Schmitz did not include the comments of Rumsfeld or Wolfowitz because, Schmitz said, they hadn’t said anything “relevant.” If so, asserted the Washington Post editorial board, “investigators must not have asked the right questions. To offer just one example: Mr. Roche recounted that Mr. Rumsfeld called him in July 2003 to discuss his then-pending nomination to be secretary of the Army and ‘specifically stated that he did not want me to budge on the tanker lease proposal.’”154 In a transcript of Schmitz’s office’s interview with Rumsfeld, obtained by the Washington Post, investigators asked the Defense Secretary whether he had approved the Boeing tanker lease despite widespread violations of Pentagon and government-wide procurement rules. “I don’t remember approving it,” Rumsfeld said. “But I certainly don’t remember not approving it, if you will.”155 Investigators then asked Rumsfeld about the fact that in 2002 President Bush asked his Chief of Staff, Andy Card, to intervene in the Pentagon negotiations with Boeing (a major Bush contributor). “I have been told,” Rumsfeld said, “that discussions with the President are privileged, and with his immediate staff.”156 The Post said much of the rest of the discussion was blacked out on the transcript. None of Rumsfeld’s comments were included in Schmitz’s report.157
What’s more, Schmitz’s team did not interview anyone outside the Defense Department, despite the well-documented involvement of several high-profile lawmakers, administration officials, and the President himself.158 Schmitz also failed to interview Edward Aldridge, the Pentagon official who approved the deal. His report noted that Aldridge failed to get proper approvals before moving forward with the deal, but said the approvals were in place anyway. In a Senate hearing on the scandal after the report was released, McCain said to Schmitz, “So, Mr. Aldridge basically lied,” to which Schmitz replied, “We know generally that… he and others within the Air Force and [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] were trying to treat the appropriations language as if it had waived a whole bunch of legal requirements.” 159 McCain was incredulous. “Don’t you think it would have been important to have his testimony?” he asked Schmitz. “My staff couldn’t reach him,” Schmitz eventually asserted, saying he had sent him a registered letter and left him some voice mails. “You couldn’t get a hold of him through Lockheed Martin?” asked a stunned McCain. Despite his subpoena power, Schmitz never used it to compel Aldridge to be interviewed. “I don’t think it’s a mystery,” Senator John Warner told Schmitz. “He’s on the board of a major defense contractor, it seems to me he’s locatable.” In fact, it is very difficult to imagine Schmitz could not reach him at Lockheed Martin. Schmitz’s brother, John P. Schmitz, former deputy counsel for George H. W. Bush, served as a registered lobbyist for Lockheed Martin from July 2002 until January 2005,160 overlapping the Boeing deal and probe. He served on a team of two to three lobbyists from Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, which was paid at least $445,000 during that time.161 There is nothing, however, to suggest that John P. Schmitz had any direct connection to the tanker deal or to Aldridge.
In the end, Senator Grassley told Joseph Schmitz that his handling of the scandal “raises questions about your independence” as Inspector General.162 Ashdown of Taxpayers for Common Sense said, “We now know that at the highest levels of the Pentagon and the White House, the wheels were greased to direct billions in corporate welfare to the Boeing Company.”163 But, he added, because of “the inspector general’s reluctance to grill the secretary of defense” and “overzealous redactions… we are now left with more questions than answers.”
With his office embroiled in multiple scandals, Schmitz served his official notice in June 2005 that he was recusing himself from Blackwater-related issues because he was in talks with the company about possible employment. The brief memo did not reveal what led to the disclosure or his dealings with Blackwater, but it came exactly a year after Schmitz returned from a nine-day trip to Baghdad, where he worked with Blackwater’s prized client Paul Bremer on establishing a network of twenty-nine inspectors general (with Schmitz’s “very best Von Steubens”) for Iraqi ministries ahead of the “handover” of sovereignty.164 To some observers, having these two officials develop a system of oversight for a “new” Iraqi government would be like asking two foxes to decide how the chicken coop should be protected.
In November 2004, Schmitz gave Bremer the Joseph H. Sherick Award, given to an individual “who contributes to the mission of the inspector general.” 165 Schmitz said he gave Bremer the award because he was “a man of vision and a man of principle.”166 In accepting the award, Bremer said, “I felt from the time I got [to Iraq] how important it was, given the history of corruption under Saddam Hussein… to try to get this concept of trust in government established right from the beginning.”167 In early 2005, Schmitz delivered a lecture to the Order of Malta Federal Association at Bremer’s church in Bethesda, Maryland, during which he told a story from Frances Bremer’s (Paul’s wife) novel Running to Paradise.168 A few months later, in November 2005, Schmitz and Paul Bremer would be united again, as Blackwater hosted Bremer at a “fundraiser” for victims of Hurricane Katrina.169
On August 26, 2005, Schmitz officially informed his staff that he was leaving the Pentagon to work with Blackwater. In an e-mail he sent out, he signed off, saying, “May the Creator acknowledged in our Declaration of Independence who has endowed each of us with those unalienable rights that we as Americans consider ‘first things,’ continue to bless each of you.”170 Just as Schmitz began his work at Blackwater, in September 2005, the company reeled in lucrative government contracts, deploying heavily armed Blackwater forces on U.S. soil, in the wake of the worst “natural disaster” in U.S. history.
CHAPTER NINETEEN
BLACKWATER DOWN: BAGHDAD ON THE BAYOU
THE MEN from Blackwater USA arrived in New Orleans right after Hurricane Katrina hit on August 29, 2005. The company beat the federal government and most aid organizations to the scene as 150 heavily armed Blackwater troops dressed in full battle gear spread out into the chaos of New Orleans. Officially, the company boasted of its forces “join[ing] the hurricane relief effort.”1 But its men on the ground told a different story.2 Some patrolled the streets in SUVs with tinted windows and the Blackwater logo splashed on the back; others sped around the French Quarter in an unmarked car with no license plates. They wore khaki uniforms, wraparound sunglasses, beige or black military boots, and had Blackwater company IDs strapped to their bulging arms. All of them were heavily armed—some with M-4 automatic weapons, capable of firing nine hundred rounds per minute, or shotguns. This despite police commissioner Eddie Compass’s claim that “Only law enforcement are allowed to have weapons.”3