These bullets have been a source of some controversy in Congress, and the manufacturer has lobbyists trying to get them approved for use by U.S. forces, calling it “an issue of national security.”91 In fact, Thomas says he was threatened with a court-martial for using unapproved ammunition after he was mistakenly understood by a Pentagon official to be an active-duty soldier. 92 It was the first recorded kill using the bullets, which had been tested for several years at the Armed Forces Journal annual “Shoot-out at Blackwater” at the company compound in Moyock.93 After Thomas allegedly killed the Iraqi using the APLP round, he sounded like a paid spokesman on a commercial for the bullets. “I’m taking Le Mas ammo with me when I return to Iraq, and I’ve already promised lots of this ammo to my buddies who were there that day and to their friends,” Thomas told an interviewer during a leave from Iraq. “This is purely for putting into bad guys. For general inventory, absolutely not. For special operations, I wouldn’t carry anything else.”94 The Armed Forces Journal excitedly chronicled Thomas’s experience with the rounds, calling them “reason enough for Pentagon officials to insist that Special Operations Command immediately begin realistic testing of the blended-metal ammunition.”95 Thomas later posted on his MySpace Web page a link to a news article about his use of the armor-piercing bullets in Iraq with a note that said:
OSAMA BIN LADEN IS MY BITCH
And here is why [story link]
Fucker wants me dead now.96
As mercenaries roamed the country freely, there was no official explanation given to Iraqis as to who these heavily armed, often nonuniformed forces were. It would be a year before Bremer would officially get around to issuing an order that defined their status—as immune from prosecution. Iraqis killed or wounded by these mercenaries had no recourse for justice. Many Iraqis—and some journalists—erroneously believed that the mercenaries were CIA or Israeli Mossad agents, an impression that enraged citizens who encountered them. The mercenaries’ conduct and reputation also angered actual U.S. intelligence officers who felt the mercenaries could jeopardize their own security in the country.97 As 2003 neared its end, much of Iraq lay in ruins, while the oft-promised “reconstruction” projects, ostensibly to be funded by Iraqi oil revenue, were overwhelmingly nonexistent or flat-out failing. For mercenary companies, though, business was booming. In early 2004, the situation in Iraq would begin to descend even further into chaos, bringing more business for private military companies.
In February 2004, Bremer’s office engaged in an incredible act of either vast miscalculation or wanton (and deadly) disregard for reality. According to a report at the time in the Washington Post, “U.S. officials courting companies to take part in the rebuilding insist that security is not an issue for contractors and said accounts have been overblown. ‘Western contractors are not targets,’ Tom Foley, the CPA’s director of private-sector development, told hundreds of would-be investors at a Commerce Department conference in Washington on Feb. 11. He said the media have exaggerated the issue.”98 On the contrary, Foley asserted, “The risks are akin to sky diving or riding a motorcycle, which are, to many, very acceptable risks.”99 By mid-March 2004, mercenary firms were basking in what had become a tremendous “sellers’ market” in Iraq. “What it cost to hire qualified security personnel in June (2003) is a fraction of what it costs today,” said Mike Battles, founder of the U.S. firm Custer Battles,100 which was contracted to guard the Baghdad airport.
On March 18, word hit the streets that the United States was putting up a contract worth $100 million to hire private security to guard the four-square-mile Green Zone and its three thousand residents.101 “The current and projected threat and recent history of attacks directed against coalition forces, and thinly stretched military force, requires a commercial security force that is dedicated to provide Force Protection security,” read the solicitation. 102 As Blackwater’s Bremer detail succeeded in keeping its high-value “noun” alive, the company’s management seized opportunity in the chaos of Iraq. They opened several new offices, in Baghdad, Amman, and Kuwait City, as well as headquarters in the epicenter of the U.S. intelligence community in McLean, Virginia, that would house the company’s new Government Relations division. Plans were under way to expand Blackwater’s lucrative business in the war zone in a profit drive that would end with four American contractors dead in Fallujah, Iraq in flames, and Blackwater’s future looking very bright.
CHAPTER SIX
SCOTTY GOES TO WAR
BY EARLY 2004, Blackwater was firmly entrenched in Iraq, while Erik Prince, Gary Jackson, and other Blackwater executives were aggressively exploring new markets and contracts for their thriving business. Its men were guarding the head of the U.S. occupation and several regional CPA offices around Iraq, giving Blackwater a pole position for prime contracts, and its forces were the envy of the burgeoning private security business in Iraq. This was made possible by the ever-worsening security situation in the country. In January 2004, the Financial Times reported, “Contractors say there have been more than 500 attacks on civilian and military convoys in the last two months alone.” That month, Blackwater executive Patrick Toohey “advised” businesses looking to operate in Iraq, “You should be adding a further 25 percent for security.”1 Some began comparing the mercenary market in Iraq to the Alaskan Gold Rush and the O.K. Corral. As The Times of London put it, “In Iraq, the postwar business boom is not oil. It is security.”2 Almost overnight, a once-despised industry was emerging from the shadows and thriving, and Blackwater was at the head of the pack. Eager to expand its business and profits, the company quickly put the word out that it was looking for highly qualified ex-Special Forces guys to deploy in Iraq. The company offered wages to “qualified” candidates that dwarfed basic military pay—and almost any other job’s salary. A contractor with Blackwater could make $600 to $800 a day, in some cases even more. Plus, the short-term contracts the company offered—two months—meant that a small fortune could be made quickly in a defined number of days. In many cases, contractors could extend for more terms if they wished. There were also major tax breaks offered to would-be mercenaries.