I recall that before the war in those areas, often the officers from other units, who were outside the military garrisons, would disappear…. In the spring of 1941, under commissar’s orders I had to make a presentation dedicated to the Red Army Day in one of the villages near Kovel. I arrived at the village, introduced myself to the kolkhoz chairman and went to the community center, where many people gathered. I delivered my presentation. During the presentation, several shots were heard outside. It was possible that the villagers, unhappy with the Soviet authority (kolhozes) decided to test, represented by me, the moral fortitude of the Red Army…. The atmosphere was quite tense, and a thought occurred to me that it would be prudent to get out of there while I was still alive. Even though I was invited to spend the night there, I insisted on leaving and set off for Kovel in a horse cart, holding a pistol inside my coat all the way there, while appearing nonchalant.[17]
Several other Soviet memoirists record instances when wives of Red Army officers shopping or running errands in western Ukrainian towns were verbally accosted by local residents. The common thread of whispered threats was: “Just wait till Germans get here. They’ll show you!” It was the atmosphere of not whether the war with Germany will happen, but when will it happen.
The feeling of oncoming war ran prevalent among the Red Army personnel as well. Colonel Ivan K. Bagramyan was transferred in December 1940 from Moscow to the headquarters of Kiev Special Military District to take over Operations Section of Headquarters of Kiev Special Military District. Since this reassignment took place in the middle of a school year, his wife and two daughters remained in Moscow, allowing the girls to finish off their school year before moving to Ukraine in the summer of 1941.
Knowing that Bagramyan was in Kiev alone, his direct supervisor, Maj. Gen. Maxim A. Purkayev invited Bagramyan to his apartment to ring in the new year. Shortly before being assigned to his current position, General Purkayev served as a military attaché in Germany. This posting gave Purkayev an insight into the situation in Germany and its military capabilities, giving him ample cause for concern.
Apparently, Purkayev’s wife, Antonia, shared some of her husband’s apprehensions, for she raised a toast: “Especially, that there would be no war!” Despite the cheerful occasion for their dinner, table conversation was serious. Purkayev related to Bagramyan that major issues were being looked at during a recent high-level military conference in Moscow:
Some issues are closely scrutinized. Stalin himself is interested in the progress of the conference. Each meeting is attended by some member of Politburo…. It appears that the Central Committee [of Politburo] is taking into account the complexity of the international situation and growing threat from the fascist Germany. This explains increased attention to the defensive potential of [our] country. And without doubt, there will be major changes in our army life.[18]
In the first week of 1941, commander of Kiev Special Military District, Georgiy Zhukov, returned to Kiev from Moscow’s conference. Within days of his return, Zhukov called together a meeting that included senior command personnel of the military district, army commanders along with their members of military councils and chiefs of staffs, the same representative groups from corps and divisions, commanders and chiefs of staff of fortified districts, and commandants of military schools.
Zhukov opened the proceedings with statement: “The threat of war more and more hanging over our Motherland.” He was no longer hiding the fact that Germany was to be considered a potential enemy; therefore, the main emphasis of the five-day meeting was dedicated to reviewing and updating the district’s plans for defending the border in the near future. Zhukov particularly stressed the fact that these plans must be made counting on only the resources at hand:
Some comrades forget that any, even the most brave, plans must be based on realistic capabilities. While planning measures in case of war, we could not base them on what our army will have in the future. What if the war starts now? We must be realistic and make plans based on means and abilities which we possess today [emphasis added].[19]
At the end of the conference, Zhukov officially announced shuffling of command personneclass="underline" General Sovetnikov, who was commanding the Fifth Army, was appointed as District’s deputy commander in charge of fortified districts. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. M. Potapov, commander of the IV Mechanized Corps. In his turn, Potapov was replaced by Maj. Gen. A. A. Vlasov, who stepped up from command of the 99th Rifle Division. As for himself, shortly after this conference, Zhukov departed for Moscow to take over the General Staff, with Zhukov’s replacement, Col. Gen. M. Kirponos, arriving shortly.
Friction between Purkayev, Bagramyan, and Kirponos began within several days of latter’s arrival. After reviewing plans for covering the border, Kirponos disagreed with them. He was convinced that there would be some warning, at least several days, before the hostilities begin. Therefore, he thought that too many troops were placed too close to the border. He wanted to have at least one division per army to be held back as a mobile reserve. Purkayev offered a counter that if Germans attack without warning, they will overcome the weak defending units, and there will be no opportunity to organize the defense. Kirponos’ counter was purely rhetoric: “We must not allow the enemy to surprise us. What do we have intelligence for?”[20]
The intelligence services, both NKVD and military GRU, had indeed been sounding warnings. Since the beginning of January 1941, Soviet intelligence began noticing significant movement of German forces towards the western Soviet border. Everything that Gen. F. I. Golikov, chief of intelligence directorate of the General Staff, would report to Timoshenko and Zhukov, they would in turn report to Stalin:
However, I do not know what intelligence information Gen. F. I. Golikov was reporting to J. V. Stalin, bypassing the [Minister] of Defense and Chief of General Staff, and such reports were frequent.
I can only say: J. V. Stalin knew significantly more than the military leadership. But even from what he was reported by the military intelligence sources, he could see undeniable increase of the threat of war, but he did not do this, and he, overestimating his abilities, continued farther on the false trail [emphasis added].[21]
In May, People’s Defense Commissar M. Timoshenko sent a directive to military districts, outlining their responsibilities in case of a sudden attack by the Germans. Since the official plans for covering the border were being worked on, Timoshenko sent out a special directive to increase readiness of western border districts. In accordance with the plan, the rifle corps were to form the first echelon, mechanized corps, the second echelon. In the Kiev Special Military District, additional defensive positions were to be built thirty to thirty-five kilometers east of the border. The second echelon, occupied by five rifle and four mechanized corps, awaited movement orders from General Staff. A district’s command post was also ordered built in Tarnopol.
After the German invasion of Yugoslavia on March 27, senior commanders of covering armies were called for a working conference to Kiev to work out a new defensive plan that called for more troops directly on the border to repel the German first strike. This work was conducted in such secrecy that only generals and officers directly involved in planning could have access to the materials. They had to write and type everything personally. Bagramyan ruefully remembered that he had to brush up on his half-forgotten skills with a typewriter.