In his memoirs, Arkhipenko remembered that they first flew together north to Brest and then along the border south to Rava-Russkaya. Again, why had they flown so far out of their area of operation, all the way to Brest? Did they have specific instructions, or did they get lost? Arkhipenko does not clarify this detail. He recalled that the whole border looked aflame, as if the very earth itself was burning. West of Vladimir-Volynskiy, they were fired upon by German antiaircraft artillery, and Arkhipenko developed a severe distaste for flack.
After the other three fighters dove into the clouds to escape fire, he broke off and flew east. Soon, Arkhipenko encountered another solo Soviet aircraft like his, and they flew together to Velitsk. They landed among the nightmarish landscape of burning aircraft, collapsed buildings, mangled bodies of the dead, and screaming wounded.
Arkhipenko’s first combat sortie is another vivid example of confusion into which the Soviet Air Force was thrown: a flight of fighters manages to get into the air without instructions from any controller; seemingly aimlessly flying in and out their area of operations, and returning without engaging the enemy.
Despite an undoubtedly severely damaging first strike, numbers of Soviet fighters managed to get into the air, especially from the airfields located deeper in the Soviet territory. Upon return, many of them increasingly found their airfields damaged and more aircraft put out of action in consecutive attacks. Russian historian A. V. Isayev writes: “Destruction of significant part of the aircraft park of KSMD [Kiev Special Military District] on the airfields was only a matter of time. If the decisive success was not achieved during the first strike, the German pilots succeeded during second, third, and sometimes, tenth strike.”[23]
Soviet reinforcements flying in from deeper in Ukraine were forced to land on the airfields already known to and damaged by the Germans. The already mentioned 17th Fighter Regiment based at the Velitsk airfield was finished off on the third day of war:
In the morning of the third day, a dozen Me-109 fighters arrived. They formed two circles: six aircraft turning right and six—to the left, and began diving as if on exercises. They shot true, confident, as if at [practice] targets. As the result, there were ten combat-capable I-153 and one MiG-1 remaining, the rest of aircraft, numbering around 150—were damaged. They included… aircraft from Zhitomir Regiment [reinforcements].[24]
Since a majority of Kiev Special Military District’s fighter regiments, fifteen out of seventeen, were assigned to forward armies, a majority of them were destroyed in the first few days of war, virtually ceding the skies over the border region to the Germans.
The Soviet aircraft that did manage to get airborne were immediately outnumbered by German Bf 109 fighters from Jagdgeschwader 3 under Maj. Gunther Lutzow. OberLieutnant Robert Olenik from the 1st Squadron of this wing scored their first air victory at 0430 hours, shooting down a Soviet I-16 fighter.
German aircraft of the Luftflotte 4 were still to meet large numbers of Soviet aircraft. Further east, aircraft of Soviet 17th, 19th, and 44th Air Divisions began moving closer to the border. Despite definitely gaining initiative, the German Air Force did not achieve complete air domination in western Ukraine, as it did in Byelorussia in the area of operations of Western Special Military District. Already on the very first day of the war, despite terrible odds, the 62nd Air Division of the Fifth Army was attacking advancing German units in the area of Ustilug, dropping 134 50-kilogram bombs.[25]
In the above-mentioned action in the afternoon of June 22, aircraft from 17th and 89th Fighter regiments escorted bombers from 62nd Bomber Division. While they were away, Germans visited their home airfields, destroying thirty-six fighter planes and seven bombers. Another Soviet joint fighter/bomber attack by thirty-six bombers supported by fighters was carried out at 1840 in the same area. This mission cost dearly: fourteen bombers were lost to German fighters.[26]
Despite individual bravery demonstrated by Soviet fliers, their efforts initially came largely to naught due to lack of cohesive actions and coordination. Senior air force leadership was out of touch with its subordinate elements from the very first moments of the invasion. Accompanying the rest of Kiev Special Military District headquarters personnel, General Ptukhin and his Air Force staff were also on the move to Tarnopol at the start of the invasion. Ptukhin’s detachment started off in Bagramyan’s wheeled column in the morning of June 21. Until they set up shop in Tarnopol, Ptukhin left a small detachment in Kiev, under his deputy chief of staff, Major General Maltsev, along with a small group of staff officers and several cipher clerks. This follow-on element was to maintain communications with all the airfields in Kiev Special Military District until the main air force command post in Tarnopol would be set up.[27]
While Ptukhin’s staff was frantically working on setting up their new command post, air units around Tarnopol were taking severe beating. Then-Colonel Nikolay S. Skripko related description of events at the nearby Buchach airfield, related to him by then-Major I. S. Suldin, commander of the 87th Fighter Regiment belonging to the 44th Mixed Air Division of the Sixth Army.
Even though normally a majority of married pilots and staff went to their families on Saturdays, on this particular weekend, division commander, most likely arriving at correct analysis, did not permit anyone to leave their units. The 87th Fighter Regiment had the following combat-capable aircraft: sixty older I-16 fighters and four new MiG-3s. Ten other I-16s were to be transferred to the 36th Air Division the next day, and pilots from that unit were also at the airfield.
Skripko writes:
A telegram was received from division [headquarters]… at 0430 [hours]: “According to reports, German aviation is bombing border towns of Peremyshl, Rava-Russkaya, and others. Bring the regiment to combat readiness.” The duty officer, squadron commander Senior Lieutenant P. A. Mikhailyuk, sounded alarm. Pilots, engineers, technicians, and maintenance crews took their places near the fighters…. The pilots from the 36th Air Division took places at their just-received ten planes and started up their engines. It seemed that combat readiness was full. But a serious mistake was made, for which many were made to suffer. Approximately at 0450 hours, barely visible in the raising sun, a two-engine bomber was spotted approaching from the east. Everybody thought that the division commander was coming to check on regiment’s readiness. But that was a German Ju-88 bomber. On a strafing run, he attacked the planes lined up in a row. Seeing the crosses on the bomber, the soldiers around the airfield opened rifle fire on him. But it was too late. The German plane accurately dropped small fragmentation bombs and fired machine guns at the personneclass="underline" out of ten lined-up aircraft, seven completely burned down, two pilots sitting in the cockpits were killed, and two maintenance crewmen were wounded.[28]
Even though Bagramyan’s column managed to get to Tarnopol on time, at least according to Bagramyan’s claims, Ptukhin and his staff fell behind and only made it to Tarnopol around 1400 hours on June 22. This meant that for almost ten crucial hours, the commander of the Air Force of Kiev Special Military District was isolated on the road and out of touch with his command [emphasis added].[29]