There was an additional small number of tanks that was not reflected in the above totals that were assigned to command elements of the VIII Mechanized Corps.
IX MECHANIZED CORPS
Even though the IX Mechanized Corps was formed in the first wave in November 1940, at the start of German invasion it was one of the weakest mechanized corps in the Red Army. Its commander was pugnacious Maj. Gen. Konstantin K. Rokossovskiy, recently released from NKVD jail. Major combat formations of IX Mechanized Corps were the 20th Tank, 35th Tank, and 131st Motorized Rifle divisions. Part of the reserves of the South-Western Front, this corps was located ninety miles from the border, having its regular garrisons in and around Novograd-Volynskiy and Shepetovka, along the pre-1939 border.
At the start of war, the corps had 298 tanks, all of them light and older models, most of which were gathered from training facilities, consisting of 269 BT and T-26 tanks and 29 very light reconnaissance T-37, T-38, and T-40 tanks. There were 11 light and 62 medium armored cars, 1,069 wheeled vehicles of all types, 133 tractors, and 181 motorcycles. The dearth of armored combat vehicles caused Rokossovskiy to bitterly call his tank divisions the “so-called tank divisions” in his memoirs.
Rokossovskiy was bitter for good reason. Among the tanks in his corps, there was not a single modern one. His 20th Tank Division numbered only 36 light tanks. The 35th Tank Division numbered 142 light tanks, 40 of which were armed only with a machine gun. Ironically, the 131st Motorized Rifle Division was stronger in tanks than the 20th Tank Division, having 122 tanks, including 18 T-37 swimming reconnaissance tanks and 21 outdated BT-2s.
In the 35th Tank Division, seventy-nine T-26s were armed with 45mm cannons, and an additional forty mounted only machine guns. Four T-26s had 37mm cannon, and ten T-26s did not have any armament at all, being used only for towing.
In his memoirs, Marshal Rokossovskiy wrote:
By the beginning of war our corps had an almost complete complement of personnel, but was not fully equipped by primary materieclass="underline" tanks and wheeled transportation. We had no more than 30 percent of quantities allocated under the TO&E. Combat vehicles were worn out and not ready for prolonged operations. Basically, the [9th Mechanized] Corps was not combat ready under these circumstances. Neither the headquarters of Kiev Special Military District nor General Staff could have been ignorant of this situation.
XIX MECHANIZED CORPS
The XIX Mechanized Corps under Maj. Gen. Nikolay V. Feklenko was a virtual twin to Rokossovskiy’s IX Mechanized. Feklenko’s corps was also part of reserves of South-Western Front and was also located along the old border, centered on towns of Zhitomir and Berdichev. Major combat units of this corps were the 40th Tank, 43rd Tank, and 213th Motorized Rifle divisions. The chart on the next page illustrates the approximate strength of XIX Mechanized Corps at the start of the war.
Colonel Tsibin, commander of 43rd Tank Division, described the condition of his unit on the eve of war in the following manner:
Division had 711 out of 1,253 senior commanders; 1,054 out of 2,172 junior commanders; 6,669 out of 6,451 lower enlisted; for a total of 8,434 out of 9,876 allotted, i.e. 50–60% of commanders, over 100% in privates. Core of division was formed from the veteran 35th Tank Brigade and was well trained. Command personnel were also well trained, many being veterans of the Finnish War. Motorized rifle regiment was approximately 70% short of command personnel. Lower enlisted personnel of 1st battalions of both tank regiments were mainly new inductees who just finished their basic training.
Combat vehicles were fully ready for combat operations, with complete crews, but were technically seriously worn. Out of wheeled vehicles on hand, almost 150 were in Berdichev, inoperable; partially under repair at the depots and partially without drivers…. There were approximately 40%–50% of required spare parts at division’s supply depot.[19]
Tsibin describes the vehicles available to 43rd Tank Division (see Table 13).
The 37mm ADA cannon did not have any ammunition.
The overall condition of the XIX Mechanized Corps resembled that of the IX. The motorized rifle divisions of both corps were similarly short of wheeled transport and prime movers for artillery:
[W]heeled vehicles on hand did not by any means provide division with means to begin campaign and upload all the supplies. Because of this, majority of personnel from the motorized rifle regiment… did not have transportation. In the similar manner, the soldiers of first battalions of tank regiments could not depart, not having equipment.[20]
Diluting the offensive power of the XIX Mechanized Corps were the numerous very light T-37 amphibious reconnaissance tanks, comprising roughly 60 percent of corps’ total tank strength. These tanks, being hardly more than tankettes, were armed with machine guns only and had very light armor.
1ST ANTITANK ARTILLERY BRIGADE
The 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade under Maj. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko was a brand new unit. After evaluating successes of German panzer formations in Poland and France, leadership of the Red Army created a number of antitank artillery brigades, designed to counteract German panzer threat. Moskalenko’s brigade, bearing numeral one, was also the most combat-capable of the five such brigades of the South-Western Front.
In his memoirs, Moskalenko described his unit:
The 1st Antitank Artillery brigade was comprised of two artillery regiments, combat engineer battalion, transportation battalion, and smaller service support units. Each regiment had two battalions of 76mm cannons (24 pieces), three battalions of 85mm cannons (36 pieces) and one air defense artillery battalion (eight 37mm cannon and 36 DShK machine-guns). Therefore, brigade possessed 48 76mm cannons, 72 85mm ones, 16 37mm cannon and 72 DShK machine-guns. We were completely equipped with ammunition, including armor-piercing.[21]
Likewise, Moskalenko’s brigade was fully equipped with wheeled and tracked vehicles.
Similar to other military districts, the majority of units under Kirponos’ command experienced manpower shortages. Colonel Alexei V. Vladimirskiy, chief of Operations Section of Fifth Army’s headquarters, described the manpower situation in his army on the eve of war: