It was now around 8 o'clock in the evening. A sea mist was reducing visibility and Lord Howe realised that he would be unable to bring on a general action before darkness fell and communication with his ships became difficult. He therefore made the signal to recall the fleet and form line ahead and astern of his flagship. During the night the much battered Révolutionnaire evaded the British fleet and made her way back to Brest escorted by a French seventy-four. The equally battered Audacious needed dockyard attention and headed back to England. The first round had ended in a draw.
With the coming of dawn on 29 May the enemy fleet was seen to be 4 or 5 miles away, sailing in a line ahead. It was a grey day, with cloudy skies and a mist hovering on the horizon. The wind was still blowing from the south-west and had lessened from gale force to a stiff breeze, but a heavy swell continued to roll across the ocean from the west. The French were to windward of the British and therefore had the advantage of the weather gauge. This meant that they could choose to run down on the British fleet with the wind behind them or try and avoid action altogether by maintaining their current course which was taking them away from the British. Howe was determined to bring on a general action but this meant sailing close-hauled and tacking his fleet to bring his leading ships into contact. The second of Nicholas Pocock's aerial views shows exactly what happened. Lord Howe hoisted signal 78 for the fleet to tack in succession, 'the headmost and weathermost ships to tack first'. At 11.30 am the French fleet is stretched out along the horizon. Most of the British fleet have already tacked and the leading ships have begun firing on the enemy. The Bellerophon is in the centre of the picture, following in the wake of Lord Howe's flagship.
If they stayed on the same tack the leading British ships would pass harmlessly to leeward of the French so Lord Howe hoisted the signal to cut through the enemy's line. Captain Hope in the Bellerophon observed that Howe 'tacked in the midst of a very heavy fire or cannonade and cut through between the 4th and 5th ship in their rear. We tacked and passed between the 2nd and 3rd ships.' He went on to provide a glimpse of the confusion as ships at close quarters poured broadsides into each other: 'In passing we brought down a ships topmasts and in the heat of the action it was difficult to know who was French and who was English. We was all firing thro one another.' By sailing through the line of enemy ships, the Queen Charlotte and the Bellerophon exposed themselves to the full broadsides of the enemy before they were able to bring their own guns to bear. Captain Hope noted that 'in passing the line we had our sails and rigging cut to pieces' but they had succeeded in cutting off three French ships and isolating them from the rest of the French fleet. These ships received such a pounding from the British guns that one of them was totally disabled. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse acted promptly. In the words of Pocock, 'The French Admiral seeing this ship must be taken if he stood on, wore his fleet in succession from the van and rallied in a very gallant manner and in good order towards our fleet.' In the ensuing mêlée the French managed to rescue their damaged ships and tow them clear.
This second day of action, like the first, ended inconclusively. The French had fought valiantly but several of their ships were so badly damaged that they had to retire from the scene. Some of Howe's ships, notably the Leviathan and the Queen, had sustained heavy casualties and were badly damaged but they could be repaired by their crews on the spot. From a tactical point of view the British were now in a much stronger position. By tacking through the enemy line Howe had successfully manoeuvred his ships to windward of the French and now he had the weather gauge.
That night the sea mist, which had been lurking on the horizon, spread across the ocean and enveloped the two fleets in a damp haze. Howe's main concern was to prevent the French fleet from escaping. The French admiral's concern was to protect his crippled warships and to keep the grain convoy at a safe distance from the British. On the Bellerophon the crew used the interlude of night to carry out urgent repairs and were employed splicing lengths of rope and repairing sails and rigging. The gun crews remained at their quarters. Indeed, according to a seaman on another ship, 'we lay upon the decks at our guns all night for two nights and three days.' In spite of their vigilance they lost sight of the French fleet and at one stage the fog was so thick that visibility was reduced to a cable's length (200 yards) and they could only glimpse three of their own ships in the immediate vicinity. In the early hours of 31 May the mist was accompanied by drizzling rain. Edward Codrington provides us with a vivid picture of the scene on board the Queen Charlotte at dawn. The ship was cleared for action and there was consequently only a canvas screen between the Admiral's cabin and the quarterdeck. Codrington was an officer of the watch at that early hour and by lifting the canvas screen he was able to observe a brief exchange between Lord Howe and his flag captain Sir Roger Curtis. He saw Lord Howe sitting in an armchair in his greatcoat. Curtis came in to make his report to the Admiral.
'My Lord, I am sorry to tell you that the fog is now so thick that we cannot see anything beyond our ship, and God knows whether we are standing into our own fleet or that of the enemy.'
'Well, Sir, it can't be helped,' Howe calmly replied, 'we must wait with patience till the weather improves.' Codrington noted that the Admiral showed no nervousness in the difficult circumstances but 'evinced a heroic fortitude which may have been equalled, but never can have been exceeded.'
The fog partly cleared at around 6 o'clock and the crew of the Bellerophon were able to see most of the rest of the fleet but not the Queen Charlotte which remained hidden in a fog bank. Not till around 1 o'clock in the afternoon did the fog clear sufficiently for the flag-ship to be able to rejoin the fleet and for them to be able to see the French fleet which was now 8 or 9 miles to leeward. Lord Howe hoisted the signal for the fleet to form the established line of battle and they set a course for the enemy. By 6.30 in the evening the French were still too far away and it was evident to Howe that he would not be able to bring on a conclusive general action before nightfall. He decided to hold his hand till the next day and gave the signal 'to haul the wind on the larboard tack.' That evening the British crews completed the repairs to the damaged ships and prepared for the impending battle. Howe sent the frigates Phaeton and Southampton along the line with orders to hail each ship and tell them that the Queen Charlotte would be sailing all night under a single foresail, reefed topsails, jib and main staysail. This enabled individual captains to judge the speed required to maintain their station in the line.
The morning of 1 June was cloudy with a fresh breeze from south-south-west and a continuing heavy swell from the west. On the Bellerophon they could see no sign of the enemy fleet at daybreak but the frigates had spotted them about 7 miles to leeward. Howe was determined to make the battle decisive and he therefore hoisted signal 34 which meant, 'having the wind of the enemy, the Admiral means to pass between the ships in the line for engaging them to leeward'. And in case there should be any doubt in his captains' minds he followed this up an hour later with signal 36, 'Each ship independently to steer for and engage her opponent in the enemy's line.' Although baldly expressed in the language of Howe's signal book, this order was similar in spirit and intention to the famous direction which Nelson was to give to his captains before Trafalgar when he told them that 'no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.'