At approximately the same time, Timoshenko and Zhukov submitted a joint request to Stalin to call up round-out personnel to bring rifle divisions to full strength. Initially, Stalin denied this request on the grounds that such call up could be interpreted by Germans, intentionally or not, as mobilization and cause for war. In the end of March, however, Stalin relented and authorized a call up of five hundred thousand men earmarked for border districts in an attempt to bring each rifle division to at least eight thousand men. Several days later, an additional call up of three hundred thousand men was authorized. Training periods for them were to last from May to October. This allowed a majority of first-line rifle divisions to be brought up to eight to nine thousand men.[22]
On April 26 they received orders to form five antitank artillery brigades, but only the 1st Brigade under Maj. Gen. Konstantin Moskalenko was formed by the start of hostilities. Additionally, the I Airborne Corps was being formed from the 204th Airborne Brigade, already assigned to the district, plus the 211th Airborne Brigade, which was being transferred from Far East. Additional manpower for the airborne corps came from the excess enlisted men left over after four rifle divisions of the Twelfth Army were reorganized into mountain-infantry divisions.
In the second half of May, command of Kiev Special Military District received instructions from Moscow informing them of arrival of the XXXIV Rifle Corps from the North-Caucasus Military District, consisting of four rifle and one mountain infantry division. The first trains bearing this unit were expected on May 20. On May 25, further order announced relocation of the XXXI Rifle Corps from the Far East. According to Bagramyan:
At the end of May, significant portion of officers from district’s headquarters were occupied in meeting and housing the arriving units. Trains came in one after another. The Operations Section turned into a dispatcher section, gathering all information about movement and condition of units. Divisions were arriving combat capable, even though their commanders complained about not having enough mid-level officers and lack of combat vehicles, transportation, and communication means.[23]
Taking these factors into consideration, during March and April the General Staff was feverishly working on updating their defense plans to reflect German movements. Based on these updated plans, Timoshenko and Zhukov reported to Stalin that there were not sufficient Soviet forces in the western districts and requested urgent mobilization of several armies from internal districts and begin moving them west. “After long and quite pointed conversation, J. V. Stalin [emphasis added] permitted two armies to be moved west under the utmost secrecy and under guise of training.”[24] At the same time, NKVD received Stalin’s instructions to step up construction of airfield networks; however, the workforce was permitted to be employed on these works only after finishing construction of the fortified districts.
At the end of May, the General Staff issued orders to commanders of western districts to urgently begin preparing command posts, with further instructions in the middle of June to move their command elements to these posts. They were to be moved by June 21–25, depending on a district.
Bagramyan picks up the tale:
In the very beginning of June we found out that command element of the 19th Army has been formed and situated in Cherkassy. [Author’s note: it is interesting that formation and deployment of a new army in district’s territory was done from without district command’s knowledge.] The new army will include all five divisions from 34th Rifle Corps and three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps from the North-Caucasus Military District. This army will be headed by commander of the North-Caucasus Military District Lieutenant-General I. S. Konev and held under direct control of [Timoshenko]. A day later the General Staff gave us a heads-up: there will be another army coming, the 16th, under Lieutenant-General M. F. Lukin. It will be transferred from Trans-Baikal region during June 15th to July 10th.[25]
Bagramyan remembered being relieved that two more armies would be available to defend the border. Besides reinforcing the Kiev district, two other armies were being moved to its northern neighbor, the Western Special Military District.
As new troops continued rolling into the district, training of units already there stepped up at increasing pace. On May 26, Kirponos, Bagramyan, and other officers conducted an inspection tour of the Sixth Army. Observing maneuvers of a tank company from IV Mechanized Corps, Kirponos did not like what he saw: “One of T-34s slowly moved through the obstacle course. The tank, directed by an inexperienced hand, was barely navigating it. Two other vehicles fared slightly better.” Following movements of the tanks, Kirponos winced: “Not good!” General Morgunov [commander of Kiev Special Military District tank troops] sighed: “It’s not surprising, Comrade Commander. The drivers did not have opportunity to familiarize themselves with the new vehicles. They have not even had three hours of driving time with them.”[26]
This same unit, while conducting itself better during shooting practice, did poorly during the night march:
Along the route of tank regiments, we saw large number of halted vehicles along the roads. The farther we went, the more [broken down vehicles] turned up…. When division commander arrived and began making a report about the progress of the night march, [Kirponos] interrupted him: “Why, Colonel, you have such a mess? Your tanks are halting on the march; what would happen in combat?” Division commander attempted to explain that only the most-used T-26 and BT tanks, mainly from the training park, had halted, due to lack of spare parts.[27]
Amid heightened activity,
The intelligence section of Kiev Special Military District began receiving reports each more concerning than the other. [Chief of Intelligence] Colonel G. I. Bondarev practically became the most frequent [Kirponos] visitor. We noticed that after almost every conversation with him M. P. Kirponos became even grimmer. There were plenty of reasons for worry… [Around June 10th] commander called together the Military Council at which [Bondarev] reported all he knew.[28]
Bondarev talked about construction of numerous airfields on the other side of the border and laying roads directly to the Soviet border. Since April there had been increased movements of German forces and large number of trains were arriving every day. He was seconded by General Ptukhin, commander of the air forces, who reported ever-increasing overflights by German aircraft in violation of Soviet air space.
Kirponos told the officers that while general movement towards the border was forbidden, army commanders received orders to have their units ready. Several divisions could be shuffled around without drawing attention from Moscow. Purkayev brought up an issue that greatly concerned him—the fact that the second-echelon corps were not up to strength, and an especially alarming situation was with lack of wheeled transport and tracked artillery movers. In case of sudden attack, a majority of artillery units would not be able to move forward a significant part of their cannons.
Kirponos replied that such addition of manpower and assets from the civilian sector would only be possible with an announcement of mobilization. He called it “an issue of state policy” and the Soviet government’s attempt not to give Hitler any chances at provocation. Even partial mobilization would not be possible to conduct in secrecy. Purkayev, though, managed to convince him and Commissar Nikolay Vashugin to return artillery regiments and engineer battalions from training camps to their parent divisions. Besides these measures, Kirponos gave orders to each covering division to move forward small detachments and take up positions in the fortified districts.