Rifle divisions… had on the average 10,000 men, or 70%, of assigned personnel. These divisions were staffed at 68–70% with officers, 70–72% with noncommissioned officers, and 66% of lower enlisted…. Shortages of officers were planned to be remedied by calling up reserve officers from the eastern regions of Ukraine; shortage of noncommissioned officers—by promoting privates and, in part, by [calling up] noncommissioned officers of former Polish army born in the western regions of Ukraine, after re-training them at division-level training course; shortages of lower enlisted personnel was to be fully covered by residents of western Ukraine, with the exception of truck and tractor drivers, who were to be assigned from eastern Ukrainian regions.
Significant portion of senior commanders of the [Fifth] Army, as well as commanders of larger units who survived Stalin’s purges, participated in World War I and Civil War, and some of them—in fighting with Japanese aggressors or with Finns in 1939–1940—had combat experience, but those who were elevated to their command positions relatively recently did not yet fully know their missions in accordance with the operational plan. Headquarters of armies and rifle [corps] were headed by experienced commanders and were cohesive; however, headquarters of [lower-echelon] units were composed of officers with little experience, needing additional training. Readiness of cadre noncommissioned officer and lower enlisted personnel could be acknowledged as quite satisfactory, but the lower enlisted men called up in the fall of 1940 only finished their training on squad level.[22]
Shortfall in personnel in the Kiev Special Military District was mirrored by chronic and systemic shortages of equipment, vehicles, and armaments. Lieutenant General Mikhail A. Parsegov, chief of artillery of the South-Western Front/Kiev Special Military District, on July 14, 1941, presented an extensive report to the chief of artillery of the Red Army. The tables below were created from his report.[23]
In addition, Separate Railroad Corps (arriving from another district in May–June of 1941) was short fifteen thousand rifles and other infantry weapons; at least fifteen construction battalions (formed locally and arriving from different districts) each needed one thousand rifles.
Note: The Kiev Special Military District also had 213 old 107mm cannons that were not on any table of organization. Including these field pieces, Kiev Special Military District was 88.56 percent equipped with artillery. According to the same report, 487 artillery pieces, or almost 14 percent of on-hand totals, were in need of depot-level overhaul.
A problem plaguing air defense artillery in particular was a shortage of ammunition, especially the armor-piercing type.
The above-mentioned report noted that quantity and quality of equipment varied based on when the unit was created:
Older units… were well-provided with all weapon systems, with the exception of 37mm air defense cannons…. The corps-level artillery regiments and those belonging to first tier of Reserve of High Command were fully equipped, the shortages in the [Kiev] District were experienced by units formed in the second wave. The new formations, created during April–May, had the following shortages:
• Rifle divisions had their 76mm cannons of model year 1927 replaced up to 80 percent by cannons of 1902/30 year-model.
• Seven rifle divisions were short of 122mm howitzers of 1910/30 year-model.
• Six new divisions were short of 152mm howitzers of 1909/30 year-model.[24]
Parsegov also presented examples of shortages of specialist equipment.
• Binoculars: Old rifle divisions had 65% of allotted amounts; new rifle, tank and motorized rifle divisions and artillery brigades—between 45–50%; corps artillery regiments—100%; Reserve of High Command artillery regiments—75%; all other units—20–40%
• Theodolites: All old artillery regiments—100%; new regiments (formed in 1941)—50–75%; artillery brigades—30–35%.
• Periscopes: Old artillery regiments, corps artillery regiments, and artillery regiments of Reserve of High Command—85–100%; units formed in 1941—40–45%; [antitank] artillery brigades—up to 35%.
• Topographical surveying equipment—15–50%.
• Search Lights—20–50%.[25]
Specialist units like reconnaissance, combat engineers, and signal units were short of equipment necessary for accomplishing their specific tasks. In particular, the reconnaissance units of the Fifth Army had only 25 percent of allocated motorcycles, 48 percent of armored cars, and 54 percent of T-37 and T-40 tanks.[26] Likewise, a majority of units of the Kiev Special Military District, corps and below, had 50–60 percent of radio equipment and 60–70 percent of telephone equipment. The situation was slightly better in army- and front-level formations—roughly 75–80 percent of assigned norm.[27]
CHAPTER 5
Creeping up to War
HOW WAS IT THAT THE SOVIET UNION, country with an acknowledged most-extensive intelligence network, was caught unaware of the impeding danger that came close to bringing the communist state to its knees within the first six months of war?
Winston Churchill’s critique was harsh:
War is mainly a catalogue of blunders, but it may be doubted whether any mistake in history has equaled that of which Stalin and the Communist chiefs were guilty when they… supinely awaited, or were incapable of realizing, the fearful onslaught which impended upon Russia…. As far as strategy, policy, foresight, competence are arbiters, Stalin and his commissars showed themselves at this moment the most completely outwitted bunglers of the Second World War.[1]
For decades after the war, the government of the Soviet Union steadfastly maintained its position that Germany’s attack came as a complete and total surprise. Generations of Soviet children born after the war grew up to believe that myth. The Western governments, knowing the truth, politely kept the silence. After all, the Cold War enemy was yesterday’s ally in the fight against Hitler.
These claims of ignorance do not hold up under even the most perfunctory scrutiny. Even without having a widespread and well-placed spy network, how could a country miss over three million potentially hostile soldiers along its borders or completely misinterpret intentions of their leadership?
When Adolf Hitler signed into being Directive No. 21, the “Case Barbarossa,” these plans for attack against the Soviet Union contained a caveat:
In certain circumstances I shall issue orders for the deployment against the Soviet Russia eight weeks before the operation is timed to begin. Preparations… will be concluded by 15th May, 1941. It is of decisive importance that our intention to attack should not be known.[2]
German leadership understood very well that massing a large army on the enemy’s doorstep would not go unnoticed for very long. Presence of widespread troop concentrations and railroad movements bringing them forward would be impossible to conceal. Therefore, what needed to be concealed was not the troops’ presence, but their purpose.