because we use the modifier; and political entities do not become—or stop being—empires merely because terminological fashion says so.”7 By the mid-2000s it was increasingly clear that Russia had not become a democratic state, nor had its aspirations for empire been squashed by the “end of history.” Tensions over the post–Cold War order and post-Soviet borders reemerged. NATO and EU expansion reached Russia’s borders and the borders of its so-called near abroad states that Moscow viewed as its inherent sphere of influence. In the same period Russia went to war for the first time outside its borders in the Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008.
Nonetheless, Russia’s imperial revival appeared like a marginal idea in the broader context of Russian foreign policy for most of the 1990s and 2000s. Neo-imperialism was embraced mostly rhetorically and superficially by a handful of radical Russian politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky or alluded to by Putin and his entourage for rhetorical flourish and to drum up nationalism among the domestic audience. Some attributed this nascent imperialism to Russia’s growing wealth and confidence driven by high oil prices of the mid-2000s.8 Some pointed again to the natural need to correct the alleged “humiliation” of Russia after the collapse of the USSR.9 Following the global economic downturn of 2008 and the domestic protests of 2011–13 against Putin’s regime, some saw Russia as isolated, embattled, and defensive and hence pushing back against these constraining international conditions.10 Some suggested that the rising nationalism and aggression was Putin’s response to his weakening popularity and growing opposition at home and an attempt to rally the country behind the Russian flag.11 But few took the rising signs of Russia’s vaulting imperial ambitions seriously. Indeed over the past five years, most scholars have justified this indifference by alleging that Russia was a shadow of its former self and its military presented no challenge to the European continent or international order.12 For instance, in 2011, scholar of Russia and at the time director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin, echoed a common sentiment at the time: “Russia’s remarkable disinterest in its former empire has been paralleled by the other former Soviet republics distancing themselves from the former imperial center.”13 With the Georgian war already forgotten, the signs of Russian neo-imperialism were not all that evident.
Some scholars and commentators—especially those closer to the part of the world in question—did foresee Russia’s expansionist drive all along. In 1994, Norwegian academic and founder of peace and conflict studies Johan Galtung stated that Russia is expansionist and likely to base its agenda “on Slavic culture and religious orthodoxy, building a Soviet Union II based on Russia, Belarus, eastern Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan.”14 In 2001 Ukrainian-American Motyl argued that Russia is pursuing “creeping reimperialization.”15 In 2008, without much support at the time, British commentator and Economist editor Edward Lucas argued that Putin’s Russia has waged a “new cold war” on the West.16 In 2009, Kiev-born, Moscow-based political scientist and former Yeltsin adviser Emil Pain concluded, rather anticlimactically but nonetheless in dramatic counterpoint to the established view, that Russia demonstrates an “imperial syndrome” and seeks “maintaining territories” while preserving or re-creating an empire.17 Days ahead of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, I argued that we are witnessing an expansionist strategy in action—Moscow’s efforts to grab land in the former Soviet space under the guise of protecting Russian compatriots.18
Following the annexation of Crimea, there has been much debate on how to respond to Russia’s revanchism, but the debate has not been new. Since the 2000s, there has been disagreement about whether Russia can be a true partner to the West or whether it will remain a potential threat. The United States under the leadership of George W. Bush supported NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia and installing a missile defense system for Central and Eastern Europe. President Barack Obama sought to “reset” relations with Moscow and some progress was made before the initiative fizzled. Following Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Robert Menendez and other senators argued for arming Ukraine to fight Russia.19 In December 2014 the U.S. Congress voted for another round of tougher sanctions.20 In early 2015, after rocket attacks from Russian-supported separatist regions on the Ukrainian city of Mariupol, the EU extended its sanctions on Russia. Motyl has argued in Foreign Affairs that George F. Kennan’s Cold War policy of “containment,” formulated in regard to the Soviet Union, should be applied to contemporary Russia to thwart its expansionism in Ukraine and the post-Soviet space.21 However, before a long-term response to Russia’s neo-imperial strategy can be launched, an understanding of Russia’s policies as well as their drivers and aims is imperative. At the center of Moscow’s expansionist policies lies the question of the Russian “compatriots.”
THE REIMPERIALIZATION POLICY TRAJECTORY
The central argument of this book is that since the 1990s and particularly since the 2000s there has been an increasing tendency in Russian foreign policy toward reimperialization of the post-Soviet space, especially in regard to the territories where Russian compatriots reside. Under Putin’s leadership, Moscow’s policies demonstrate an increasingly orchestrated effort to utilize its Russian compatriots in neighboring states in order to opportunistically grab land and gradually rebuild its historic empire when domestic and international conditions are favorable. Over the past decade, Moscow has sought influence over the Russian and Russian-speaking diaspora by offering them Russian citizenship and passports and eventually calling for their military and legal protection. This has resulted in de facto or de jure annexation of territories where Russian compatriots reside, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Indeed, Putin’s request to the Russian Senate to approve military intervention in Ukraine in order to “protect the interests of Russian citizens and compatriots”22 on 1 March 2014 highlighted once seemingly innocuous compatriot policies that had been formulated two decades ago. These policies, whose origins and development will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, were ostensibly meant to protect and support ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in the near abroad. These policies could appear to be part of Moscow’s harmless soft power and cultural efforts. Instead, these compatriot efforts should be understood as part of Russia’s and the Putin regime’s consistent policy trajectory that seeks territorial gains in the former Soviet republics, especially where three factors are present: (1) a large and concentrated population of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians; (2) that population resides in territories bordering Russia; (3) the population is receptive to Russia’s influence.
Throughout this book, I will demonstrate how Russia employs soft power, compatriot and humanitarian policies, information warfare, and “passportization” (systematic distribution of Russian citizenship) to prepare for more aggressive military policies under the guise of separatism, civil conflict, peacekeeping, and support for compatriots. The outcome may be hybrid warfare—or a military strategy that seamlessly blends conventional military tactics with irregular ones that can include civilian participation, guerilla warfare, and modern technology to achieve an advantage both on land and in cyberspace. These methods help Russia’s foreign policy to achieve its expansionist and territorial ambitions. I propose that there is a consistent trajectory in Russia’s policies toward the former Soviet republics and their populations, and particularly their territories where Russian compatriots reside that follows seven stages. What I term the “Russian reimperialization policy trajectory” starts with (1) soft power and continues to (2) humanitarian policies, (3) compatriot policies, (4) information warfare, (5) “passportization,” (6) protection, and finally (7) annexation.