I have the honour to be,
Your excellency's most obedient, etc, etc,
Grand Marshall Count Bertrand.
This was not an entirely honest letter because Napoleon had not received a promise from anyone, let alone the British Government, that the passports would be granted him. On the other hand Maitland knew perfectly well that the request for passports had been refused but at no time did he reveal that he was aware of this. Both sides seem to have been playing a game of diplomatic poker, trying to find out each other's intentions without giving too much away. At this stage Maitland's orders were restricted to preventing Napoleon from leaving France, but while he was still pondering his response to the letter a hail from the deck announced the arrival of another British ship. It was the Falmouth, a 20-gun sloop under the command of Captain Knight, with an urgent message from Admiral Hotham who was still on patrol off Quiberon Bay 120 miles to the north. The letter was dated 8 July and informed Maitland that the Admiralty now had definite news that Napoleon intended to escape to America with his family. Maitland was ordered to keep the most vigilant lookout for him, and 'if you should be so fortunate as to intercept him, you are to transfer him and his family to the ship you command, and there keeping him in careful custody, return to the nearest port in England (going into Torbay in preference to Plymouth) with all possible expedition.' He was warned that the whole operation must be conducted with the strictest secrecy.
These new orders placed an increased responsibility on Maitland's shoulders. He was not only required to prevent Napoleon leaving France at all costs but must endeavour to get him on board the Bellerophon. He was aware that the future peace of Europe might depend on his actions. In the circumstances he decided not to reveal the British Government's intentions to Savary and Las Cases, a decision which has led some French commentators to accuse him of cynical double-dealing. Captain Knight was invited to sit in on the discussions which went on for nearly three hours. Savary and Las Cases kept plying Maitland with questions, and tried to persuade him that the peace of Europe would best be served if Napoleon were allowed to depart quietly from France. They said he wished only to retire and to spend his days in obscurity and tranquillity. When Maitland made it clear that he had strict orders to prevent the frigates leaving Rochefort they suggested that Napoleon be allowed to depart on a neutral, unarmed vessel, but again Maitland was discouraging. He set out his position in a letter which he gave them to take back with them. It was his formal answer to Bertrand's letter: 'In reply, I have to acquaint you, that I cannot say what the intentions of my Government may be; but the two countries being at present in a state of war, it is impossible for me to permit any ship of war to put to sea from the port of Rochefort.' With regard to the suggestion that the emperor proceed in a merchant vessel he was equally adamant. He could not allow a person of such consequence to pass in any vessel, under whatever flag, without the sanction of his commanding officer, Sir Henry Hotham.
Around noon Savary and Las Cases returned to Napoleon on the frigate Saale. Two hours later Captain Knight departed in the Falmouth and headed back to Admiral Hotham, taking with him Bertrand's letter and a despatch from Maitland with his appraisal of the current situation. From the British point of view Maitland's conduct of the negotiations had been masterly. He had given nothing away, but he had learnt much from his discussions with the two envoys. In particular he had noted that the hardening attitude of the government in Paris and the approaching Allied armies were putting Napoleon under increasing pressure to escape from France. Maitland's problem was that he did not have a sufficiently strong force under his command to blockade the three approaches to Rochefort effectively. He later admitted that, from the moment he learnt that Napoleon and his party were on the frigates and intended to proceed to America, 'my duty became peculiarly harassing and anxious'. The Bellerophon was capable of stopping the two French frigates, but the Myrmidon and Slaney, which were only 20-gun sloops, were no match for them. Moreover it was impossible for the three ships to intercept every small vessel in the vicinity if Napoleon should decide to escape in a chasse-marée (a type of French coastal vessel notable for her speed under sail) as some of his followers were urging him to do.
A few hours after Savary and Las Cases had departed, Maitland sailed the Bellerophon up the channel towards the French frigates and dropped anchor in Basque Roads close to the Ile d'Aix. He noted with some concern that the sterns of the frigates were loaded with vegetables, that small boats were constantly going to and fro between the ships and the shore, and that the position of the yards and sails of the frigates indicated that they were ready to put to sea at any moment. That evening Maitland took precautions to ensure that Napoleon did not give him the slip. He sent two boats to row near the frigates all night with orders to signal to him if the ships got under way. He ordered the Bellerophon and the Myrmidon to be anchored with slip buoys on their cables for immediate release; and he arranged for the topsail and topgallant yards to be hoisted and their sails held with thin yarn so they could be broken out and set at a moment's notice.
The next morning there was no sign of further activity on the frigates. Alarmed by reports that Napoleon was now planning to escape on a smaller vessel, Maitland decided he was not in the best place to keep watch on all the escape routes and gave orders for the Bellerophon to weigh anchor. With the Myrmidon and Slaney in company, they worked their way out to sea and resumed their patrol of the seaward approaches to Rochefort. On 12 July his flotilla was joined by welcome reinforcements: the Daphne, 22 guns, and the 20-gun sloop Cyrus. Maitland ordered the Daphne to take up a position at the entrance of the southernmost channel, the Passe de Mamusson, and the Cyrus to keep a watch on the northernmost channel, the Pertuis Breton. For the next two days the Bellerophon prowled restlessly back and forth, intercepting local craft and always keeping a wary eye on the frigates.
In the meantime Napoleon continued to hold discussions with his aides and delayed making any decision. When Savary and Las Cases returned to the frigate Saale after their visit to the Bellerophon, the rest of the day was spent discussing the implications of Maitland's letter and the possible options. Two of his followers thought Napoleon should return to the army but Bonaparte said that he did not want to be the cause of a single cannon shot. Most of his followers, notably Bertrand, Savary and Las Cases, were in favour of his surrendering to the British. One man, Captain Ponée, had an interesting alternative. Ponée was the commander of the Méduse, the other large frigate in the anchorage, and he proposed the following course of action:
I will go ahead of the Saale under cover of darkness, take the Bellerophon by surprise as she lies at anchor, grapple with her broadside on, and thus prevent her moving. The engagement might last two hours, and the Méduse, being a frigate of sixty guns while the Bellerophon has seventy-four, cannot fail to be sunk, but meanwhile the Saale could take advantage of the wind offshore that blows every evening, to get away, and the twenty-two gun corvette and advice-boat that made up the rest of the English flotilla would not be able to stop the Saale, a frigate of the first rank, carrying twenty-four guns in batteries and carronades of thirty-six on the bridge.