There was one other thing the Navy was looking for: a chance for retribution. It wanted to get the Soviets back for Gudgeon and other acts of harassment against U.S. subs. Admiral jerauld Wright, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, posted a framed proclamation outside his office:
Whereas, the presence of unidentified submarines in the approaches to the United States has been frequently reported, and
Whereas, the submarines have been uncooperative in declaring either their identity or their intent as is required by the customs and usages of honorable seamen, and
Whereas, tangible evidence that these surreptitious operations are being conducted would result in appropriate embarrassment to those involved.
Therefore, I do hereby pledge to donate one case of Jack Daniels Old No. 7 Brand of Quality Tennessee Sour Mash Corn Whiskey, made as our fathers made it for seven generations at the oldest registered whiskey distillery in the United States, established 1866, to the first Scene of Action Commander in the Atlantic who produces evidence that a "non U.S. or known friendly" submarine has been worn out.
/s/ Jerauld Wright
Admiral, U.S. Navy
In May 1959, Wright declared a winner. The USS Grenadier (SS-525) chased a Soviet submarine near Iceland for nine hours before forcing it to surface, completely "worn out." Grenadier's skipper, Lieutenant Commander Theodore F. Davis, got the whiskey, and the Navy had surfaced its first Soviet sub.
More important, the Navy also had its first good look at a Soviet missile boat. Davis had trapped one of the Zulus that had been converted to carry missiles. He also brought home photographs and sound tapes, and the Navy quietly broadcast his success all over Washington. In fact, later that year President Eisenhower's special assistant for science and technology, George B. Kistiakowsky, noted in his diary that he had received "a very interesting account of the ways in which our Navy gets intimate information on the Soviet naval activities," a briefing that was so "hush-hush" he couldn't put it on paper. "Someday," he mused, "it will make a very exciting news story."
Something else came out of these dogfights as well. There was a growing realization on both sides that as much as the snorkel had revolutionized submarine warfare, it had massive limitations. As long as submarines could be held down and their crews choked, they were still too vulnerable. For the U.S. sub force, it was clear that Rickover's nuclear navy could no longer remain a curiosity. It was time for his submarines to move to center stage.
Rickover's revolutionary boats had a seemingly endless source of power. Reactors split atoms and turned water into steam, steam enough to power a propeller shaft and run a submarine longer and faster than any diesel boat ever could. They also could generate their own oxygen and scrub excess carbon dioxide from their air. Holddowns would no longer be a threat. These boats would he able to stay underwater indefinitely.
Nuclear attack subs began to take on missions that closely mirrored those pioneered by diesel subs, invading Soviet waters with impunity. The orders remained similar. Drive close to Soviet craft, even closer to Soviet shores. Take any risks. Don't get caught.
For instance, in late 1960, Commander William "Bill" Behrens drove the USS Skipjack (SSN-585) into the mouth of the long ship channel that led to Murmansk. He got so close to another Soviet port that his officers could look through a periscope and see the pier only 30 or 40 yards away. That may have been closer than even the Navy would have liked-at least closer than the Navy ever wanted to admit. Indeed, just before Behrens snuck into the channel, crewmen saw one of his officers disable a mechanical tracing device that plotted the sub's movements so there would never be any written record of the incursion. Later on that same mission, Behrens also monitored the sea trials of one of the first Golf-class subs, a diesel-powered boat that was the first Soviet submarine designed from the start to carry ballistic missiles. Behrens, who initially struck some of his crew as stuffy and dull, had proven that he could play as dangerously as other cap twins, that he could he one man on shore and quite another at sea, especially at sea in Soviet waters.
In this sense, Behrens was not alone. This was an era of daredevil nuclear-sub captains who seemed rooted in the no-holds-barred diesel heritage. Over in the Pacific, a couple of captains briefly turned off their reactors to cut down on the background noise when they tried to get sound signatures-and suddenly found their own boats drifting way too deep. Another sub lurking at periscope depth got humped by a Soviet sub that started to surface from below.
One of the most urgent goals was to find out where the Soviets stood in their quest to develop nuclear-powered subs. Though some top U.S. officials were reluctant to believe it, it gradually became clear that the Soviets were starting to turn out three types: "Hotels," each armed with three ballistic missiles; "Echos" carrying cruise missiles meant for use against other ships; and "November" attack subs. Still, early surveillance showed that these subs were so crude and noisy that the U.S. Navy had taken to using a shorthand built on a convenient acronym, nicknaming them the "HENs." And neither the Golfs nor the Hotels were anywhere near ready to head out on patrol.
It was clear that the United States had won the race to position missile subs within range of enemy shores. Four diesel boats with the primitive Regulus missiles had led the way in the Pacific in 1959 and 1960, and the first Polaris sub, the USS George Washington (SSBN- 598), ventured out into the Atlantic in November 1960. In no time, the Regulus subs were spending so much time lurking in terrible weather off the Soviet coast that their crews took to jokingly calling themselves the "Northern Pacific Yacht Club." One, the USS Growler (SSG-577), was heavily damaged when it ran into an ice floe near the Kamchatka Peninsula, just off the Soviet base at Petropavlovsk. Before long, the men designed lapel pins showing an anchor crossed by three semaphore flags, labeled "S," "M," and "F." The initials stood for the typical cry during a storm: "Shit! Man! Fuck!"
Throughout these deployments, the Polaris program was pushing on. President Eisenhower had given William F. "Red" Raborn, the garrulous rear admiral in charge of Polaris, unprecedented authority, allowing him to bypass the usual red tape and to hire anyone he decided could do the work of designing and building Polaris subs well, and fast. There were predictable snags with new technology. (Raborn's aides showed enough humor to compile a classified film of Polaris bloopers test missiles that barely rose at all and others that just cartwheeled.) But Polaris succeeded, and timetables were met, largely because the program was given top priority. Everyone was working such ungodly hours that the submariners came to believe that the new boats were designated SSBNs not because "SS" stood for submersible ship, "N" for nuclear power, and "B" for ballistic missiles, but because the initials stood for "Saturday, Sunday, and a Bunch of Nights."
While Raborn and his team labored to ensure that the subs were built, it was up to Rickover to oversee the installation of the nuclear reactors and the crews that would run them. Rickover was looking for men who would be unflinching in a crisis, men willing to pay attention to exact detail, men who were as meticulous as he was. He was convinced that was the only way to ensure reactor safety, and he knew that reactor safety was the only way to maintain public support for his nuclear-powered submarines. With all of this, he was helping to create a submarine force that would be unparalleled. Now Rickover's men were about to drive the most lethal subs ever built, subs that would prove crucial to the balance of power in the cold war.