General Malik flew back to Rawalpindi that night in the cold, throbbing body of the C-130. He wanted to go to sleep, for he was tired after the long day, but he found that he could not. He was turning over in his mind the information that Commander Hassan had provided. More than that, he was thinking about the secrets the young warrior had not divulged.
But General Malik understood: Somehow, the brotherhood of Al-Tawhid had found its way inside the American compartment. It knew when a secret agent arrived in Karachi and whom he met. These simple men in their shalwar khamiz had not cracked the American code themselves, but someone had helped them. How was this possible? General Malik did not know the answer yet, but he set his mind to discovering it. What he would do with this secret, once he learned it, he did not know.
The plane bucked and shuddered as it skirted the summer thunderstorms of the Indus Valley. The general was somewhere else. He was thinking of his biggest unsolved mystery from his early days as director general. It dated back to 2005. The Americans were working their antiterrorism traces very hard in those days. They were pressing everywhere for information that they could load into their computers-to follow money flows and communications links and all the other strings that would lead them to Al-Qaeda. Of course, the Pakistanis were trying to help officially, just enough, but they had held something back, too.
It had become obvious to General Malik in the course of 2005 that the Americans had obtained the identities and communications protocols of several of the ISI’s most sensitive contacts with Al-Qaeda. This was evident because the Americans began targeting these men, and eventually killed two of them. What troubled the general was that only someone with an intimate knowledge of ISI tradecraft and Pakistani dialects could have uncovered these links. They had been disguised by codes within codes. That was when the general had begun to worry that a gungrat, a dung beetle, was loose in his stores of information.
General Malik had paid an unofficial visit that year to Washington, where he had called on the man in the CIA he knew best, a rotund and genial officer named Cyril Hoffman, who always understood more than he said.
“Are you inside our tent, Cyril?” the general had asked.
They were sitting in the CIA cafeteria, surrounded by signs warning agency personnel that a foreign national was in the area. Hoffman had leaned toward his Pakistani friend.
“Of course we are,” the American had whispered, his voice as soft as spun sugar. “But you can’t see us, and you can’t feel us, and you’ll never find us. So my advice is to stop worrying about it. You’ll only make yourself unhappy if you go poking around.”
Perhaps that had been the right advice, but General Malik had launched his investigations anyway, silently at first, and then more openly. He was looking for a Pakistani who understood signals intelligence, someone with the intellectual creativity to disassemble an elaborate puzzle. They called in a dozen suspects-military and intelligence officers, a senior executive of the leading wireless telephone company, several professors, a retired ISI officer who had been living in India. The investigators ruined the careers of most of these people, with their rough and stupid questions, but it couldn’t be helped.
Eventually, sometime in 2007, General Malik had given up, just as Cyril Hoffman had advised. The Pakistani leak seemed to have dried up, that was part of it. But Malik had concluded that Hoffman was right. This inside source was too well hidden. Perhaps the truth about this source would emerge one day, on its own, but tearing up the garden to try to find him was unwise.
Malik’s own private name for the case was “the Cheshire Cat,” because he could see the grin, but not the cat itself. It made him mad, still, to think that the Americans could vex him.
When he arrived at his office in Islamabad the next morning, General Malik summoned Homer Barkin, the CIA station chief. He told him that in four hours the Foreign Ministry would send a formal statement to the embassy declaring him and two other members of the CIA station at the embassy persona non grata because of their intelligence activities. They would be ordered to leave the country. He advised Barkin to leave that afternoon, to avoid unpleasant consequences at the airport.
Barkin was bewildered. He had met in this office with the ISI chief only a few days before. They had talked of friendship and trust.
“What the hell is going on?” he asked. “What is this all about?”
General Malik shook his head. He had a distant, wistful smile, as if remembering better times.
“It seems that you really do not know.”
“Know what?” asked the station chief.
“My poor, unfortunate Mr. Barkin: Your expulsion is a message to whoever in Washington thinks it is acceptable to send secret warriors with bribes into the territory of an ally. If it is true that you did not know about this operation in Karachi, then that is the greatest outrage. I suggest that you resign, sir, when you get home. These actions will have consequences. That is what you should tell Langley.”
Barkin, still astonished, sputtered a response.
“I protest, on behalf of my agency. We have done nothing wrong.”
“Thank you, Mr. Barkin. This is nothing personal, I assure you. Now you should leave. I fear that Pakistanis will be very angry. I would not be surprised if there were demonstrators tomorrow at the entrance to the diplomatic zone near your embassy, expressing their outrage. The embassy should take precautions, I think.”
12
The Dubai Airport had a hungover, half-deserted look when Marx arrived. She made her way past bleary-eyed South Asians in transit, who were wandering up and down the corridor like weary birds looking for a place to alight. The customs hall was nearly empty, except for the Filipina “Marhaba” girls who were arrayed to greet any VIP visitors who chanced to arrive. The city beyond had the look of a new luxury car, its seats still wrapped in cellophane, standing in an empty showroom with no customers in sight.
“Things are looking up in Dubai,” insisted her taxi driver, an Indian from Kerala. He offered to show her an apartment that she could sublet, half price, no, quarter price. Marx took his card and then told him to be quiet. As the driver weaved along the airport road across the new downtown, they passed a dozen dazzling apartment towers that appeared to have few if any tenants. Would anyone ever live in them, or would they gradually decay into ruins of chrome and glass, with blowing sand caking the entryways and the elevators creaking to a halt for lack of maintenance?
Marx checked in to her hotel, a vast place made to look like the architect’s fantasy of an ancient Arab city. It had been immaculate a few years before, every surface of brass and wood polished and sparkling, so that if you rubbed one of the urns that decorated the lobby, you might expect Aladdin himself to pop out. Now the mahogany furniture was losing its stain, and some of the fancy carpets were discoloring from the sun and the foot traffic.
Marx loved Dubai the way earlier generations of intelligence officers had embraced Beirut or Hong Kong. It was a city that existed at the margins, between East and West, between the imaginary and the real. Plus it had good air service, and you could drink the water. She liked it even more now that the bubble had burst and the place had come back to earth. The hotels that were never full, and the parking lots that were still sprinkled with Mercedes cars that had been abandoned when their owners couldn’t make the payments.
She showered and changed, and lay on her bed for a while staring at the ceiling, thinking about how she would handle the interrogation of Hamid Akbar. An hour before the meeting, she rode the elevator down to the ground floor, which opened onto one of the ersatz canals that linked the buildings in this imaginary Medina. She took a seat in the stern of a dhow that served as a water taxi; behind her loomed the towers of a make-believe Arabian fortress.