The official explanation for having large-scale German troop concentration in Eastern Poland was given as rest and recreation and training for continuing operations against England, out of reach of the Royal Air Force. As Anthony Reed described it: “Every possible means was used to create a huge double-bluff, by presenting Barbarossa itself as ‘the greatest deception operation in military history,’ aimed not at the Soviet Union but at Britain, and this remained the principal cover story right up to the end.”[3]
Training for Operation Sealion (Unternehmen Seeloewe in German), a proposed invasion of the British Isles which was cancelled on October 12, 1940, began again in the spring of 1941. Along with highly visible land forces training, the German Air Force made numerous reconnaissance flights over England, with the sole intent of being noticed.
However, a serious monkey wrench was thrown into Hitler’s plans by none other than one of his closest companions, Rudolph Hess. Neanderthalish Hess, Hitler’s political deputy and Nazi “old fighter,” held a privileged, albeit diminishing, position at Hitler’s side. On May 13, Hess flew a Messerschmitt Bf 110 plane to England and parachuted out of it over Scotland on an ill-conceived solo peace mission. Hess’ intentions were to bring England and Germany to the peace table; but, realizing that Hess was not completely mentally stable and acting without authorization from Hitler, British authorities disregarded his overtures.
While creating few minor and temporary ripples in the two affected countries, Hess’ escapade had a significant effect on Josef Stalin. The Soviet dictator never believed that Hess’ mission was not authorized and maintained an opinion that Germany and England were conspiring behind his back.
As Adolph Hitler raged over his old comrade’s indiscretion, Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels, the evil genius behind Hitler’s Propaganda Ministry, threw all of his considerable energy in the deception efforts. Anthony Reed quotes from Goebbels’ diary: “I am having an invasion of England theme written, new fanfare composed, English speakers brought in, setting up propaganda companies for England, etc.”[4] German invasion of the small Greek island of Crete in the morning of May 20, 1941, served as an example of German continued war against England and provided Goebbels with ample fuel to pull off a deception effort worthy of his talents.
With Hitler’s full knowledge and approval, on June 13, 1941, Goebbels published an article in Voelkischer Beobachter, the official newspaper of the Nazi party, full of bombastic threats against England. In mid-afternoon on the same day, a great stage-managed show of seizing and withdrawing this edition of the newspaper was conducted across Berlin. According to Reed, “Goebbels then placed himself in public ‘disgrace’, to complete the illusion that he had committed a grave indiscretion.” It was quite obvious that he was quite satisfied with his efforts:
Everything goes without a hitch. I am very happy about it. The big sensation is under way. English broadcasts are already claiming that our troop movements against Russia are sheer bluff, to conceal our plans for an invasion of England…. At home, people regret my apparent faux pas, pity me, or try to show their friendship despite everything, while abroad there is feverish conjecture. We stage-managed it perfectly. Only one cable got through to the USA, but that is enough to bring the affair to the attention of the whole world. We know from tapped telephone conversations between foreign journalists working in Berlin that all of them fell for the decoy.[5]
Another aspect of the German misdirection campaign was Hitler’s apparent concern about the Soviet Union building a line of strong fortifications along the border and the rumor that Hitler was about to make a list of demands and concessions from the Soviet Union. This last factor confirmed in Stalin’s mind the pattern of Hitler’s modus operandi: ask first, then demand, and then, if needed, attack. This pattern was present in Hitler’s previous adventures with Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
Although Hitler cautioned for the utmost secrecy, Operation Barbarossa did not stay hidden for long. Within one month, indications of still-distant, but growing, threat, came trickling into the Soviet state. Despite the post-war Soviet claims, there were plenty of warnings, coming from diverse and independent sources. One of the early bell-ringers was Richard Sorge, Soviet deep-cover agent stationed in Tokyo, Japan. Sorge was born in the old Tsarist Empire, son of a Russian mother and a German engineer father working in Russia. In 1898, shortly after Sorge’s second birthday, his family moved to Germany. When World War I broke out, young Sorge fought in the German army, receiving an Iron Cross for his bravery. Like many young men of his generation, cast adrift in the aftermath of the world war, Sorge became disillusioned with the present system and became a willing convert to socialism. While living in Russia and idealistically working for Comintern (Communist International), he was recruited into Soviet military intelligence in 1929 by the chief of Fourth (Intelligence) Directorate of NKVD, General Jan Berzin (real name Peteris Kyuzis, a Latvian). His background as a decorated war veteran won Sorge wide admittance into German military circles. The ticket in was Sorge’s left leg, almost one inch shorter as the result of a WWI wound, combined with his outward outspoken Nazi views. In his solid cover as a freelance reporter for several German newspapers, most notably the respected Frankfurter Zeitung, Sorge was posted to Japan, where he penetrated the highest level of German diplomatic community and established reliable information sources in Japanese government.
Within two weeks of Case Barbarossa being approved, Richard Sorge got wind of this dangerous development and began a stream of warnings to Moscow. Despite his best efforts, Sorge’s warnings were ignored, and the tone of his communiqués became frustrated and desperate. Why were Sorge’s reports unheeded?
Richard Sorge’s former direct superior, chief of Fourth Directorate Jan Berzin, was caught up in the wave of purges. Implicated as Trotskyite, he was imprisoned in 1935 and executed in 1939. Close personal and professional associates of General Berzin shared his fate. Berzin’s former deputy and replacement, Semyon P. Uritskiy, also perished in NKVD basements and, in turn, Uritskiy’s replacement, Semyon G. Gendin. In 1937, many Soviet intelligence agents operating abroad were recalled to Moscow where they were arrested and executed. These men who had done so much for their country were not trusted by the country’s leadership on the grounds that they were likely to have been suborned while living in capitalist countries and turned into double agents.
Besides the loss of experienced intelligence officers, their carefully nurtured networks were destroyed along with them. This decimation of intelligence-gathering resources immediately and negatively reflected on the quality and quantity of intelligence information coming into the Soviet Union.
Sorge was one of those who received instructions to return to the Soviet Union. However, he had access to multiple western European newspapers highlighting the espionage “show trials” in the Soviet Union and naming those convicted and executed, many of whom were personally known to Sorge. An intelligent man, Sorge developed a strong suspicion that he would share their fate. A severe blow to Sorge came in 1940, when newspapers around the world publicized the death of his friend Ignac Poretsky, an NKVD defector assassinated in Switzerland in September of that year.[6]