The first Polaris subs were 382 feet long, about 60 feet longer than nuclear attack subs, and they carried sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles that could be aimed at targets more than 1,000 nautical miles away. They also were given two crews, blue and gold, who went out on alternating 60-day cruises-keeping the subs at sea as much as possible. The duty was tough. The 1,000-mile missile range forced these boats to ride the rough waters off the northern coast of Europe to stay near targeting distance of Moscow. Their job was to "hide with pride," to be an intercontinental missile force lurking and ready to fire a second strike if the nation were attacked and land missiles destroyed."[1]
For their part, the Soviets had only a few nuclear-powered subs, and those so ill designed that men were dying. One submarine suffered such a horrible reactor accident that it was redubbed the Hiroshima by survivors. By the time the Soviets tried to locate missile launchers in Cuba in 1962, the United States had moved so far ahead that it was able to quickly scramble several Polaris submarines, ultimately nine in all, to points within shooting distance of the Soviet Union."
The United States had the clear advantage, but for how long? The crisis might have taught Soviet leaders that it would be impossible to build a nuclear missile force on land near U.S. shores. But by scrambling the Polaris subs into firing position, the United States had also shown the Soviets a better way to accomplish the same thing.
Three — Turn To The Deep
Flying on the wild success of his Polaris program, Admiral Red Raborn began looking ahead, thinking about new, imaginative ways of furthering nuclear deterrence. He quickly turned to the dreamer within his ranks, a young civilian whom the admiral had plucked from obscurity a few years earlier and anointed the chief scientist for Polaris.
John P. Craven was only in his midthirties when Raborn found him, but it was his job to look over the shoulder of everyone involved in the development of the missile subs, to find the problems, to come up with the answers. He was, as he put it, "chief kibitzer."
The moniker fit. Talking a torrent, his ideas usually overflowing, Craven was the kind of man who could dissect a blueprint and still have time to spout a few lines of poetry, biblical verse, or one of his endless series of self-scripted maxims of the sea. Sometimes he'd mix verse with maxim and sing the result aloud. He preached fantasy amid military discipline; he carried romance to the mechanics of nuclear war.
It was a role Craven had been bred to. He was the product of a family that reached back to Moorish pirates on his mother's side and was divided on his father's between Presbyterian ministers and Navy officers yawning in the family pew.
The Navy brass was the part of the lineage that most of the Cravens liked to boast about, the part that went back to Tunis Agustas MacDonough Craven, who skippered the Civil War Union ship Tecumseh when it was rammed by a Confederate mine during the Battle of Mobile Bay and inspired Admiral David Farragut's memorable cry to the remaining fleet: "Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead."
In noble tradition, Tunis drowned at the helm. Most of the Craven clan would stop the story there. John Craven, however, delighted in presenting a footnote: that Tunis died while fighting to get off the sinking ship ahead of the harbor pilot. And only John Craven boasted of what the rest of his family dared not even whisper: the pirate blood he inherited from his mother's side.
That John Craven was going to he different was evident from the moment he made his first appearance on the planet, landing in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn. It was a Halloween night, a fact that his paternal relatives chose to ignore as they instantly christened him Navy, fully intending that he would live a life of rigid military discipline. That their plan was doomed to fail became clear some fifteen years later when Craven was rejected by the Naval Academy. It wasn't for lack of intelligence. He'd skipped through to high school by the time he was eleven years old. But once there, he took the rogue's route to popularity. He convinced his much older classmates that he was merely small for his age and then proceeded to win their respect by becoming the class wise guy, the kid who was too tough to do homework.
Ultimately, he fulfilled at least part of his family's expectations. He never earned a Naval Academy degree, but he did get his commission in the reserves and he became an ocean engineer. From then on, he took to sermonizing about the deep, about underwater maneuvers that most of the Navy passed off as impossible, or at least hugely improbable. He expected no easy converts. But like any minister preaching the coming of a miracle, Craven was drenched in the faith that he would ultimately be proven right.
Now Rahorn was handing Craven a nearly blank check to do what he did best-come up with ideas, as many as he could. By 1963 Craven was working hard on Rahorn's vision of an Advanced Seabased Deterrent Program. As his first step, he set aside $1 million a year, thinking that would he just enough to create a small political science program to dissect the strategy of deterrence. In the process, he discovered he had hired just about every political scientist specializing in strategic defense.
With the rest of his budget and his new platform, he began to peer into an untouched realm of the deep, working with his group to scribble out ideas: missiles that could he placed miles below the surface on the ocean floor; submarines that could reach down and see through the murky depths, carry cameras into untraveled and alien waters.
Most of the Navy greeted Craven's visions with hardly a yawn. What little study of the deep there had been before had long ago been shoved into a corner, the purview of a small group of oceanographers. Admirals saw operating in deep water as more difficult than the manned outer-space launches that, at that moment, held the nation's attention hostage. The Navy's best submarines could reach down just 1,000 to 1,500 feet or so. Go deeper, and there was certain death by implosion from punishing sea pressures great enough to quickly crush even the mighty Polaris subs.
The miles below the Navy's operational slice garnered about as much respect as the average landfill. The Navy's main design branch, the Bureau of Ships, listed deep submergence as tenth on its list of top ten priorities-giving the deep number ten only because the list wasn't any longer. Even Admiral Rickover, wrapped as he was in the public mantle of Navy innovator, was uninterested in plumbing the depths.
Craven's deep-submergence group was on the fringe, but eager to work. A team of his scientists was asked to help test the USS Thresher (SSN-593), the first of a powerful new class of nuclear attack submarines designed to go somewhat deeper than the other subs of the day. On April 10, 1963, Thresher failed during a test dive to 1,300 feet. As best as anyone could tell, a piping failure and a subsequent loss of propulsion set off a series of events that caused the submarine to sink, killing all 129 men aboard, including four men from Craven's team. Craven got the news as he was sitting with Harry Jackson, an engineering officer who had helped test the sub shortly before her last dive, and who had been present for every other deep dive.
Jackson sat, repeating over and over, "I should have been there." But Craven was relieved that Jackson had missed this, the nation's first loss of a nuclear submarine, along with three of Craven's own men who had been scratched from the test for lack of space.
1
Although not even the president knew where the Polaris missile subs patrolled at any given time, they did have prescribed operating areas to run through, boxes made up of hundreds of miles of ocean that kept these first missile subs close to the 1,000-mile launch range of their targets.
There were also crucial safeguards to make it impossible for one madman, acting on his own, to start a nuclear war. First, any launch order had to match exactly the authenticator codes that varied by date and were kept on board the sub behind two sets of locked doors in a safe welded to a bulkhead in the control room. Two men held the combinations to open the safe and check the authenticator codes, which they showed to the CO and XO. Once the order to launch had been verified, three men had to use separate keys, also kept in safes, to actually launch a missile. The CO's key allowed him to activate the ship’s fire control system. The XO’s key armed the missile release mechanisms. Then, the mission control officer could use his key to fire the missiles. The process was supposed to take about fifteen minutes.